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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Air Force is having a difficult time retaining their technical officers, who 
are critical to the success of their research, development, and acquisitions of major military and 
defense systems.  A statistical analysis is conducted on survey data collected, and the analysis 
seeks to explain the reasons why officers, mostly junior in rank, leave the Air Force after only a 
short time on active duty.  This retention problem leads to fewer higher-ranking officers, since 
the military only hires from the bottom up.  Results of the research show that about 47% of jun-
ior officers have intent to leave the Air Force after their initial commitment, which is 4 to 5 
years.  With nearly half of the Air Force’s incoming officer leaving after their initial commit-
ment, the problem is very serious.  Job satisfaction and the closely related Air Force assignment 
system are shown to be the primary problems for junior officer retention.  The thesis concludes 
with recommendations to Air Force leadership on where to focus their retention efforts.  Special 
emphasis is given on how the Air Force may address tangible components of job satisfaction.  
Policy change recommendations that affect satisfaction levels with the assignment system are 
also given. 
Thesis Supervisor: George Roth, Principal Research Associate 
Sloan School of Management & Lean Aerospace Initiative 
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Note on Format: 
 
This thesis has been designed in color, but has been optimized to insure printing in either 
color or black and white will produce readable results.  In the text, references to colored parts of 
a figure will be in this format: red (dark gray).  The first, “red” in this case, is the color of what is 
referenced if it is a color print or digital copy you are looking at.  The second, “dark gray” in this 
case, is the “color” of what is referenced if it is a black and white print or digital copy you are 
looking at.   
Note that for cross-tabulations, the total lines are in a dark gray always.  This gray does not 
match the grays that result in a black and white print.  The colors (or resulting grays) in any table 
are only for the data, and not the totals. 
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Nomenclature and Acronyms 
61S 61 The AFSC prefix for Scientists. 
62E 62 The AFSC prefix for Engineers. 
63A 63 The AFSC prefix for Program Managers. 
Active Duty AD To be a member of the full-time USAF. 
Active Duty Service Commitment ADSC A contract to the USAF that requires active duty service, 
usually given in exchange for something from the Air 
Force (such as a university scholarship). 
Active Duty Time ADT Completed number of years on active duty; same as 
YOS. 
Air Force (short form of USAF) AF The short form for USAF. 
Air Force Base AFB A major base of operations for the USAF. 
Air Force Institute of Technology AFIT A graduate-level military school for mostly technical 
degrees.  Located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, OH. 
Air Force Materiel Command AFMC The acquisitions command of the USAF.  Its HQ is 
located at Wright-Patterson AFB, Dayton, OH. 
Air Force Personnel Center AFPC The center responsible for all personnel and human 
resources issues for the military, including the 
assignment of duty locations and jobs.  It is located at 
Randolph AFB, San Antonio, TX. 
Air Force Reserves  The component of the USAF, under the Air Force 
Reserves Command, that is comprised of part-time 
military who otherwise are part of the civilian sector. 
Air Force Space Command AFSPC The space acquisitions and operations command of the 
USAF.  Its HQ is located at Peterson AFB, Colorado 
Springs, CO. 
Air Force Specialty Code AFSC The code assigned to personnel which identifies their 
career field. 
Captain CPT The third rank up in the officer class. 
Colonel COL The sixth rank up in the officer class. 
Command (or Major Command)  One of the 9 major division of the USAF that includes 
multiple Air Force Bases working to accomplish a similar 
mission. 
Commissioned  The official signed declaration and associated swearing-
in ceremony that makes one an officer in the military. 
Commissioned Years of Service CYOS CYOS equals YOS for any officer without enlisted time 
on active duty.  If an officer was previously enlisted, their 
YOS is greater than their CYOS. 
Company Grade Officer(s) CGO The ranks of Second and First Lieutenants, as well as 
Captains.  The junior most of the officer class. 
Department of Defense DoD One of the major departments under the US presidency 
responsible for national defense of the homeland and 
US interests abroad. 
Enlisted  A non-officer rank of the military.  Enlisted forces 
comprise the majority of the military. 
Field Grade Officer(s) FGO The ranks of Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel.  
The senior level of the officer class.  (The four ranks of 
Generals comprise the highest "executive" class of 
officers.) 
First Lieutenant 1LT The second rank up in the officer class. 
Headquarters HQ In the case of the Air Force HQ, it is located at the 
Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
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Lieutenant LT A generic grouping of all Second and First Lieutenant 
officer ranks. 
Lieutenant Colonel LTC The fifth rank up in the officer class. 
Major MAJ The fourth rank up in the officer class. 
Officer  The leadership class of the military. 
Officer Performance Report OPR The name of the report that records the annual 
evaluation of an officer in the USAF. 
Officer Training School OTS A officer commissioning source that allows those who 
already have a Bachelor's degree to join the AF as a 
2LT after undergoing officer training.  OTS graduates 
incur a 4-year ADSC. 
Permanent Change of Station PCS Being permanently relocated (or reassigned) to a new 
duty location.  Essentially all new job assignments 
require a PCS. 
Reserve Officer Training Corps ROTC A officer commissioning source that allows for officer 
training currently while the candidate is pursuing a 
Bachelor's degree at a traditional university or college.  
Successful completion of ROTC culminates in a 
commission to 2LT on or after graduation from the 
university or college, and a 4-year ADSC.  Most 
graduates of ROTC are technically considered Active 
Duty Reserve Officers. 
Scientists and Engineers S&E's A way of referring to 61S Scientists and 62E Engineers 
in the USAF. 
Second Lieutenant 2LT The lowest rank in the officer class. 
Secretary of the Air Force SAF The civilian presidential cabinet member who is 
ultimately responsible for the USAF and reports to the 
Secretary of Defense. 
Secretary of the Air Force,  
Acquisitions Office 
SAF/A
Q 
The office under the SAF responsible for major defense 
acquisitions, and also ultimately responsible for the 
scientists, engineers, and program managers that 
accomplish these acquisitions in the USAF. 
System Program Office SPO A standard unit for development and acquisitions of a 
major Air Force system. 
Temporary Duty TDY The military equivalent of a business trip, which may be 
a day or week trip to a contractor, but also includes 
deployments to war zones or being sent to a 
professional or military school for advanced training. 
United States Air Force USAF The air and space component of the Department of 
Defense of the United States of America. 
United States Air Force Academy USAFA A officer commissioning source that allows for officer 
training currently while the candidate is pursuing a 
Bachelor's degree at a military undergraduate school.  
Successful completion of ROTC culminates in a 
commission to 2LT on or after graduation from the 
university or college, and a 5-year ADSC. 
Years of Service YOS Completed number of years on active duty; same as 
ADT. 
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Air Force Officer Rank Structure1 
O1 
Second Lieutenant 
2nd Lt. (2LT) 
 
O7 
Brigadier General 
Brig. Gen. (BGEN) 
 
O2 
First Lieutenant 
1st Lt. (1LT) 
 
O8 
Major General 
Maj. Gen. (MGEN) 
 
O3 
Captain 
Capt. (CPT) 
 
O9 
Lieutenant General 
Lt. Gen. (LGEN) 
 
O4 
Major 
Maj. (MAJ) 
 
O10
General 
Gen. (GEN) 
  
O5 
Lieutenant Colonel 
Lt. Col. (LTC) 
 
O6 
Colonel 
Col. (COL) 
 
 
General of the Air Force 
(Reserved for wartime only)  
 
 
Ranks are from lowest (O-1) to highest (O-10) 
 
(For B&W prints:  all insignias are silver except 2LT and MAJ are gold.) 
                                                 
1 Source:  http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/insignias/officers.html  
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Introduction 
In the United States Air Force, military officers incur a commitment to the Air Force of 4 to 
5 years, depending on their commissioning source.  After this initial commitment, officers may 
choose to continue in the Air Force, possibly to a retirement after 20 years of service, or they 
may choose to separate (that is, to leave the AF).  The USAF process of recruitment is to “grow” 
senior officers, and they do so from the bottom ranks.  With this limitation, as officers choose to 
leave the AF, the numbers of available candidates for senior ranks diminish.  If recruitment 
properly accounts for forecasted separation rates, and if those separation rates are reasonably pre-
dictable, then the USAF is able to meet the needs of all of its officer requirements whatever their 
rank.  However, in practice, the separation rates are not predictable, nor are necessarily the re-
cruitment rates.   
This system of recruitment, which prevents “lateral recruitment” of new officers into the 
middle ranks, along with the problems of forecasting recruitment and retention, leads to the po-
tential for shortfalls in manning.  Such a manning problem, or a “retention issue”, exists in many 
different categories of officers in the USAF.  One group that has been historically undermanned 
is that of the technical workforce.  This is the officer workforce comprised of the scientists, engi-
neers, and program managers, and are known in the Air Force by the first three characters of 
their Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC’s): 61S, 62E, and 63A, respectively.2   
Most officers that work in these AFSC’s work specifically in acquisitions, a field dedicated 
to the development and procurement of new major systems for the military, such as the latest F-
22 Raptor fighter.  Primarily, all government acquisitions are actually built by civilian companies 
contracted to build a system.  The Air Force then is the customer for such contracts and its tech-
nical workforce supervises this multi-year design, test, and manufacturing process known as ac-
quisitions.  The oversight conducted by the acquisitions community is necessary to insure the 
new fighter or space-based satellite meets specifications, and thereby insures the US taxpayer is 
getting what they paid for.   
Retention of this key technical workforce is then critical to both the military and the tax-
payer, particularly as the Air Force moves to acquisitions of more complex systems, which in 
turn further necessitates the need for cutting-edge technical knowledge.  Under the military sys-
tem, retention can be addressed two ways.  The first is to overcompensate with recruitment, in 
preparation for the large losses of personnel due to attrition.  This appears to be the primary 
means the Air Force handles attrition of its officers.  However, there is considerable cost in re-
cruiting young officers only to lose them, particularly when it takes 5 or more years to develop 
an officer.3  The other means of retention is to minimize the rate attrition, and this can only be 
accomplished by addressing the frustrations of the junior officers who are in a position to sepa-
rate.  This thesis attempts to address this latter means of addressing retention by seeking to dis-
cover the factors that driver retention rates. 
                                                 
2 The shorter form, 61’s, 62’s, and 63’s, will also be used throughout this thesis. 
3 Forseth, 12. 
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Background 
The reason I have undertaken this research is that I have seen many good Company Grade 
Officers (CGO’s) leave the AF.  In fact, I myself had separation orders before I was able to bro-
ker a deal with the AF that would allow me to attend the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
As a Lieutenant, I had seen more than a few presentations on the “serious retention issue” in the 
acquisitions fields, and this “desperate need for scientists and engineers” was one of the reasons 
why my coming to MIT was difficult.  However, it was one presentation by a senior leader on 
the issue of retention for scientists and engineers (S&E’s), tied with my own impressions, as well 
as what I knew from other CGO’s based on conversations in the hallways, that led me to believe 
that senior leaders of the AF did not really understand the key issues plaguing young officers.   
I decided that perhaps a CGO should present forth to senior leaders the real key retention is-
sues driving not only the S&E’s, but also the 63A Program Managers as well.  Armed with my 
own experiences, which still holds relevancy because at the start of this research I had only been 
a Captain for about year (and therefore was part of the target population), I began to shape my 
thesis efforts.   
To begin with, I felt it worth analyzing the actual manning issue.  How bad is it?  Figure 1 
shows the manning rates from 2002-2004 for Lieutenants4, Captains, and Majors that serve 
within the pertinent three career fields (or AFSC’s).  It also shows the results for the AF as a 
whole for each category.  This first thing that becomes obvious when looking at this figure is that 
Lieutenants are grossly overmanned.  The numbers then drop below (or, given the figure, to the 
left of) 100% for Captains and Majors.   
Manning is determined by taking the number of actual officers assigned and dividing by the 
number of authorizations (or job slots) that are available for a given category.  Using authoriza-
tions in this equation, however, makes all manning calculations questionable.  Authorizations are 
determined mostly from the bottom up, beginning at each unit or organization in the Air Force.  
The maximum authorizations allowed is limited by funding allotted by Congress, but the vari-
ability of authorizations, and the respective manning, for any category of rank and AFSC can 
easily be tweaked (at essentially any level of leadership) to get desired results.  It must therefore 
be a basic assumption for this thesis that the total number of authorizations for a given AFSC is 
accurate, though I will not assume that within a given AFSC the number of authorizations by 
rank is also accurate.   
The reason for that latter part is simple.  When an organization decides what job slots it has 
available and then passes up the chain of command those requirements, nearly every organiza-
tion will ask for at least a Captain.  Occasionally, however, they will ask for a First Lieutenant as 
the lowest rank.  No organization asks for a Second Lieutenant, since they are the most junior 
rank. 
                                                 
4 Second and First Lieutenants are combined throughout this thesis as on group, as is typical for AF labor analysis.  
The only difference between the two ranks, other than insignia and pay, is time on active duty.  Job slots for Second 
Lieutenants technically do not exist, and so the sum of all Lieutenants available divided by the jobs (or authoriza-
tions) of First Lieutenants really necessitates lumping these two similar ranks together. 
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Figure 1 Manning rate comparison for 61, 62, 63, and the AF as a whole. 
For LT, CPT, MAJ in 2002-2004. 
Meanwhile, in reality, officers join the AF as Second Lieutenants, and after 2 years of ser-
vice, become First Lieutenants.  After 4 years of service, most5 have the option of separating or 
becoming a Captain.  These promotions occur essentially based on Commissioned Years of Ser-
vice alone, and so these junior promotions are assured.  With the natural attrition of officers after 
4-5 years, and the lack of lateral hiring into higher ranks in the military recruitment system, there 
are (nearly) always more Lieutenants in these career fields than Captains, and likewise more 
Captains than Majors, etc.  Yet the authorizations for Captains are 2 to 3 times more than that of 
Lieutenants.  Put another way, while actual people that are Lieutenants always outnumbers the 
actual Captains, there are more requests for Captains than Lieutenants.  This then gives an artifi-
cial appearance that there the AF has too many Lieutenants and not nearly enough Captains.  In 
reality, this is just that organizations far prefer Captains to Lieutenants.  In practice, the organiza-
tions often have to “settle” for a Second6 or First Lieutenant to fill a Captain job slot (authoriza-
tion).  (See Appendix E for actual manning data.  Notice in this data the authorizations for Cap-
tains versus Lieutenants.  Also, see Appendix Y for further discussion on the promotion system.) 
                                                 
5 Graduates of the US Air Force Academy incur a 5-year ADSC.  Graduates of OTS or ROTC incur only 4 years.  
The officer may incur other concurrently running ADSC’s due to special training or assignments, taking advantage 
of educational opportunities, etc.   
6 Which is a good thing because literally no one asks for Second Lieutenants; 2LT’s would not have jobs if the AF 
only gave organizations what rank they asked for. 
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With the question of the method employed by the Air Force for determining manning now 
raised, one might be led to think of the “manning rate” instead as a preferential rate for particular 
ranks.  This easy manipulability of manning rates leads us to Figure 2.  Employing the assump-
tion that the authorizations of any rank within a given career field is accurate or approximately 
so, this figure shows only the total number of authorizations from Lieutenants up to Captains for 
each career field.  This way we can represent a more real picture of the career field, since clearly 
Lieutenants can and do fill available Captain authorizations, as Captains can and do fill available 
Majors slots, etc.  In fact, given the higher ranks are the ones undermanned, but the lower ranks 
have the higher number of people available, there is no reason in these fields ever to have an of-
ficer serve in a job slot that was intended for someone of lower rank.    
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
95%
100%
105%
110%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
61 62 63 61+62+63 AF-Wide
 
Figure 2 Comparison of total manning rates of 61, 62, 63, and AF-wide.7 
Figure 2, masking individual rank issues, shows that the AF as a whole, as well as the 63 
Program Managers, are now overmanned, though this was not always the case.  This over man-
ning is likely a combination of an effect of the post-9/11 economy downturn, a temporary “Stop-
Loss” measure imposed selectively from 2001 to 20038, recruitment rates staying the same9 de-
spite “Stop-Loss”, and the higher sense of patriotism and serving of the public post 9/11.  How-
                                                 
7 Excludes STP.  See Appendix E. 
8 “Stop Loss” is a policy implemented with Congressional approval that denies certain critical classes of military 
from leaving the military (by either separation or retirement) for a short time.  This policy is reserved for crises. 
9 The Air Force has attempted to quell over manning by limiting recruitment in 2004.  
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ever, while 61’s are nearly at 100%, 62’s are still undermanned.  If you can assume that 61, 62, 
and 63 officers are mostly interchangeable at least within acquisitions, where the majority of 
each of these resides, then that line shows that overall, acquisitions is about at optimal manning.  
However, these jobs are not interchangeable, since engineers that are not doing engineering will 
tend to feel undervalued and underutilized.  It is in fact the belief by the assignment system that 
these officers are interchangeable that is likely a large source of dissatisfaction with both the as-
signment system and an officer’s job overall.  
While Captains and Majors may in fact be undermanned, it is difficult to know how legiti-
mate this is due to reasons explained above on authorizations.  However, it is clear that the engi-
neering field is undermanned as a whole, regardless of what is going on among its ranks.  What 
is also clear is that the military recruitment system, which only hires from the bottom, expects 
and in fact requires a certain degree of attrition.  The problem then is managing the attrition (or 
separation) rates, or their inverse, retention rates.  
Armed with the results of this research, the AF can conceivably manage their current inven-
tory of officers more effectively, thereby minimizing separation rates, which in turn minimizes 
the missing officers in the middle ranks.  Perhaps this research can also serve to help make reten-
tion rates at least somewhat more predictable.  At the very least, it is hoped that this document 
will help to educate the senior AF leadership on the issues afflicting the junior officers, thereby 
bring light to several issues that also affect overall morale. 
This research is important because close to half of the acquisitions junior officers in the Air 
Force are at least considering early separation.  This rate of loss also has intangible effects on 
unit morale in these career fields.  The Air Force has mostly addressed retention by recruiting 
more—front loading the personnel system in anticipation of high loss rates later on in an attempt 
to ultimately end up with the right numbers of personnel in the senior ranks.  But losing so many 
recruits after 4-5 years, precisely when they are becoming fully developed and most productive 
to the Air Force, is a serious problem that costs the Air Force, and the taxpayer, lots of money. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the driving issues that lead technical officers to sepa-
rate.  These issues primarily affect CGO’s, because after about the 8 to 10 Years of Service 
(YOS), officers are more compelled to remain in until their retirement eligibility at 20 years.  
The retirement system is in fact a huge motivation for anyone over about 10 YOS not to leave 
regardless of their satisfaction with military life.  However, as will be explored later in this the-
sis, it may be the case that the retirement system is also a driver for undecided CGO’s to leave 
prematurely.  The focus of this research is then “why do officers leave the Air Force”, and in par-
ticular, “why do acquisitions CGO’s leave the Air Force”.  
My hypotheses of the driving issues I believe affect all junior officers in general, but particu-
larly true of 61, 62, and 63’s, are listed in turn. 
Job satisfaction is the key problem.  People leave because they do not like their job.  The AF 
creates this environment, for example, by failing to fully utilize the degrees and skills of S&E’s. 
Over recruiting leads to lower job satisfaction.  The idea that there are so many Lieutenants 
but not enough senior officers suggest two things.  The first is that there is less professional de-
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velopment and mentoring available from higher-ranking officers due to the less favorable pro-
portion of the two.  The second is that Lieutenants are more likely to be doing less meaningful 
work because Lieutenants, in general, are given less work than a Captain would be, regardless of 
the authorization.  This hypothesis is furthered supported by the fact that there are fewer jobs at 
acquisitions organizations that are intended for Lieutenants, yet the organization is over-
populated by Lieutenants.  The minimal work then available or “trusted” to Lieutenants is spread 
across too many, leaving job challenge, value, and satisfaction low. 
Assignment flexibility is a key problem.  The assignment process, which requires officers to 
move to a new base every 3-4 years, is somewhat considerate of the officer’s wishes, but ulti-
mately the next assignment is often imposed on the officer.  The common phrase “the needs of 
the Air Force” is often employed to justify why an officer might, say, be assigned to a job that 
either is nothing like their experience, or otherwise is unsatisfactory for some other reason.  
Those that remain in the Air Force likely have grown to accept this, but junior officers who have 
joined the AF on a trial basis do not.  Furthermore, “the needs of the Air Force” should really be 
the needs of their people.  The “needs of the Air Force” become irrelevant once you lose all of 
your best people, thereby inhibiting the mission of the Air Force.  The assignment system’s ri-
gidity is therefore likely closely tied to job satisfaction. 
Pay is perceived as a problem, but not the biggest problem.  The Air Force answers all of its 
retention issues by “throwing money” at the problem—offering bonuses in exchange for volun-
tary ADSC extensions.  This type of response only treats those intending to stay in the AF with 
free money, but those that are dissatisfied are not going to be swayed by such a bonus.  The 
fence sitters are likely to take such a bonus in exchange for a reasonable ADSC, though in the 
end it may not mean they are any more likely to remain in the AF until retirement.  A common 
phrase among the military is “no one joins the military to get rich”.  If the reasons a given officer 
did join the military are not met, giving them extra pay will not satisfy their yearning to find 
what it is they are looking, and they will look elsewhere.  Pay only becomes a problem when 
none of the other primary professional desires are met.  That is, to do a job they love but not re-
ceive adequate pay is acceptable.  To do a job they hate and not receive adequate pay is com-
pletely unacceptable.  It is for this latter reason that I believe pay only becomes an issues for 
those that are unsatisfied with bigger issues in the AF.  Moreover, since pay is of lower impor-
tance, the AF should not target pay when dealing with retention. 
Civilian jobs are perceived as more attractive.  “The grass is greener on the other side.”  This 
is also likely tied to job satisfaction.  If an officer loves their AF job, then the attractiveness of 
civilian life, which includes staying in one location for a career if you so choose, perceived-
better pay10, and stability, is not enough to sway that officer from prematurely leaving.  How-
ever, once job satisfaction declines, civilian jobs become more attractive. 
The rest of this thesis investigates these hypotheses as they apply to the junior officers in the 
acquisitions community. 
                                                 
10 I say “perceived-better pay” because once you calculate the cost to buy the benefits you otherwise receive from 
the military, military pay plus allowances and benefits is very comparable to civilian pay plus benefits for the typical 
experience and education level in the military.  
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Methodology 
The process for researching and gathering data for this thesis includes a literature review, a 
web-based survey, and some limited interviews.  Most of the literature review was from RAND 
reports and publications from the Air Force’s Air University.11  The publications from Air Uni-
versity were often other theses of graduates from the Air Force’s Air Command Staff College 
(ACSC), a professional and degree-granting school for intermediate level of military education.  
The literature review, whose results are discussed in another section of thesis, served primarily to 
further my thinking of the key problems and hypotheses.  It also was important in determining 
what types of questions have not been fully recognized or considered, and this proved useful in 
designing a unique survey tailored for the AF officer population of interest. 
Interviews were conducted mostly by telephone with officers and government civilians 
whose jobs were closely related to the topic of this research.  Some of the organizations with 
which I discussed this thesis, along with my conclusions, include AFPC, SAF/AQ, AFMC HQ, 
and personnel-related people at Los Angeles AFB, the base at which I was last assigned.  
Through the course of the earlier interviews, their inputs were able to shape the survey I created.  
Additionally, some were able to provide other research or data that I had not previously been 
aware of.  Most of this data focused on the wrong kinds of questions for what was important for 
the population of interest.  While these interviews were important in shaping the course of this 
thesis as well as my understanding, explicit references to interviewees will be excluded from this 
thesis.  This is done to protect the interviewees, whether it is necessary or not, as their thoughts 
are opinions based on their experiences and do not represent the official position of the AF.   
The web-based survey, which was created using the survey website surveymonkey.com, was 
created with the intent of soliciting, with the Air Force’s help, scientists, engineers, and program 
managers from across the Air Force.  The survey was required by public law to be reviewed by a 
recognized entity qualified to validate research of any kind conducted on humans.  In this case, 
the reviewing body was the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, or 
COUHES, an office that is part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.12  Contacts through 
AFMC HQ and Los Angeles AFB helped facilitate the distribution to the target audience by 
sending a prewritten email that explained how to login in to the survey.  (See Appendix B for 
this prewritten email.)  The survey required a password, which, it is hoped, prevented those out-
side the target audience from participating.  After completion of the survey, respondents were 
forwarded to my personal MIT website, where they had the option of bookmaking the site and 
come back later to see posted results.13  The survey was open in early August, with the first re-
sponses received on August 5, 2004, and then the survey was closed on Sept 30, 2004.  (See 
Appendix D for an example of the web-based survey.)  Data from the survey was analyzed with 
the software originally called the Statistical Package for Social Sciences, but now known simply 
as SPSS.  Further analysis, as well as all graphical depictions, was conducted using Microsoft 
Excel.   
                                                 
11 Air University is responsible, among other things, responsible for professional military training and includes 
schools such as the Air War College.  Air University is located at Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama. 
12 http://web.mit.edu/committees/couhes/index.shtml  
13 This site has since been moved to a semi-permanent location:  http://mit.cartala.com  
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“Myopic fixation on compensation 
hides the fact that pay is likely a 
symptom of other larger issues.” 
“Basic ‘organizational climate’ issues 
are significant drivers on retention.” 
“…five variables important to job satisfaction 
(are) achievement, advancement, recognition, 
responsibility, and the work itself.” 
Literature Review 
The area of research on the problems associated with military retention is not new.  However, 
much of this research is focused on the AF as a whole, and while some lessons can be gleaned 
from it for the purpose of my own more-focused research, it hides some of the idiosyncrasies 
specific to technical officers in the acquisitions community.   
One example that considers the entire AF in its retention study is a 1999 thesis from the Air 
Command Staff College (ACSC) on retention problems, written by Malackowski and Keesey.  
However, it may be a bit dated, as it suggests that if the USAF improve compensation it may im-
prove retention.  While this was possibly true for the mid to late 90’s research on which this the-
sis was based, it is a basic hypothesis of my own thesis that the USAF should in fact not concen-
trate on compensation, as it is not a key driver on retention.  This ACSC thesis is indicative of an 
AF-wide problem—myopic fixation on compensation 
hides the fact that pay is likely a symptom of other lar-
ger issues.  To this end, compensation is apparently the 
only driver for career intentions the AF has taken an ac-
tive role in changing.   
However, this ACSC thesis is not without merit.  One significant finding of the Malackowski 
and Keesey thesis that is likely still true today, and one which apparently has not yet been ac-
knowledged by senior AF leadership concerned with retention, is that basic “organizational cli-
mate” issues are significant drivers on retention.   
One of the most compelling recommendations to 
senior leaders made by Malackowski and Keesey is 
that the Air Force needs to begin surveying those that 
separate—a recommendation that the AF still has yet 
to implement.  Other sources14 suggest that exit surveys should be conducted by third parties 
with assurances of anonymity to insure honest results, which often yields very different findings.  
(This idea also suggests that my own thesis may have better and more accurate results than simi-
lar work conducted by the Air Force, since I emphasized my survey was anonymous as well as 
not funded by or conducted by the AF.)   
Another thesis, by Scheuchner in 1996, looked at the entire AF and considered job satisfac-
tion as a driver on retention.  In Herzberg’s 1959 book (as cited by Scheuchner), Herzberg con-
cluded that there were five variables important to job satisfaction:  achievement, advancement, 
recognition, responsibility, and the work itself.15  Scheuchner appears to be one of the few re-
searchers to link job satisfaction to retention 
in the Air Force.  Among his conclusions, 
now likely somewhat outdated, he suggests 
the availability civilian jobs, a say in the as-
signment system, geographic stability, job 
                                                 
14 Soper  
15 Scheuchner, 8. 
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“The (personnel) system rewards retention 
more than it rewards performance.” 
challenge, quality of senior leadership, and recognition are all top drivers for non-rated16 officers 
to separate.17  These insights would prove useful as I began to build my own survey. 
It was not until about 2001 that research began to appear that was specific to the acquisitions 
community, and in fact most of it specific to S&E’s.  The basic premise of Lin’s 2003 thesis was 
that for most people, some single event began the idea of separation, and this single event began 
a snowball effect for those that ultimately did separate.  Lin’s research, which was focused on a 
specific group18 of former Air Force officers had who are now separated, suggested the top five 
drivers on separation, in order of importance, were the assignment system, family, promotion, 
job satisfaction, and policy/bureaucracy.19  (Compensation was only the sixth most important 
reason this group had separated.)  The reference to promotion was the frustration with the pro-
motion system because it is based on time in service instead of performance.  That of family was 
closely tied with the assignment system in that people were frustrated with the strain of relocat-
ing frequently or moving to remote locations where they could not bring their family.  One re-
spondent’s example of bureaucracy was dissatisfaction with officers having operational back-
grounds being in charge of a group of analysts.   
There is also an apparent stigma some senior officers have against junior officers with aspira-
tions to leave the AF.  This stigma suggests that early separation is somehow not living up to the 
Air Force Core Value of “Service Before Self”.  Lin suggests, “...by fulfilling one’s Active Duty 
Service Commitment (ADSC), an officer was patriotic, fulfilled his or her duty, and has done a 
lot for the Air Force and should not feel guilty at all about separating.”20 
Lin’s study is also one of the few to look at a 
theme of the lack of a merit-based system (or 
lack of a meritocracy, as he refers to it).  The 
idea is that merit is not recognized in the AF as 
a means to differentiate officers on pay or promotion.  Lack of a merit-based promotion system, 
and its effects, were emphasized in a 1994 RAND report by Asch and Warner which stated, 
“…although more productive individuals do tend to get promoted more often and thus get pay 
raises quicker under a time-in-service system, they lose their current pay advantage over less-
productive individuals once the less-productive ones are promoted.”21  (It is important to note 
that in the Air Force, this accelerated promotion schedule is not even an option until the promo-
tion to Lt Colonel.)  The RAND report adds that another problem with a system based on time is 
that “…lower ranking personnel with more seniority receive (in some instances) more than 
                                                 
16 Non-rated refers to those officers not in direct operational capacities.  That is, non-pilots, non-navigators, etc. 
17 Scheuchner, 35. 
18 61S, 62E, 63A, as well as two other AFSC’s (32E Civil Engineering and 33S Communications & Information).  
(Together, these five AFSC’s were the only groups eligible for the Continuing Skills Retention Bonus, or CSRB.)  
The survey was of 182 people that had separated from these AFSC’s in the last 10 years (1993-2003).   
19 Lin, 47. 
20 Lin, 56. 
21 Asch and Warner, 24. 
 21
“Life interests are what will ultimately make 
one happy, and this is the key to long-term 
retention.” 
higher-ranking personnel with less seniority.  The concern is that the system rewards retention 
more than it rewards performance.”22   
The Asch and Warner report reemphasized many of the key themes suggested above.  One 
interesting thing about this report is that it gave reasons why junior officers that are considering 
separating should leave the AF earlier than later:  “…since the reward for an intermediate-length 
career is low, personnel must decide early on whether they want to be long-term careerists or 
leave.  Some personnel who might have stayed longer under an alternative (personnel or retire-
ment) system leave very early.”23  The report also cites that personnel that leave in their 40’s or 
50’s “…may have worse civilian opportunities than those who either left earlier or (compared to) 
civilians of similar age.”24 
The RAND report also appears as one of the only documented sources of what every officer 
knows exists: that the “…implicit tenure point…is promotion to (Major), around (Years of Ser-
vice equals) 10.”25  This is more commonly known by officers as the “point of know return” for 
making a career decision.  Once past this point, the officer has less time to retirement (at 20 
years) than behind them.   
Finally, this report also made light of a very well known but rather unchallenged discrimina-
tory act of the military compensation system, that of paying those with dependents (children, 
spouses) more compensation than those that are single.26  The report stated, “…payment based 
on need (number of dependents) rather than on performance weakens motivation and effort.”27 
Lin’s thesis led me to another important work:  that of Butler and Waldroop’s “Job Sculpt-
ing” article from the Harvard Business Review.  This article asserts that achievement in one’s job 
is not indicative of job satisfaction, and that 
in the end, only if the job meets their deeply 
embedded life interests will they want to stay.  
“Deeply embedded life interests do not de-
termine what people are good at—they drive 
what kinds of activities make them happy.”28  The problem is that, according to Butler and Wal-
droop, “…a good number of people, at least up until midlife, don’t actually know what kind of 
work will make them happy.”29  People that do not yet know their life interests may jump from 
job to job in a “grass is greener on the other side” mentality, but never being satisfied because 
they have not yet discovered the root of their dissatisfaction. 
                                                 
22 Asch and Warner, 23. 
23 Asch and Warner, xvii.   
24 Asch and Warner, 25. 
25 Asch and Warner, 20. 
26 Specifically, Basic Allowance for Housing and Basic Allowance for Sustenance, which can make up a third of an 
officer’s total pay, are given based on number of dependents.    
27 Asch and Warner, 24. 
28 Butler and Waldroop, 146. 
29 Ibid. 
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“The military retirement system’s 
importance as a factor on one’s career 
intent, which grows stronger with time in 
service, competes with job satisfaction.  
Thus, if an officer discovers their deeply 
embedded life interests cannot be easily 
fulfilled in the AF later in their career, they 
are more likely to remain in the AF despite 
low job satisfaction.  This might be good 
for retention, but it is not good for growing 
strong leadership.” 
The problem then is that people join the military because it meets the other two criteria 
deemed lesser by Butler and Waldroop—values and ability.  Values because most people that 
join the military appreciate the patriotic ideal of serving, and may value such things as a stable 
pay, assured retirement benefits (after 20 years), etc.  Ability is augmented because most military 
jobs receive training necessary to make the officer good at any given job they are assigned.30  
However, Butler and Waldroop say that life interests are what will ultimately make one happy, 
and that is the key to long-term retention.  Interestingly, the military retirement system’s impor-
tance as a factor on one’s career intent, which grows stronger with time in service, competes with 
job satisfaction.  Thus, if an officer discovers 
their deeply embedded life interests cannot be 
easily fulfilled in the AF later in their career, 
they are more likely to remain in the AF de-
spite low job satisfaction.  This might be good 
for retention, but it is not good for growing 
strong leadership. 
Butler and Waldroop claim that managers 
are at fault for “…botch(ing) career develop-
ment—and retention—because they mistak-
enly assume people are satisfied with the jobs 
they excel at.”31  The real reasons career development goes wrong is due to “…the way jobs usu-
ally get filled, and…the fact that career development so often gets handed off to the human re-
sources department.”32  These assertions strike at the heart of what are the problems with job sat-
isfaction in the Air Force as well as the assignment system.   
Other documents explicitly echoed the problems of the assignment system.  For example, an 
Air Force report by Arreola and Soper that conducted career research on a focus group of S&E’s 
documented problems of mismatching S&E’s to positions that really utilized their skills.  It also 
reemphasized that many S&E’s were disenchanted with the current assignment system process.  
The report raised the question that several of the focus group wondered:  is there a need for 
S&E’s in the military if so many of them are performing jobs that do not require technical de-
grees or skills?  Related to this issue is that of an option of dual career tracks:  one that would 
remain technical focused and one that would be headed towards management.  Many in the re-
port were upset at only being promoted based on advancements along managerial paths.  The 
idea of a dual career path is not new, and is available to pilots, for example.33 
The Arreola and Soper report also discussed the need for a merit-based system of incentives 
and the closely related issues with the Air Force evaluation and appraisal system, embodied in a 
documented form known as the Officer Performance Report (OPR).  These sentiments are reso-
nated in an article by Wayland, who states “…many officers don’t perceive a direct relationship 
                                                 
30 Many, however, would claim training for acquisitions-type work is either untimely or incoherent with their daily 
work. 
31 Butler and Waldroop, 147. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Armstrong, 2. 
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“Outsourcing more and more S&E officer 
jobs to government civilians or contractors 
meant that officers were working side by 
side with a living example of how they could 
do the same job, get paid more for it, and 
likely never having to be relocated again.” 
“Those above 30 tend to think of the Air 
Force as their life, while junior members tend 
to feel that one’s job is just a part of one’s 
life, and that their lives outside of the work-
place are just as important if not more so.”
between advancement and actual duty performance.”34  The article states the major problem with 
the OPR system is that it is extremely over-inflated and thereby makes the evaluation truly 
meaningless.   
Another key problem the Arreola and Soper report found was that outsourcing more and 
more S&E officer jobs to government civilians or contractors meant that officers were working 
side by side with a living example of how they could do the same job, get paid more for it, and 
likely never having to be relocated again.   
The idea of an operational assignment was also suggested in this document.  While some of 
my literature review seemed to unilaterally suggest operational tours as a means of retention, 
these sentiments often are not representative of the S&E community.  According to the Arreola 
and Soper report, “overall, the military S&E’s felt it best to leave (operational tours) as an op-
tion.”35  In fact, many agreed in this report with one comment that “the first tour (of duty) in an 
(operational) assignment would be a kiss of death.”36  It is more likely that individuals are split 
on their desire for an operational tour, and for 
those that do desire “Ops”, that desire likely 
wanes with time as officers become more in-
terested in settling down, raising a family, etc.  
The report also offered a middle ground for the 
debate of operational tours:  an operational 
temporary duty (TDY) of just weeks or 
months.   
A recent study by the Air Force Materiel Command (known as the Junior Force Study), 
looked at junior officers in general (with some specific focus on the acquisitions community) and 
found some interesting insights in how senior leaders see the world and the Air Force from a 
very different generational-lens than junior officers.  The report highlights differences such as 
those above 30 tend to think of the Air Force as their life, while junior members tend to feel that 
one’s job is just a part of one’s life, and that their lives outside of the workplace are just as im-
portant if not more so.  It also implies that older generations are of the mind that you work your 
way up the corporate ladder, while the junior officers are much less loyal to any given corpora-
tion and are more concerned with meaningful and challenging experiences.  The report also high-
lights that many in acquisitions felt they 
were not aware of what they were getting 
themselves into before joining the Air Force 
as acquisitions officers.37 
Finally, in preparation for my own sur-
vey and statistical analysis, I was able to gain 
                                                 
34 Wayland, (no page number). 
35 Arreola and Soper, 14. 
36 Ibid. 
37 “The Next Greatest Generation:  Junior Force Study”, 95. 
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“Job satisfaction, the assignment system, 
and availability of comparable civilian jobs 
are the primary factors on retention.” 
access to results of a 2003 survey of 62E’s as was conducted by a division of SAF/AQ 
(SAF/AQR).38  The results showed that for those with 3-5 YOS, about 46% suggested intent to 
make a career of the Air Force, 34% were leaning to leave the AF, and the remaining 20% were 
undecided.  These numbers were based on 203 respondents.  The results mimicked closely 
(within 1%) a study of 1664 non-pilots.  This survey went on to consider top reasons that would 
influence remaining in the AF, and top reasons influencing leaving the AF, and then compared 
this to a large number of responses from all non-pilot AFSC’s.   
According to the study, the top five reasons for 62’s with 3-5 YOS to remain in the AF were 
1) the retirement system, 2) job security, 3) patriotism, 4) medical care for dependents, and 5) 
medical care for oneself.  Bonuses or special pay ranked #9.  These 62E results were based on 93 
respondents.  In comparison, the Air Force wide population of 746 non-pilots with 3-5 YOS var-
ied slightly in their rankings.  They ranked the top five as 1) patriotism, 2) the retirement system, 
3) medical care for oneself, 4) job security, and 5) medical care for dependents.  In short, they 
each had the same top five choices, but in a slightly different order.  (There were 42 choices 
available to rank as influences for an AF career.) 
The top five reasons for 62’s with 3-5 YOS to leave the AF were 1) availability of compara-
ble civilian jobs, 2) compatibility of military with spouse or spouse’s job, 3) number of PCS 
moves (that is, new assignments), 4) potential for outsourcing or privatization of the 62E career 
field, and 5) Air Force officer or enlisted evaluation system.  The assignment system ranked in at 
#6, overall job satisfaction at #8, pay and allowances at #20, and bonuses or special pay was at 
#24.  These 62E responses were based on 69 respondents.  In comparison, the Air Force wide 
population of 598 non-pilots with 3-5 YOS varied slightly once again.  Their top five were 1) 
availability of comparable civilian jobs, 2) compatibility of military with spouse or spouse’s job, 
3) job assignment system, 4) number of PCS moves (that is, new assignments), and 5) having a 
say in the location of the assignment.  For this group, overall job satisfaction came in at #6, pay 
and allowances was at #27, and bonuses or special pay was at #22.  (There were 42 choices 
available to rank as influences to leave the 
AF.) 
These results help affirm my hypothesis 
that pay is not a major driver for retention.  
However, in this group, job satisfaction did not ultimately end up as high on the list for a reason 
to separate, as I would have expected.  The assignment system in this study is broken down into 
many components (i.e. compatibility of military with spouse or spouse’s job, job assignment sys-
tem, number of PCS moves, etc.).  Considering this to simplify the SAF/AQR study results, then, 
for example, the top reasons for 62’s with 3-5 YOS to leave the AF were 1) availability of com-
parable civilian jobs, 2) dissatisfaction with the assignment system, and 3) overall job satisfac-
tion.  Therefore, job satisfaction is not as low as it first appears—it just depends on the level at 
which you break down major themes.  I believe, however, that job satisfaction is more significant 
than this study suggested.   
                                                 
38 See the “Career Influences of Company Grade 62EX Personnel with 3 to 5 Years of Service” report. 
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My conclusions from the literature review are that job satisfaction, the assignment system, 
and availability of comparable civilian jobs are the primary factors on retention.  I also believe 
that pay, despite what some of the older literature suggested, is not a significant factor, but 
merely a symptom of the first three issues.  Finally, I believe that there is some negative reten-
tion effect due to the military being primarily devoid of merit-based incentives, whether promo-
tion or pay.  The approach of my research is then to focus on job satisfaction and assignment-
related issues by asking unique questions that have not been presented in other research.  I will 
also analyze pay and the effects of the recent Continuing Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), which 
is so recent that it has yet to be addressed in any research. 
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Survey Results 
Analysis Methodology and Statistical Considerations 
The web-based survey, which was opened in early August, received its first responses on 
August 5, 2004, and was closed on Sept 30, 2004.  During these nearly two months of data gath-
ering, 762 unique respondents were gathered.  Of these, 40 did not complete the survey.   
Of the remaining 722, tests were conducted on the data to insure its validity.  The tests were 
conducted by comparing the results of both Question 12 and Question 29, which both asked the 
respondent about their career intentions within the AF, but in different ways.  Question 12 was 
posed as innocuous as possible while Question 29 deliberately posed the same question regard-
ing career intentions in a reverse way, forcing the respondent to really read the question.  So in-
stead of asking if the respondent intended to remain in the AF, it asks the respondent the chances 
they will NOT stay in the Air Force.  The responses were then compared and if the career intent 
was widely different from either of these two questions, their entire data record was considered 
“Suspect”.  (Details of how these two questions were tested to insure the record was valid are 
listed in detail in Appendix H.)  The tests concluded that 130 records should be labeled as “Sus-
pect” records, and so were specially marked.  The likely cause of so many Suspect records is that 
since the invitation instructions for this web-based survey were delivered to its intended audience 
via email, often with encouragement of someone of higher rank or position within the given AF 
organization, this likely influenced respondents to take the survey without regard to answering it 
correctly.  With all the non-suspect data sets, Q12 and Q2939 were converted to the same scale 
and then averaged.  This average is then used throughout this analysis as the best answer for a 
respondent’s career intention, and is referred to as “Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Aver-
age”.40  The reason I used the average was for two reasons.  First, if the responses did vary 
slightly, it is unclear which is the “right” one.  Averaging them together would then give the best 
answer.  Though it should be noted that both are extremely correlated as a result of removing 
suspect data records.  The second reason is that with Q29 being at the end of the survey, there is 
likely a bias introduced to it due to the other questions asked throughout the survey.  This bias’s 
direction would depend on the individual’s personal feelings on the various questions posed. 
The working data set then was 592 records.  In the analysis below, you will see the number 
specific to a given analysis marked as “N”.  Reasons the number N may be less than 592 may be 
due to the type of question.  For example, any analysis looking at career intention versus another 
variable is always N=522 or less.  This is because there are 70 respondents in the working data 
set that had answered one of the N/A choices for career intent (either because they were already 
retirement-eligible, or already retired or separated).  Other examples below may be much smaller 
because one of the variables analyzed was from a question only asked of respondents who, for 
example, identified themselves as with an AFSC of 61 or 62.  Finally, when it seemed appropri-
                                                 
39 Questions will be referred to in the format of “Q12” throughout this section.  Consult Appendix A for the actual 
questions. 
40 See Appendix J for an explanation of how these were averaged. 
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ate, an N number might appear at the bottom of a column to give context to how accurate the 
percentages listed in that column may be.   
Throughout this section, cross tabulation (technically known as contingency table analysis) 
has been used to test for correlation between two variables.  Cross-tabs are symmetric and so will 
produce the same result regardless of the order of the variables considered.  The chi-square sta-
tistic (abbreviated Chi-Sq.), the degrees of freedom (d.f.), and the significance probability (Sig.) 
are shown for each cross-tab.  While often not shown in this report, the raw calculations of the 
cross-tabs include the actual count of respondents answering a given way, and then this count is 
proportioned out throughout the cross-tab to determine an expected count.  The more propor-
tional the rows and columns are to the totals, the smaller the chi-square value will be.41  The chi-
square value and the degrees of freedom aren’t useful by themselves, but instead are used to de-
termine the significance probability, or the probability that the proportionality exhibited by the 
chi-square is significant.  The smaller the significance probability, the less likely the association 
of the variables is purely due to random sampling, and the more likely there is a relationship be-
tween the two variables.42  Confidence then is one minus Sig. and shown as a percent.  So if the 
Sig. is 0.005, then the confidence is 1-0.005=0.995 or 99.5% confidence.  Note that there is al-
ways some chance the pattern is due to random sampling.  However, I show the Sig. number to 
only three significant figures, and so while it may appear to be zero, and is so close it can be 
treated as such, it is in fact not exactly zero.  In considering the cross-tabs produced during the 
analysis phase of my research, I have chosen to ignore anything with a Sig. of 0.1 or higher (or 
equivalently, a confidence of less than or equal to 90%).  The confidences of all figures shown in 
this thesis are 98% or better unless otherwise noted. 
The primary consideration of this analysis is to consider career decision factors and influ-
ences that lead officers, particularly junior officers, to separate from the Air Force instead of 
staying in for a career, which is defined as 20 years of Active Duty service.43  For both simplic-
ity, and to follow the methodology employed by AFPC, all Lieutenants (First and Second Lieu-
tenants) are considered as one category or Rank Class.  Also, many of the Colonel respondents 
do not appear in analysis where career intent is a key variable because they already qualify for 
retirement44 (and so have given an “N/A – Retirement Eligible” response).  However, Lieutenant 
Colonels do appear in these charts and may, along with Majors, cause a pro-Air Force bias in 
cross-tabs that consider the whole data set, since they are very near retirement.   
                                                 
41 Alreck and Settle, 327. 
42 Alreck and Settle, 323. 
43 Of the 16 Reservists (Reserve Duty Air Force) in the data record set of 592, 11 identified themselves as separated 
from the (Active Duty) Air Force.  That is, they answered properly in that they are no longer on Active Duty.  The 
other 5 responded to the career intent questions as if they were on active duty, likely considering their aspirations for 
retirement within the Reserve system (which is quite different from the Active Duty retirement system).  These 5 
stray results have been left in the data set (they were not discovered until late in analysis) and are hereby acknowl-
edged.  However, due to the size of the record set, their effect on the results presented here are negligible.   
44 There were 10 Colonels in the data set.  For their career intent responses, they all had either “N/A – Retirement 
Eligible” or “N/A – Separated/Retired”, and because all N/A responses for a given question are excluded in all the 
cross-tabs used in this research, they are then excluded in any cross-tab that considers career intent.  However, in 
other cross-tabs with other variables, their data is considered.   
 28
Whenever practical, 5-point scales will be combined for graphical purposes to an implied 3-
point scale, implied because a numerical scale will not be used.  For example, for career inten-
tions, it will appear as Leaning to an AF Career, Neutral, and Leaving to Leaving the AF.  In this 
case then, a 1 or a 2, corresponding to a “Probably will Remain in the AF” and “Possibly will 
Remain in the AF”, will all be grouped as “Leaning to an AF Career”.  Likewise, a 4 or a 5 will 
be grouped as “Leaning to Leaving the AF”, and a 3 will remain as “Neutral”.  This is done to 
make figures more readable.  However, the statistics involved in the graphs are still those of the 
5-point scale.  It is best to consider the charts as masking the 5-point scale, but is really the 5-
point scale data presented in a friendlier format. 
Some of this analysis focuses on comparisons with separation factors (Q31) which were only 
asked of those respondents with an undecided career intent or with intent to leave the AF (220 
respondents or about 37% of the respondents).  This group largely reflect the intent of Lieuten-
ants (68%) or junior Captains (Captains of any seniority accounted for 31%).  Of this group of 
220, 81% had less than 5 years of active duty as of when they took the survey.  Another 16% 
were between 5 and 10 years of active duty.  Therefore, whenever the analysis considers separa-
tion factors (Q31), the majority are junior officers.   
Due to the different sub-populations included in the entire group surveyed, I divide the popu-
lation based on time on active duty and then further divide those segments by career intent.  In 
many cases, this produces uncorrelated results, such as in the leadership section.  This is only 
useful to analyze the group of junior officers.  Analyzing senior ranks in this fashion tend to pro-
duce uncorrelated results because those that were dissatisfied enough to have it affect their career 
intent have already left by the time they would have made these senior ranks.   
Whenever I divide by groups of respondents based on their YOS, the population will be di-
vided into two segments as follows.  Junior officers are defined as having less than 5 years of 
completed active duty (YOS) at the time of taking the survey, non-junior officers are 5 years or 
more of active duty.  Junior officers then make up 48% of the 592 records in the data set.  The 
title of “junior officer” is a term I created for simplicity only and does not correspond to the 
common definition, which is often used to group a set of ranks.  In the case of my data, a non-
junior officer may include Lieutenants.  For example, if the respondent had 4 years of prior-
enlisted service and was now a First Lieutenant of 3.5 years as an officer, then they will have 7.5 
YOS.  Under my scheme, they will be considered among the non-junior officer group.  However, 
in common practice, a First Lieutenant would always be considered a junior officer regardless of 
YOS. 
Before looking at the analysis, I will start with a brief overview of the surveyed population. 
Overview of the Entire Population 
Of the N=592 respondents, Figure 3 shows the break down by Air Force Specialty Code 
(AFSC) and Figure 4 by Rank.  These figures are showed merely to give an overview of the 
demographics of the respondents. 
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Figure 3 Respondents by AFSC. 
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Figure 4 Respondents by rank. 
The attrition of junior officers, and the very purpose of this research, is best exemplified in 
Figure 5, which explicitly depicts the retention problem by showing the large numbers of officers 
with less than 5 years of service that are either undecided or intending to leave the Air Force.  
After 4-5 years, depending on the commissioning source for a given officer, junior officer then 
have an opportunity to separate.  It is for this reason that those leaning to separate nearly goes to 
zero beyond YOS = 5.     
  Figure 6 compares Figure 5 to the actual inventory data from the Air Force Personnel Cen-
ter.45  This shows that the survey is indeed a good sample of the actual population.46  It is impos-
sible to determine the response rate the survey because it was mass distributed and forwarded by 
email.  However, I can use the raw numbers to derive an estimate.  The AFPC statistics for Sept 
2004 give 6159 total personnel in the Core AFSC’s47 of 61, 62, and 63.  My working data set 
                                                 
45 Figure  shows all respondents regardless of AFSC, and so includes 28 records with “Other” AFSC’s.  In Figure 6, 
the 28 “Other” records have been removed, thereby providing a more accurate comparison to the AFPC data. 
46 See the footnote(s) to Figure 6. 
47 Core AFSC simply means the AFSC to which the officer belongs.  This is opposed to an officer’s possible secon-
dary AFSC or their duty AFSC, which is the code for the job authorization the officer is currently filling. 
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(not including those labeled suspect) includes 528 total current members48 in these Core AFSC’s.  
Dividing the two, my sample is about 8.6% of the actual population, and is therefore representa-
tive of the population. 
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Figure 5 Career intentions vs. YOS (All AFSC’s). 
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Figure 6 Comparison of survey data to (normalized) actual inventory.49  
Limited to 61’s, 62’s, and 63’s. 
                                                 
48 Respondents that were already separated or retired are not included.  These are only current active duty members, 
plus the previously acknowledge few reservists in the data set. 
49 From AFPC Online Database:  http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/sasdemog  Note my data is actually measured in 
Years of Service (YOS), while this inventory data was measured in Commissioned Years of Service (CYOS).  For 
officers that have never been enlisted, CYOS = YOS.  The only case in which these numbers vary is for those offi-
cers who were prior enlisted, which in the case of my data set, is 13% of the population.  The initial term of enlist-
ment for these individuals is likely 4 years.  So unfortunately, this comparison is very close, but only approximate.  
It is not possible to accurately calculate CYOS from my data, nor is YOS readily available for actual AF inventory.  
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Why Officers Separate 
In the survey, those who answered the second question to on career intent (Q29), with a re-
sponse that indicated either undecided or that they were leaning towards separating, were sent to 
a branch of the survey that included separation factors (Q31).  This question asked the respon-
dent to rank the following from most to least important influence on their potential separating: 
(a) Pay & Allowances, (b) Promotion System, (c) Job Satisfaction, (d) Availability of Compara-
ble Civilian Jobs, and (e) Assignment System.  The survey randomized the order these five 
choices would appear.  The respondent gave a rank from 1 (most influential reason to leave AF) 
to 5 (least influential), and was allowed an N/A response.50  The survey software itself prevented 
the respondent from ranking two factors the same rank.  The weighted results appear in Figure 7.  
This data may not indicate all of the top reasons people separate, but of those shown, the scale 
and rank is correct.  (Appendix L shows the comparison of separation factors to rank.)   
The result is that job satisfaction is the primary reason people are leaning towards separating, 
while the assignment system is in a distant second place.  This result supports my hypotheses 
that job satisfaction and assignment system are the chief reasons that officers separate.  It is im-
portant to note that since the majority of people separating are junior officers, Figure 7 inherently 
represents (nearly) only junior officers.  One flaw with this survey question on separation factors 
is that it only gave five choices.  While it allowed an N/A response to insure respondents were 
not forced into ranking a factor not applicable for them, it did not give enough choices to insure 
that job satisfaction is truly the chief reason people are separating.  That is, job satisfaction is 
clearly the top reason people are separating of the five choices given in the question, but there 
may be other reasons not offered in the question that may be even more substantial.    
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
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Assignment System
Pay & Allowances
Promotion System
Availability of Civilian Jobs
 
Figure 7 Reasons Air Force acquisitions officers (61’s, 62’s, and 63’s) separate.51 
                                                 
50 It is because of this N/A option that the number of valid responses (N) varies slightly for the five factors of Q31.  
291 respondents were given Q31, and N=275 to 283 (valid non-N/A responses were given), depending on the factor. 
51 The scale for the figure is derived in the following manner:  the 5-point Likert Scale used in Q31 is averaged to 
determine the mean.  This mean is then subtracted from 5, since lower means indicate more importance for this 
question, but the figure aims to depict more importance having a longer bar.  The mean for job satisfaction was 2.16.  
5 - 2.16 = 2.84, and this is depicted in the figure.   
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Overall Air Force Satisfaction 
Q10 and Q30 asked the respondent their satisfaction with eleven aspects of being in the AF, 
aspects that directly feed into overall satisfaction with life in the AF.  Q10 and Q30 asked the 
eleven sub-questions in two different ways:  Q10 asked to rank your peers’ satisfaction, while 
Q30 asked the respondent to rate their own satisfaction.  The logic in doing this is that people 
tend to answer a bit more truthfully for their peers, as if they are projecting their own feelings to 
their peers, while the ratings they give for themselves are likely a bit biased to a more conserva-
tive number.  See Appendix J on how these numbers were averaged, and then tested, to insure 
the method for averaging was found to be valid.  The resulting averaged values were true 5-point 
averages represented in a Likert scale.  The eleven Air Force satisfaction sub-questions or factors 
(1030Ave) were (a) overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with (b) pay, (c) educational opportuni-
ties, (d) the promotion system, (e) recognition, (f) Officer Performance Reports (OPR’s), (g) 
leadership opportunities, (h) the retirement system, (i) deployment opportunities, (j) Temporary 
Duty (TDY) opportunities, and (k) the assignment system.  These eleven factors appeared in a 
random order in the survey. 
When compared to career intent, all of the eleven AF satisfaction factors showed over 98% 
confidence of correlation with the exception of (j) TDY opportunities.52  Consequently, I will 
ignore (j) for the remainder of this section.  See Appendix M for the detailed data of all of AF 
satisfaction factors, with the exception of (j).  
For those leaning to leave, a majority of people were dissatisfied with six of these aspects of 
AF life in particular: (a) overall job satisfaction, (e) recognition, (f) OPR’s, (g) leadership oppor-
tunities, (i) deployment opportunities, and (k) the assignment system.  OPR’s and the assignment 
system are the top two dissatisfactions, both with nearly 53% each, while job satisfaction rounds 
out the top three with about 48%.  Despite intent to leave the AF, most (71%) feel they are paid 
adequately, 68% feel educational opportunities are satisfactory, and 66% are satisfied with the 
retirement system.  This strongly supports a key hypothesis of this paper, which is that pay is not 
a major driver for people to separate from the AF.  (See Figure 21 in Appendix M.) 
The fact that OPR’s are a significant source of dissatisfaction is unexpected since OPR’s do 
not contribute to the time-based promotion system of junior officers.  The dissatisfaction with 
OPR’s, tied with the fact that recognition was also a source of dissatisfaction, seems to indicate a 
need for recognition of one’s performance or merit.   
Comparison of the ten AF satisfaction factors to rank revealed only three of the elements, (a) 
overall job satisfaction, (g) leadership opportunities, and (k) the assignment system, gave a 
strong (99% or better) confidence.  All the others gave such low confidences that they must not 
be correlated to rank.  For the three aspects that do correlate, Lieutenants are more dissatisfied 
than Captains, who are in turn more dissatisfied than Majors are.  This is to be expected, because 
the junior ranks have more people that are dissatisfied but have not yet had an opportunity to 
leave the AF.  Comparison of the ten AF satisfaction factors to AFSC reveals strong correlation 
to (a) overall job satisfaction, (b) pay, (g) leadership opportunities, (h) the retirement system, (i) 
                                                 
52 Other than (j), the lowest confidence of any of the remaining valid components of this question was 98.3%.  (j) 
had a confidence of just 20.5% (or Sig. = 0.795).   
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deployment opportunities, and (k) the assignment system.  This data shows that engineers tend to 
feel slightly more dissatisfied with pay and their overall job, as well as leadership opportunities.  
There does not appear to be any noteworthy trends in the correlation to AFSC, however, from 
which to derive conclusions.  (Data is provided in Appendix M for both the comparison to rank 
and to AFSC.) 
Refining our view by now only looking at AF satisfaction factors within the junior officer 
category (<5 years), regardless of their career intent, pay and the promotion system were mostly 
sources of satisfaction.  (See Figure 8, which shows only the six factors that were significant 
when the analysis was limited to junior officers.  Note this figures summarizes the data nicely, 
but the areas are not significant statistically.)  However, deployments are a key source of dissat-
isfaction (even more so among those planning to stay in the AF for a career).  Job satisfaction, 
leadership opportunities, and the OPR system all are major sources of dissatisfaction for junior 
officers, regardless of career intent.   
Finally, AF satisfaction factors were analyzed using regression analysis, and here again I di-
vided the population by junior officers (<5 years) and non-junior officers (5+ years), the results 
of which are detailed in Appendix N.  In each case, the dependent variable was career intent, and 
then the dependent variables were all eleven sub-questions on AF satisfaction, plus Years of Ser-
vice.  For the junior officers53, overall job satisfaction has the greatest weight on career intent.  If 
job satisfaction is high, the officer is likely to stay in, and if job satisfaction is low, the officer is 
likely to leave.  The promotion system and the retirement system are the next important factors, 
and encourage junior officers to stay.  The final key factor on career intent is deployment oppor-
tunities, which is seen as a driver to leave the AF.  This is because the deployment opportunities 
are few or none for these career fields.54 
For the non-junior officer category55, the amount of time the officer has in the service is the 
largest contributor to career intent.  The more time in, the more likely they are to remain in the 
Air Force.  The promotion system is the next, followed by the opportunities for advanced educa-
tion, and both are factors that encourage non-junior officers to stay in the AF.  The next most 
important is leadership opportunities, which was a reason to separate.  Finally, the last significant 
factor was the retirement system, which was of course a reason to remain in the AF for this 
group.   
The regression analysis confirms the findings from the cross tabulations by naming overall 
job satisfaction as the primary factor on career intent for junior officers.  However, the assign-
ment system was not indicated, and so must be statistically correlated to one of the factors that 
was.  (It will be shown below that the assignment system is correlated to job satisfaction.) 
                                                 
53 See model 4. 
54 Interestingly, the non-junior officers are much more satisfied (48% satisfied) with deployment opportunities than 
junior officers (27% satisfied).  It is unclear if this is because they are receiving opportunities the junior officers are 
not, or if they are simply satisfied not having opportunities at all.  In my experience, very few of these career fields 
ever deploy, of any rank.  If indeed more senior officers are simply satisfied because they do not necessarily care for 
the opportunity of deploying, then factors like senior officers are more likely to have a family certainly play a role in 
this difference. 
55 See model 5. 
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Figure 8 For respondents with YOS < 5yrs, career intent vs. 1030Ave. 
(Top) is for those respondents leaning to leave the AF (N=134), (Bottom) is for those leaning to a career in the AF 
(N=88).  Those that are undecided for career intent are not depicted. 
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Regardless of the analysis conducted (all of the population but limited to those separating, all 
of junior officers that were separating, or regression analysis of junior officers on career intent), 
overall job satisfaction was the largest source of dissatisfaction and most correlated influence for 
those intending to separate.  Deployment opportunities, leadership opportunities, and the OPR 
system were also large sources of dissatisfaction and influenced career intent. 
Job Satisfaction Factors 
Job satisfaction can mean different things to different people.  So one of the first ways in 
which the survey tested for job satisfaction was to question the respondent’s satisfaction with 
several aspects of job satisfaction (Q18).  This job satisfaction question had five sub-questions 
that asked, in a randomized order, the respondent’s satisfaction level with (a) the meaningfulness 
of their current job to their unit, (b) the challenge of the job, (c) the ability to use their degrees or 
skills, (d) the feeling of being valued, and (e) the amount of additional duties associated with 
their job.  For each of the five, they were then compared to career intent, rank, and AFSC.  All of 
these job aspects proved to have a very strong correlation to the respondent’s career intent.  (See 
Appendix O for the complete cross tabulations analysis.)  However, most of these factors proved 
to be uncorrelated to career intent when the comparisons were limited to either junior or non-
junior officers (even though they were correlated to rank, which is strongly linked to tenure). 
In turning to those leaning to separate or undecided career intent, there were greater levels of 
dissatisfaction with all of the five factors of job satisfaction among this group than compared to 
those whose intent was to remain in the Air Force.  Of those with intent to separate or undecided, 
the only factor where a majority of respondents expressed dissatisfaction was that of use of one’s 
skills or degree.  For the other four factors, feeling valued was the second largest at 37% dissatis-
fied, and the other three ranged from about 31% to 34%.  However, even for the group that is 
intending to leave, more than 60% of them found job challenge to be satisfying.   
As is expected, the respondents that indicated dissatisfaction can be correlated to rank, since 
rank and Years of Service and strongly correlated.  Logically, as these factors are a driver for 
career intention, the higher the rank, the less remaining dissatisfied personnel, as they have al-
ready had the opportunity to leave the AF.  All five job satisfaction sub-questions were then 
highly correlated to rank.56  There is also some correlation of these factors to AFSC.  The trend is 
that engineers are slightly more dissatisfied than program managers with job challenge (Q18b), 
25% and 23% respectively.  Scientists are more satisfied with job challenge (only 17% indicated 
dissatisfaction).  For use of degree (Q18c), 41% of engineers reported dissatisfaction, compared 
to 37% for program managers and 30% for scientists.  For the aspect of feeling valued (Q18d), 
nearly 29% of both engineers and program managers felt dissatisfied, compared to 20% of scien-
tists.   
The largest contributor to job dissatisfaction was the lack of opportunity to use one’s degree 
or skills.  This was especially true for the younger officers, who have only recently received their 
degree.  It was also particularly true more for engineers, but a source of dissatisfaction for all.  
                                                 
56 See Appendix O. 
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Feeling valued was the second largest source of dissatisfaction for those separating, though this 
one and the other factors did not represent the majority of those with intent to separate. 
The Assignment System 
I have shown above that assignment system was ranked as the number two reason to sepa-
rate.  Here, I look at some assignment-related issues. 
When I compared the desire for an AF policy allowing personnel to remain at one base for an 
entire career (a “homesteading” policy, Q20) to ranking of the assignment system as a separation 
factor, nearly 25% that favored such a policy also ranked assignment system as a major reason to 
separate (1 or 2).  In fact, the more the respondent agreed with such a homesteading policy, the 
higher they ranked the assignment system as an influence to leave.  Strong support (a 1) for 
homesteading is slightly greater for Captains and than with Lieutenants, and overall homestead-
ing correlates to rank with 96.6% confidence.  The reason this may become a bigger desire in the 
mid ranks is likely tied to people wanting to settle down, raise a family, buy a long-term home, 
etc, something that their civilian counterparts at that point of their career are doing.  Obviously, 
those that are burdened or bothered by the requirement to relocate to new duty stations every 3 or 
so years have likely left the AF by the time they would have otherwise been a Lt Colonel, or 
have otherwise grown to tolerate it.  Lieutenants, on the other hand, are more likely to be eager 
for the opportunity to “see the world” by relocating every few years. 
When I compared desire for more operational experience (Q26b) to ranking of the assign-
ment system as a separation factor, while 50% of respondents desired more operational experi-
ence, only about 23% ranked assignment system as their number 1 or 2 reason to separate.  Fur-
ther analysis of desire for operational experience indicates that whether we focus on the group 
leaning towards separating, or the entire population, respondents are only slightly swayed to-
wards wanting more operational experience.  Since, in general, most people in this career field 
are not given the opportunity for operational experience, we can assume that those that were not 
in favor were not because they do not want that experience at all, not because they have received 
some already and had enough.  The issue of operational experience from the standpoint of the 
respondent then tends to be an issue that is split.  This means that if an AF policy was created 
that forced an initial operational tour upon commissioning, the result would be that such a policy 
would do just as much damage as it does good.  Similar issues, those of deployment opportuni-
ties and TDY opportunities, proved to have no correlation.   
The most remarkable finding is that of Table 1, which compares satisfaction with the as-
signment system to overall job satisfaction, and represents the entire group of respondents, re-
gardless of career intent.  The strong correlation shows that those happy with their jobs are happy 
with the assignment system, and vice-versa.  Since this shows the entire population, it is clear 
that satisfaction with the assignment system and job satisfaction are directly linked, and not just a 
peculiarity for those with intent to leave the AF. 
The assignment system is a major source of dissatisfaction overall, and it is strongly corre-
lated to job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction pertains to one’s current job, while the assignment sys-
tem is more or a global problem, and as such deserves the most attention from AF leadership.  
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The idea of homesteading at one base for long tours or even a career is also something that 
would be welcomed by many, and is a factor that contributes to dissatisfaction with the assign-
ment system overall.  Allowing a homesteading policy would certainly contribute positively to 
minimizing separation rates.  Operational experience is something that is desired by about half of 
population, but forcing operational tours on everyone instead of making them voluntary would 
cause major turmoil in satisfaction and likely hurt overall retention.  Details of this section are 
available in Appendix P.   
  Ave 10&30a: Job  
 N=592 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 Satisfied 7.6% 3.2% 0.3% 1.7% 0.2% 13.0% 
2 8.6% 13.0% 3.2% 4.9% 2.2% 31.9% 
3 3.0% 5.6% 2.5% 2.7% 1.5% 15.4% 
4 2.5% 6.9% 3.7% 6.4% 3.7% 23.3% 
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5 Dissatisfied 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 4.1% 6.9% 16.4% 
 Total 23.6% 30.6% 11.5% 19.8% 14.5% 100.0%
 Chi-Sq. = 165.859 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 1 Cross tabulation of 1030Ave(a) on job satisfaction vs. 1030Ave(k) on the assignment system.57 
Pay 
I now turn again to only those respondents who expressed undecided career intent or were 
leaning towards separating from the AF, and thereby were asked what factors influenced their 
possible separation (Q31).  As it was revealed above, pay (Q31a) turned out to be only the third 
ranked influence as a reason to separate.  Obviously, those that considered they were underpaid 
(Q21) or felt that S&E’s should have special pay for their unique skills (Q14b) were more prone 
to rank pay as a significant reason to separate.  However, this effect of ranking pay as a separa-
tion influence was not as strong (though still significant) for those that felt officers with ad-
vanced technical degrees (Q16) should be paid more.  56% of all respondents felt they were ade-
quately paid, while another 20% were neutral on the issue, leaving 24% that felt they were un-
derpaid.  Among junior officers alone, 72% were satisfied with pay and allowances.   
One interesting result was found when comparing overall job satisfaction to satisfaction with 
pay.  It shows that regardless of job satisfaction, the majority of respondents were satisfied with 
pay.  Thus, those that are dissatisfied with their job and therefore more prone to leave are not 
overly concerned with pay, or at least consider it a smaller career influence.  What this means is, 
if people are separating due to low job satisfaction, then pay is inconsequential.  This also sug-
gests that retention bonuses will only retain those that intended to stay in the AF in the first 
place.  (See Table 2 below.)     
                                                 
57 For all cross tabulations presented in this section, unless otherwise noted:  red (dark gray) cells are with percent-
ages greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges 
between 1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N. 
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While some prioritize pay, the majority of respondents felt they were adequately paid, and 
pay was only a primary influence to leave the AF for a minority.  Consequently, bonuses used 
for retention will not likely be successful at mitigating attrition—a theory I test in the following 
section.  (Consult Appendix Q for detailed data on pay, and Appendix W for further analysis of 
pay that is specific to S&E’s.) 
  Ave 10&30a: Job  
 N=592 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 Satisfied 14.7% 9.5% 3.4% 6.8% 3.9% 38.2% 
2 6.1% 14.0% 5.2% 6.6% 5.9% 37.8% 
3 1.5% 3.0% 1.5% 2.4% 1.7% 10.1% 
4 0.8% 3.7% 1.0% 3.2% 1.9% 10.6% 
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5 Dissatisfied 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 0.8% 1.2% 3.2% 
 Total 23.6% 30.6% 11.5% 19.8% 14.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 62.809 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 2 Cross tabulation of satisfaction with pay in 1030Ave(b) vs. 1030Ave(a) on overall job satisfaction.58 
For entire population. 
Bonuses (the CSRB, etc) 
This leads me to the next analysis of pay:  that of the Continuing Skills Retention Bonus 
(CSRB).  Based on the relationship of pay to separation as described above, I theorize bonuses 
do not have a significant effect on retention.  Here I take an in-depth look at the recent CSRB 
and put this theory to the test.   
The CSRB, or “Engineering Bonus”, was in fact offered to more than just engineers.  Ac-
cording to the AFPC website59, among other requirements, the applicant must have a Core AFSC 
of 32E, 33S, 61S, 62E, or 63A.  The CSRB was available only for a short window, from 6 Feb 
03 to 30 Sept 03.  In analyzing the CSRB data, I insured the applicant was indeed qualified for 
the CSRB when they said they were, and not when they said they were not.  Those that identified 
themselves blatantly incorrectly were not included in this section of analysis, and the resulting 
dataset was of 482 respondents.60   
The dataset included 118 active duty respondents that were qualified for and accepted the 
CSRB, 64% of which were Captains, and only 61% of these were sure they would remain in the 
AF for a career. What is interesting is that, as a touted retention bonus, the CSRB likely had no 
                                                 
58 For all cross tabulations presented in this section, unless otherwise noted:  red (dark gray) cells are with percent-
ages greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges 
between 1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N. 
59 http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/csrb/csrb/faq.htm  
60 Those records filtered out were done so from the working data set of 592, which was the data set that resulted af-
ter eliminating suspect records, as described in Appendix H.  Those filtered out for CSRB reasons were done so just 
for the questions pertaining to the CSRB and otherwise their records were used throughout the rest of this report’s 
research.  See Appendix I for details on how the data was filtered, and Appendix R for a supplement to this section. 
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retention impact on the Major class, considering all of them have more than 10+ years of active 
duty service and are more than half way to retirement.61  Table 3 attempts to grade the effective-
ness of the CSRB by comparing career intent for these 118 to the respondent’s own assessment 
on whether or not the CSRB made a difference in their career intent (Q23).  According to the 
data, only 11% of the 118 indicated a strong effect due to the CSRB and gave a strong indication 
of staying in the AF.  If I am a bit more generous62, I could say the CSRB was likely effective at 
long-term retention with less than 31% of those that accepted it.   
 Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=118 1 Career in AF 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Strongly 
Agree 9.3% 1.7% 0.0% 3.4% 0.8% 15.3% 
2 14.4% 5.1% 5.9% 3.4% 1.7% 30.5% 
3 Neutral 9.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.2% 
4 26.3% 2.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 29.7% 
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5 Strongly 
Disagree 13.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 14.4% 
 Total 72.9% 10.2% 6.8% 7.6% 2.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 35.082 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.004  
       
63.6%  45.8%   11.0% 
no long-term effect with 
CSRB 
 
some effect of CSRB 
(long or short-term)  
definite long-term 
effect of CSRB 
 
Table 3 Cross tabulation of whether the CSRB had an effect (Q23) vs. career intent. 
Q23, which rates the respondent’s feelings of how much of an effect the CSRB had on how long they planned to 
stay in the AF versus their indicated career intent. 
Therefore, from a standpoint of long-term effect, the CSRB seems to have been widely un-
successful.  It is of course unclear if the intent of the CSRB was to fix a short-term problem.  
However, if this were the case, then it seems less likely that they would have offered it to Ma-
jors, or that the AF would have cancelled the CSRB after less than one year of being offered.  In 
fact, had the CSRB not been offered to Majors, it is possible that the excess funding could have 
been stretched for use for a second year.   
The other aspect of the CSRB is that it may have done more damage than it did good.  Of the 
202 active duty respondents who missed the opportunity to accept the CSRB due to their tenure, 
about 20% probably have been swayed to leave the Air Force due to the cancellation of the 
CSRB.  About 50% of these (10% of the total) definitely will leave the AF due to the CSRB can-
cellation.  (See Table 4.)  However, these respondents may have otherwise always been destined 
                                                 
61 The idea of a “point of no return” at 8-10 years is widely considered the last logical chance to voluntarily leave 
active military duty.  Otherwise, the huge benefits of the military retirement system become more and more a major 
factor in your career intent.  This can be graphically seen in Figure 5 where nearly all doubt on career intent is gone 
by YOS = 10. 
62 31% is found from including the all four values in Table 3 where a 1 or 2 was given for Career Intent and Q23, 
and are the top-left four values in the cross tabulation.  These four values sum to 30.5%, or about 31%. 
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to separate from the AF, and they simply point to the cancellation of the CSRB as a tangible 
scapegoat for why they wish to separate.  (See Appendix R for details.) 
The CSRB had very limited success in long-term retention with Captains, and wasted valu-
able resources by giving away bonuses to Majors who were already effectively vested.  The can-
cellation of the CSRB also likely had at least some negative impact.  With 11% having a definite 
positive effect from the CSRB, and possibly 10% having a definite negative effect due to its can-
cellation, the CSRB may have ultimately had no net retention effect.  What is perhaps the most 
important thing to take away from looking at the CSRB is that the idea of fixing a retention prob-
lem by giving the target group a bonus opportunity does not really address the root cause(s) for 
the problem in the first place (and hence this thesis).   
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=202 1 Career in AF 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Strongly 
Agree 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 15.3% 
2 4.5% 3.0% 5.0% 6.9% 5.9% 25.2% 
3 Neutral 9.4% 5.4% 3.5% 2.0% 7.9% 28.2% 
4 4.0% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 11.9% 20.3% 
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5 Strongly 
Disagree 2.5% 0.5% 1.0% 3.0% 4.0% 10.9% 
 Total 22.8% 11.4% 15.8% 16.3% 33.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.125 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
 
43.1% possible effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
19.8% probable effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
 
9.9% definite effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
 
 
Table 4 Cross tabulation of effect of cancellation of the CSRB (Q24) vs. career intent . 
Q24, which rates the respondent’s feelings of how much of an effect the CSRB’s cancellation had on their AF career 
decision versus their indicated career intent. 
Promotion System 
The promotion system was ranked as the fourth most influential reason to separate (Q31b).  
Appendix L shows the distribution of ranking the promotion system as compared to the rank of 
the respondent and suggests Lieutenants are not as influenced to separate by the promotion sys-
tem as were Captains, and especially Majors.  (Majors showed a greater concern for the promo-
tion system, likely because the performance-based promotion to Lt Colonel is much more diffi-
cult than the performance-based promotion to Major.63  Those few Majors that are considering 
                                                 
63 The promotion from Second to First Lieutenant, and from First Lieutenant to Captain, are time-based, occurring at 
the 2-year and 4-year point, respectively.  Extremely poor performance or illegal or immoral conduct is the only way 
one might not make these first two promotions.  The promotion to Major is the first performance-based promotion, 
though it also occurs in a window of time based on years of service.  The promotion rate (for line officers) to Major 
was 92% (for non-rated mission support officers in the primary zone) in the 1 Nov 2003 review board, whose results 
were published in March 2004.  See Appendix Y for more details. 
Source:  http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/offprom/default.htm  
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separating late in their career are likely doing so because of fear of not being promoted again.)  
Yet, as shown in the Overall Air Force Satisfaction section above, promotion system 
(1030Ave(d)) was significant.  About 24% of junior officers were dissatisfied with the promotion 
system, while about 22% of non-junior officers were dissatisfied.  While dissatisfaction with the 
promotion system may be correlated to career intent, it is likely not a key reason junior officers 
are separating.  For this reason, the promotion system being ranked fourth may have been ranked 
this high simply due to only being offered five choices to rank as separation influences.  It could 
in fact be lower for junior officers if more options were offered. 
The question that asked respondents if they were in favor of a performance-based only pro-
motion system (Q25), which would essentially only affect Lieutenants and Captains and to a de-
gree, Majors, yielded a lack of interest in such a system.  The results were mostly neutral (34%), 
with about an even split around the neutral point (23% responded with a 2 suggesting slight 
agreement for such a policy while 25% responded with a 4 suggesting slight opposition to such a 
policy.)  However, interest of lack therefore in a performance-based promotion system had no 
correlation to career intent, nor did it correlate to rank or AFSC. 
Based on the regression analysis detailed in the Overall Air Force Satisfaction section, for the 
junior officer category, the promotion system appears to be a driver to stay in the AF, which is an 
unexpected result.  It was also surprising to see that Lieutenants were not strongly in favor of a 
performance-based promotion system.  Apparently, the assured promotion at the early ranks is 
widely considered a positive feature of the AF.   
Availability of Civilian Jobs 
I now turn to an analysis of the ranking of the availability of equivalent civilian jobs as an in-
fluencing factor to separate (Q31d).  Comparing availability of civilian jobs versus overall job 
satisfaction, for those that are dissatisfied with their jobs, they are slightly more likely to rank 
availability of civilian jobs as a higher influence to separate.  However, the results of this com-
parison do not yield any striking trends, and it may be that, despite the option to enter N/A when 
ranking factors that influence separation, the limited five factors offered gave some artificial 
boost to the factor of availability of civilian jobs.   
Appendix L shows the comparison of the ranking of the availability of equivalent civilian 
jobs to rank.  Lieutenants ranked availability of civilian jobs mostly from 3 to 5, while Captains 
were most likely to rank it a 5.  This suggests a Lieutenant’s perspective on the civilian world 
may be more optimistic than that of a Captain.   
In looking again at all respondents, about 75% of all respondents felt their AF job was at 
least as good as or better than their civilian counterpart was (Q19).  Comparing this to overall job 
satisfaction showed that, for those that are very satisfied with their job, they also feel their AF 
job is better than the equivalent civilian job.  Those that were dissatisfied with their job felt their 
AF job was either about the same or slightly worse than their civilian counterpart’s.  This is evi-
dence that job satisfaction affects one’s perspective on other jobs and prospects.  This clearly in-
dicates that job satisfaction is once again a root cause for even this factor.  It should be noted, 
however, that the comparison of one’s AF job to that of a civilian counterpart is most definitely 
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linked to the perception or reality of the civilian job market and the economy.  Perception that 
civilian jobs are less secure during economic turmoil is certainly a factor in the results of these 
questions.  Likewise, if this survey were administered in the dot-com boom, opposite results 
would likely have been exhibited. 
Leadership Factors 
One leadership factor that is the concern of several respondents, as indicated in their open-
ended comments, is that there is a perception that senior leadership is mostly pilots or non-
acquisitions officers.  If true, such a lack of example of senior officers who started in acquisitions 
would have a negative effect on morale for junior officers who may be contemplating an AF ca-
reer.   
The respondents were asked if they started out in Acquisitions or another field within the AF 
upon commissioning (Q9) to see whether their initial job was led to different career intention re-
sults.  While the resulting comparison proved to be almost completely uncorrelated64, there is 
nearly 100% confidence when comparing the initial job to rank (see Figure 9).  Note this figure 
has limited the data set to those respondents that are currently in acquisitions.  Figure 9 might 
suggest attrition as you progress in rank within acquisitions, since higher-ranking officer posi-
tions are fewer.65  Clearly, this data also supports the perception that the AF is bringing in offi-
cers from other fields to fill acquisition jobs for the senior ranks.  This data seems to confirm the 
perception that there is a decrease in acquisitions-grown officers as you move up in rank.  The 
survey did not measure how this might effect junior officers, but the open-ended comments did 
express some frustration with the lack of indigenous leadership.   
This brings us to consider how leadership may play a role in the career intent of an individ-
ual.  The survey asked each respondent to rate their satisfaction for (a) their immediate supervi-
sor, (b) their unit leadership, (c) their base leadership, (d) their command leadership, and (e) AF 
Headquarters-level leadership (Q11).  Figure 10 shows the overall satisfaction of the population 
with leadership.  Overall, most people are satisfied.  However, as we move up the chain of com-
mand, more people have a neutral attitude towards higher leadership.  This suggests that many 
officers are either unaware of or out of touch with the higher levels of the chain.  Conversely, 
higher segments of the chain of command are out of touch with lower ranking officers. 
When comparing each of these five leadership levels to career intent, the results were insig-
nificant until (d) command leadership (97.8% confidence) and (e) AF Headquarters leadership 
(~100% confidence) were considered.  A summary, based on the cross tabulation for these two 
factors, is shown in Appendix T.  For the respondent leaning towards staying in the AF, 69% are 
satisfied with their command leadership, compared to only about 46% among respondents lean-
ing towards leaving the AF.  These numbers are nearly identical for satisfaction with AF HQ 
leadership.  However, for those leaning towards leaving, they tend to be either neutral towards 
                                                 
64 Exhibiting a Sig. of 0.914. 
65 Acknowledging the few Colonels in the data set and the question of whether my data is representative of this high 
rank, if this is indicative of reality, then it is particularly interesting to see less than 40% of Colonels currently in 
acquisitions actually started in acquisitions.   
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their command and the AF HQ, or slightly more dissatisfied than those intending a career in the 
AF.  This suggests that more of those leaning towards leaving the AF have not been exposed 
enough to their command or HQ leadership or have not been happy with the leadership they have 
seen.  This might also indicate that those leaning towards separating are doing so because of AF-
wide policies.   
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Lieutenant Captain Major Lt Colonel Colonel
Acquisitions Non-Operational or Other Operations or Ops Training
 
Figure 9 For respondents currently in acquisitions, initial job in the AF by rank; N=478. 66 
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Leadership
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Leadership
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Figure 10 Leadership satisfaction of the population; N≥511.67 
Supervisors and base leadership are not a major driver for career intent.  Most, in fact, are 
quite satisfied with these levels of leadership.  There is only statistical significance with com-
mand and AF HQ leadership when compared to career intent, though even with these levels, the 
majority is satisfied.  The correlation with the top levels of leadership to career intent surely in-
                                                 
66 There are 241 Lieutenants, 143 Captains, 65 Majors, 21 Lt Colonels, and 8 Colonels that contribute to Figure 9.  
The smaller numbers at the higher ranks means that the results on the right side of the figure may not be accurate. 
67 N/A responses were allowed in the leadership questions, hence N≥511. 
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dicates a need for senior leadership to do more to address the concerns of junior officers who are 
apt to separate.  Additionally, the Air Force should look closely at who they choose to put in 
command positions at the base level, and whenever possible, insure they are acquisitions officers 
that are in command of other acquisitions officers.  These commanders serve as an example of 
how junior officers in these career fields can also rise to such a high rank and position if they ap-
ply themselves.   
Discussion of Key Open-Ended Comments 
An optional question (Q32) allowing open-ended feedback was available at the end of the 
survey.  There were 224 respondents that left some sort of comment, and this is of the entire 
population that took the survey (N = 762).68  Key comments and themes are listed in Appendix 
U.  This section will discuss a few of these themes.     
Job satisfaction appeared in many forms in the survey, most notably as feeling of underval-
ued and underutilization, particularly of the junior officers.  Several had also mentioned that they 
felt fooled by their ROTC program, expecting more traditional military jobs (leadership opportu-
nities, deployments, etc) in their jobs, as well as having expectation of hands-on engineering and 
science.  This sentiment puts a different spin on the question asked in the survey as to whether 
respondents understood the career field before joining the Air Force, to which a majority of the 
scientist and engineers reported they did not (see Appendix V).  Others noted they had no incen-
tive to work hard (due to the lack of any merit-based system of pay, promotion, or other incen-
tives).  Finally, many frustrated with their AF jobs suggested the Air Force does not need officers 
to serve in acquisitions at all, and that these jobs can and should be outsourced to government 
civil servants.  The assignment system was also a major source of frustration exhibited in the 
comments, and included frustrations with the rigidity of the system, the AF treating all officers 
as interchangeable in any job, and frustration with relocations.  The large number of comments 
on job satisfaction and the assignment system reinforces the hypotheses that these are the two 
chief drivers for career intent.  Additionally, few comments existed on pay, and the lack of such 
comments further reinforces my belief that pay is not a serious drive on career intent.  The com-
ments also highlighted several nuances of job satisfaction and assignment system, some of which 
were measured indirectly in the survey, and some not at all. 
 
 
                                                 
68 The comments have not been limited to the non-suspect data set used for analysis above (N = 592). 
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Discussion and Conclusions69 
“To turbocharge retention, you must first know the hearts and minds of your employees and then under-
take the tough and rewarding task of sculpting careers that bring joy to both.” 
—Butler and Waldroop (p. 152) 
Job and Air Force Satisfaction 
47% of junior officers in this survey expressed intent to separate.70  Without a doubt, junior 
officers are leaving primarily due to low job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction entails different things 
for different people.  Reasons include lack of feeling value, lack of challenging work, lack of op-
portunity to use one’s degree or skills, lack of leadership opportunities, lack of deployments or 
lack of operational experience, lack of recognition, and the OPR system.  Of these, the biggest 
drivers are the six underlined. 
Of the factors of job satisfaction, more than a third of junior officers expressed being under-
valued in their jobs.  This may mean being underutilized or simply not respected.  While this did 
not correlate directly to one’s career intent when limited to just junior officers, it was very sig-
nificant for the population as a whole.  The same is true of lack of challenging work.   
Many Lieutenants expressed lack of serious work, represented not only in open-ended com-
ments but also in the factors measuring lack of opportunity to use one’s degree or skills, lack of 
challenging work, and lack of feeling valued.  The issue for the Air Force is that this is precisely 
the group that should be catered to the most, as they are the ones most likely to leave the Air 
Force.  Being a Lieutenant should mean being subject to a marketing campaign from the Air 
Force—Air Force marketing should not stop once an officer is commissioned.  The Air Force 
focuses on bringing in new Lieutenants through recruiting initiatives to fill the large number of 
vacancies that appear as officers separate.  Instead, the AF should be spending this effort on re-
tention.   
The opportunity to use one’s degree or skills, particularly true for the many in this research 
with technical degrees, is very important, especially as you are just leaving college to join the Air 
Force.  This is partly tied to job value, but it is mostly tied to the fact that engineers and scientists 
are mostly doing managerial work, even as brand new officers.  This is a major source of frustra-
tion for the entire population considered (more than 50% of S&E’s were dissatisfied with the op-
portunities to use their degree), and is even true for those who intend to make the AF a career.  
Based on both open-ended comments and the fact that 66% of Lieutenants did not understand 
how S&E’s were utilized by the Air Force, there is a severe problem that begins with the com-
                                                 
69 Much of this discussion is focused on junior officers, defined as having less than 5 YOS, since this is largely the 
group that is likely to separate.  See Appendix G for demographics related to this group. 
70 47% is the combination of those that have a 4 or 5 on the 5-point Likert Scale.  32.6% gave a 5 (Probably NOT 
Stay in Air Force), 14.4% gave a 4 (Possibly NOT Stay in Air Force).  If we limit the officers to just those with 3-5 
completed YOS, then the intent to separate totals 42.7%, with 29.8% giving a 5, and 12.9% giving a 4.  Each of 
these measures uses the 5-point true average of Questions 12 and 29.  See Appendix J for details. 
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missioning sources and recruiters.  Education is critical and more ROTC cadre slots (and the 
equivalent at other commissioning programs) should be filled with acquisitions-experienced offi-
cers, particularly at technical schools.  As of the writing of this thesis, none of the cadre at MIT’s 
own Air Force ROTC program had acquisitions experience or an S&E background.  For a lead-
ing technical school as MIT, this is a major failure on the part of the Air Force. 
Lack of leadership opportunities are another significant influence in overall job dissatisfac-
tion.  45% of junior officers were dissatisfied with the lack of leadership opportunities, and an-
other 17% were undecided or neutral on the issue.  This is again partly due to the misconceptions 
generated in commissioning sources like ROTC.  ROTC gives the impression that officers lead 
enlisted, and indeed this is true for the vast majority of the military.  However, ROTC programs 
fail to educate their officer-candidates about the very different acquisitions community, where 
leadership opportunities may not exist until Major or even Lt Colonel.  The acquisitions world is 
a very different world than ROTC or likely USAFA portrays, and this is partly because this field 
is unlike the rest of the USAF.  Again, the need for better education through commissioning 
sources is paramount.  It is at this early indoctrination to the AF that the image of military life is 
formed, and when acquisitions proves to be contrary to this image, it leads many junior officers 
to be disappointed. 
About half of junior officers feel operational experience would be important, but the idea of 
an operational assignment is widely disagreed upon.  If the Air Force were to mandate an opera-
tional first assignment, the result would likely do as much harm as good.  The best alternative is 
to give optional opportunities for such experience.  Since maybe only 50% of junior officers 
would be interested in such experience, it would likely minimize cost not to mandate such as-
signments.  Alternatively, the Air Force could create a program, and mandate it if necessary, that 
is limited to operational TDY’s of weeks of a few months.  Finally, the Air Force should con-
sider pairing System Program Offices (SPO’s) and other acquisitions units to applicable opera-
tional units that are would-be users of that which the SPO is developing.  The SPO could then 
participate perhaps just twice a year in field exercises with the user unit.   
More than half of junior officers want deployment opportunities, with another 20% neutral 
on deployment.  On one occasion, I was able to witness a presentation of retention issues by sen-
ior leadership to the acquisitions community.  Expectedly, deployment opportunities were 
brought up by someone in the audience.  The response was that the Air Force does not wish to 
train and equip acquisitions officers for combat, and so deployment opportunities are not likely 
to appear.  This is curious, since all the while the Air Force tries to invigorate these officers by 
calling them “war fighters” and trying to tell them of the big picture and how their work matters.  
However, regardless of the number of memos, emails, or visits by Generals, junior officers will 
never connect their jobs to the operational Air Force if they cannot see that part of the Air Force.  
The Air Force cannot call the acquisition officer a war fighter, or a soldier, if that officer cannot 
fight, deploy, or experience operations, even when many are literally begging for these experi-
ences.  Without these opportunities, the Air Force should seriously consider if officers are 
needed to fulfill the acquisitions needs of the AF, or if civil servants would be better suited for 
this role. 
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The Assignment System 
Related to opportunities for deployment and operational experience is the assignment system.  
The assignment system is clearly the second most important source of frustration, behind job sat-
isfaction.  In fact, Table 1 shows the two are directly linked.  If an officer is satisfied with their 
job, they attribute this to the assignment system, and vice versa.  Job satisfaction, which is intan-
gible and hard to quantify, can then be improved by improving the assignment system.  That is, 
fixing problems with the assignment system means fixing two major problems in the acquisitions 
community.  In fact, job satisfaction is linked to one’s current job, while the assignment system 
is a more global factor in Air Force satisfaction.  Therefore, solving problems with the assign-
ment system will have more far-reaching effects than just one’s individual job.   
One of the chief problems with the assignment system is that officers are treated as inter-
changeable parts.  While the current system attempts to consider the needs of all stakeholders, 
including the officer and the Air Force, the system is failing to do so adequately.  The fact that 
chemical engineers are being placed in mechanical engineering jobs or that some scientists and 
engineers are coded as 63A’s (instead of 62E’s) are examples of a mismatching problem that be-
lieves officers are interchangeable.  The system is also limited as it fails to take into account an 
officer’s experience and new realizations of what kinds of jobs will make them happy (and this 
happiness leads to job satisfaction).71    
This leads to the next problem in the assignment system, that of being locked into an AFSC.  
The assignment system primarily assigns people to jobs that match their AFSC.  The problem 
with this is that the average officer is assigned their AFSC based on their undergraduate degree 
alone.  Their undergraduate degree may have little to do with their embedded life interests, 
which they may not even discover until well after they have achieved their Bachelors.  This is 
further complicated by the fact that, due to the historical retention and manning problems for the 
61S, 62E, and 63A fields, AFPC is reluctant to allow officers in these fields to change their 
AFSC.  What this means is that officers feel, and indeed are, stuck in their AFSC. 
This locking in happens very early, since the Air Force offers scholarships to many under-
graduates in ROTC if they are pursuing technical degrees.72  This scholarship is certainly a major 
influence not to change one’s degree major.  It is therefore true that the decision of degree major 
as a senior in high school can lock you into an AFSC and career track through ROTC and 
throughout the remainder of your tenure with the Air Force.  However, it is unlikely that many 
seniors in high school know yet what their embedded life interest may be.   
Hence, as an officer either discovers new professional interests, or finds that their embedded 
life interests may be something other than their AFSC, they may have little choice but to sepa-
rate.  This inflexibility is a fundamental problem with the Air Force.  If people are indeed the 
greatest asset the Air Force has, then listening to them and working with their needs is what is 
                                                 
71 There is a space on the assignment preference worksheet for the comments of both the officer and one’s supervi-
sor.  Additionally, there is politicking for assignments, which can be more easily facilitated if one’s supervisor is of 
a rank or position of influence.  However, for the vast majority of junior officers, the group that is of the biggest 
concern of my research, these supervisor factors are limited. 
72  USAFA students, who do not choose their major until their junior year, have tuition and cost of living paid for. 
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necessary to not only make them happy, but also to quell separations and thereby maximize the 
Air Force’s ability to succeed at its mission.   
The final assignment issue is that of the number of reassignments.  Many people expressed a 
desire for longer tours of duty, particularly in the open-ended statements (the survey itself did not 
adequately measure for this).  This would certainly cut costs for the military by minimizing 
number of moves the Air Force would need to pay for.  Furthermore, this would help the Air 
Force continuity for long-development acquisitions programs.  If frequent reassignment is a non-
negotiable modus operandi, then the Air Force could reassign personnel to elsewhere on a base, 
and need not keep them in the same job per se.  There exists no logical reason to force personnel, 
particularly non-rated non-operational personnel, to relocate for a new assignment every 3-4 
years.  The Air Force does this because that is the way it has always been done, and because it 
makes sense to some degree for operational personnel.  However, unless the Air Force indeed 
begins offering operations and deployments and otherwise treats the acquisitions community 
more as war fighters, it is 1) not economical, 2) not conducive to acquisitions or research & de-
velopment, and 3) a negative effect for many on their quality of life to force these relocations so 
often.  As one open-ended comment stated, “…several bases provide the opportunity to do a lab, 
SPO, test, staff job at 3-4 years a piece and therefore, could still build depth and breadth at one 
location.”  So not even “depth and breadth” is an adequate reason to deny this change.  The key 
point is, if people are getting out of the Air Force because they cannot stay in one location longer 
than the standard 3-4 years, then why not let them stay in the Air Force and remain at one base?  
(Indeed, many of these bases are also undermanned, so if they were to retain people for longer 
than 3-4 years, it certainly would not harm base level manning.)  Changing this can only improve 
many factors for the Air Force and these officers.  Even if for some reason “homesteading”, or 
remaining at one base for a career, is simply not tolerable, some comprise such as longer tours, 
or two consecutive assignments at one base, is certainly both beneficial to the Air Force and the 
personnel. 
OPR’s, Promotions, and Merit 
Another area of concern, the OPR system, was dissatisfactory for many junior officers (44%, 
with another 13% undecided) and was linked to their career decisions, but to a lesser degree.  
Recognition proved an even smaller driver on retention, though was still significant with 40% of 
junior officers dissatisfied with recognition.  Those concerned most with recognition, as well as 
the promotion system, were higher-ranking officers who are less likely to separate due to the 
greater influence of the retirement system with more time spent in the military.  Since these fac-
tors appeared to have a small influence on retention, further discussion is reserved for Appendix 
Y.  
The OPR system leads us to a similar topic, that of the promotion system.  It is interesting 
that while many open-ended statements referred to the lack of incentive to excel ahead, and that 
recognition did prove to have an impact on career decisions, 62% of junior officers were satisfied 
with the current time-based promotion system.73  When asked if they favored a performance or 
                                                 
73 Results from those with a 1 or 2 response for 1030Ave(d), limited to junior officers. 
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merit-based promotion system, 36% were undecided, with the rest split just around the center 
point (about 22% slightly agreed or favored, 23% slight disagreed or did not favor).   
Yet, since recognition was a factor on career intent, this leads to the question of whether 
some other merit-based measures should be instituted.  The problem with a lack of a merit-based 
system is that it encourages mediocrity—with job performance not really a factor for promotion 
until Lt Colonel74, time in service essentially drives one’s promotions.  Since the pay chart has 
rank on one axis, and years of service on the other, this means that in fact pay is exclusively 
time-based for all ranks until about Lt Colonel.  Therefore, pay is not an incentive to do one’s job 
well.  Such a system then encourages separation of those who are naturally inclined to be over-
achievers.  This system in fact actually discourages hard work, and encourages those that do not 
want to work hard to remain in the military.  For, if those that do not wish to work hard were to 
leave the military, the civilian system that is based on merit would demand far greater efforts 
than the military.  It is therefore a lack of a merit-based system in the military that is a retention 
tool for the underachievers and at the same time a tool to expel the sharpest and brightest of 
young military officers.   
Those that feel the need for merit-based performance are likely to leave the Air Force, though 
likely these sentiments were not adequately tested for in my survey, except perhaps with the 
question on feeling valued or on recognition.  It is likely a problem to get a real measure on this 
issue, since senior officers are likely to appreciate the non-merit-based system (having grown up 
in it) and junior officers tend to be focused on other issues for their career decisions.  (Recogni-
tion and feeling valued were lesser drivers, after all.) 
Pay and Bonuses 
Pay turns out to be a small factor for separation, with 72% of junior officers satisfied with 
pay and allowances.  (24% of the entire population felt they were underpaid for their skills and 
experience).  If pay is largely unimportant as a driver to stay or leave the Air Force, then logi-
cally monetary-based incentives for merit should also be met with minimal support.  It is there-
fore inconclusive whether more merit-based initiatives should be available, and if so, where to 
implement them.  It is also unclear if they would be met with support or not.  More research 
should be conducted in this area.   
It was interesting, however, that pay was largely inconsequential, regardless of one’s job sat-
isfaction.  Since pay is not a major driver, the Continuing Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) was, 
for this and other reasons, a failure.  Indeed, civilian companies feel paying a retention bonus at 
all is a failure, as it reflects a lack of attention to real retention factors.75  Those that missed the 
CSRB were frustrated by its cancellation, but the data suggests only about 10% were definitely 
affected enough to drive them from the Air Force.  However, these 10% would have likely left 
for other reasons if not the CSRB, as the total expected separation rate for this group is un-
changed.76  The real negative outcome from canceling the CSRB is from continuing to offer 
                                                 
74 See Appendix Y. 
75 Soper, 10. 
76 However, all of this data is necessarily affected in some way by the CSRB.  See Appendix R. 
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flight pay to pilots when the civilian economy is not hiring pilots, sending a very negative mes-
sage to the acquisitions community.  As for what was gained by the CSRB:  only about 11% of 
those that accepted it were definitely swayed to a career in the AF that they had not previously 
envisioned.   
Conclusions 
Revisiting my hypotheses: 
Job satisfaction is the key problem.  Job satisfaction is clearly the key driver for retention for 
junior officers.  Those non-junior officers intending to separate do so for varying reasons, but the 
bulk of retention efforts should be focused on those leaving at the 4-5 year point, where the ma-
jority of officers are leaving.  Of this group, the primary reason they leave is due to job satisfac-
tion.  Conclusion:  my hypothesis is correct. 
Over recruiting leads to lower job satisfaction.  It is unclear in the end whether over recruit-
ing leads to lower job satisfaction.  Since excess Lieutenants fill the many vacant Captain posi-
tions, in the end, most organizations do not have an excess of overall personnel.  However, with 
underutilization of Lieutenants in general, as is shown above, more Lieutenants likely means less 
valuable work for all.  Additionally, it has been said elsewhere77 that attrition of the mid-level 
officers hurts mentoring of junior officers, which likely has some effect on job satisfaction.  In 
the end, the survey did not adequately prove a connection of over recruiting and job satisfaction, 
one way or the other.  Conclusion:  my hypothesis is inconclusive. 
Assignment flexibility is another key problem.  Not only is this “another” key problem, it is 
the clear secondary problem, and is directly linked to job satisfaction.  Frustration with the as-
signment system includes inability to change AFSC’s, particularly in the acquisitions commu-
nity, lack of control on job assignment or base/location, and the frequency of reassignments.  The 
Air Force competes with the civilian world in this regard more than any other, and with pay not 
being a major problem, it is the assignment-related quality of life issues that the Air Force must 
focus the bulk of its retention efforts.  The entire system should in fact be overhauled, as sweep-
ing changes are required.  Conclusion:  my hypothesis is correct. 
Pay is perceived as a problem, but not the biggest problem.  Pay is largely considered ade-
quate, even by those with intent to separate.  It is not the driving force behind separation, and the 
Air Force should not focus their retention efforts on special pay for the acquisitions community.  
Nevertheless, the continued bonuses offered to pilots have an impact on morale and job satisfac-
tion of acquisitions officers.  For this reason, the Air Force should either consider implementing 
bonuses from a morale standpoint (not a retention standpoint), or should do away with those for 
pilots.78  Conclusion:  my hypothesis is correct. 
                                                 
77 Arreola and Soper, 12. 
78 There are major political issues with removing flight pay.  The best alternative may then be to institute engineer-
ing pay, but again, it is more for morale and a show of support from senior leadership.  Flight pay is unnecessary in 
today’s economy, and it sends a negative message to undermanned groups like acquisitions.  It is further acknowl-
edged that senior leadership is mostly pilots, and this will likely affect acceptance of this recommendation. 
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Civilian jobs are perceived as more attractive.  40% of junior officers felt their jobs were bet-
ter than those of their civilian counterparts, and another 26% felt they were about the same.  For 
junior officers with intent to separate, availability of civilian jobs averaged as their fourth influ-
ence to separate of the limited reasons given in Question 31.  This leads to the conclusion that 
similar civilian jobs are not, by most, considered more attractive than their AF jobs.  Conclusion: 
my hypothesis is incorrect. 
The problems with retention and dissatisfaction are many.  Real action by Air Force leader-
ship, in the form of changes in policy, is what is required.  Indeed doctrine like the S&E Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS) document suggests the Air Force is willing to do this:  “To motivate 
the workforce, we must provide a culture with technically challenging and rewarding work, 
along with competitive compensation and rewards that are based on technical merit and contribu-
tion.”79  The Air Force has not yet come to realize that competitive compensation is no longer in 
the form of (just) pay, but in the form of quality of life.  Most of the problems listed here, and the 
recommendations on how to address them, are quality of life issues.  In addition, many of these 
issues plague the Air Force as a whole, and not just acquisitions-related officers.  Some of the 
recommendations, explicitly given below, require radical thinking and major shifts in culture and 
thinking.  But the civilian world has either already made these changes, or had always had them 
as an advantage.  The Air Force simply needs to catch up.  With 47% of the junior officers ex-
pressing intent to leave, and the high cost of losing officers at the precise time they are becoming 
most productive and valuable, the Air Force cannot afford to ignore these issues.  When the Air 
Force must heavily recruit to maintain personnel as large numbers separate, it should send a sig-
nal that something is seriously wrong with the system.  And it needs to be fixed. 
                                                 
79 S&E CONOPS, 8. 
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Key Recommendations to Air Force 
In this age of internet file-sharing, music downloads, and Tivo, one principle has become 
evident, particularly in today’s younger generations:  people will give up quality for flexibility 
and control.  In fact, the entire consumer industry is moving more and more to giving people 
more control.  While this is applicable to many internet-based business models and consumer 
products, this is also true for career choices.  The Air Force competes with the civilian sector as a 
whole for manpower, and the flexibility offered by the civilian sector is more valuable to many 
people, even despite benefits like retirement and medical pay.  Such benefits are essentially un-
realized gains for very junior officers, while these same benefits become strong incentives to stay 
in the Air Force for senior officers.  Because of benefits being unrealized for juniors, junior offi-
cers are more likely to weigh their career decision on non-monetary and non-benefit incentives.  
The problem with AF manpower is that the military gets just one chance to retain someone, since 
once separated, a former officer can not (typically) rejoin.  Thus, finding the root causes for re-
tention are critical if the military wishes to minimize the numbers that are separating.  The over-
all reasons junior officers are separating are due to problems with the assignment system and 
overall job satisfaction, and these two factors are strongly correlated to each other.  Thus, giving 
officers better control, particularly in these two areas, is at the heart of all of the following spe-
cific recommendations to the Air Force. 
Overhaul the assignment system:  Better flexibility, more say for assignments (which should lead 
to better matching of jobs), and allowance for cross flowing to other AFSC’s should be allowed 
to keep the Air Force competitive to the civilian world.  The assignment system is one of the 
chief problems of retention, and it is directly linked to job satisfaction, the biggest source or re-
tention.  Addressing the assignment system will also immediately help job satisfaction. 
 
Improve job satisfaction:  Job satisfaction will improve due to its direct relationship with the as-
signment system.  Try to create more opportunities for deployments, such as connecting every 
System Program Office (SPO) to a group of applicable operators, or offer TDY’s of weeks or 
months for operational experience.  Do not make operational assignments mandatory, though 
operational TDY’s could be, as the damage from such a mandate will overshadow any good from 
it.  Encourage more leadership opportunities at the SPO or unit level.  Finally, create a culture for 
change that better utilizes junior officers. 
 
Longer tours of duty or reassignment within an AFB:  The Air Force should allow more flexibil-
ity in length or location of assignment.  The need for relocation of acquisitions officers is hard to 
defend, and frequent relocations are 1) not economical, 2) not conducive to acquisitions or re-
search & development, and 3) a negative effect for many on their quality of life.  The idea that 
people leave the Air Force because they merely do not wish to move, whether for family reasons 
or something else, is indicative of a rigid system.  No military professional in this career field 
should have to leave the Air Force to keep their family intact in order to avoid a PCS, especially 
when the base they would be leaving is likely undermanned. 
 
Avoid focusing future retention solutions on pay:  Consider reinstituting some sort of engineer-
ing bonus only for morale to show this is an important group, otherwise, if this is impractical, 
strongly consider canceling that pay for pilots.  Pay or bonuses for retention purposes serve little 
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use for the acquisitions community, and likely the Air Force as a whole, and so cancellation of 
extra pay for pilots is justifiable (particularly with a pilot-unfriendly economy).  Equalize acqui-
sitions to the pay status of pilots, one way or another.   
 
Better education about AF scientists and engineers at the commissioning sources:  The fact that 
66% of Lieutenants did not understand how S&E’s were utilized by the Air Force proves there is 
a severe problem that begins with the commissioning sources and recruiters.  Education is criti-
cal and more ROTC cadre slots (and the equivalent at other commissioning programs) should be 
filled with acquisitions-experienced officers, particularly at technical schools.  It is at this early 
indoctrination to the AF that the image of military life is formed, and when acquisitions proves 
to be completely contrary to this image, it leads many junior officers to be disappointed. 
 
Standard outgoing surveys to all that separate:  As originally proposed elsewhere80, outgoing sur-
veys should be a mandatory part of the separation process, thereby creating a database of real 
data to understand the real situations.  The data should be anonymous, or ideally, conducted by a 
non-government third party to insure genuine and authentic data.  If conducted by the USAF, the 
data will be less genuine as respondents will not wish to burn bridges. 
                                                 
80 Malackowski and Keesey for example. 
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Recommendations for Future Research 
Further research should be conducted in on assessing the nuances of the assignment system.  
My own survey did not focus enough on these individual nuances.  More focus should be placed 
on issues of relocation, how having a family affects this, and other issues related to frequency of 
reassignment.  Reassignment should also be differentiated from relocation, since one can be re-
assigned to a different job at a given location.  Focus should also be given to the actual assign-
ment process, including job selection, control given to the individual, etc.  All of these factors 
should be compared to rank, AFSC, whether the respondent has a family and/or children, etc. 
Another avenue of research should be on the OPR and promotion system.  Many people are 
frustrated with these issues, and they are certainly key factors influencing career intent.  Ways to 
fix the subjective OPR system in particular and problems with the “one opportunity” promotion 
system should be explored.  The relationship with OPR’s and promotion at the higher grades are 
also important to research, as well as analyzing effectiveness of a hyper-inflated OPR system in 
adequately differentiating performance and promote-ability.  The promotion system should be 
further analyzed for its effectiveness as a time-based promotion system, and contrasted to a per-
formance-based system.     
Future research should look more closely at the considerations of whether a merit-based sys-
tem of promotion, pay, or other recognition, may have positive effects on the military.  My own 
results are inconclusive, but suggest there is a desire for merit-based incentives, though perhaps 
not a more merit or performance-based promotion system.   
Another area that should be studied is that of the retirement system.  The system tends to feel 
that once an officer is above the 10-year point, they are fully vested and so, regardless of per-
formance, mid-level officers and senior officers are kept in the system so they can make retire-
ment.  Such a system retains low-performing officers who may have been rightfully passed-over 
for promotion to Major or Lt Colonel.  Research should expand on these RAND report findings, 
focusing on how the retirement system may push junior officers with uncertain career intent in 
the direction to leave the Air Force, since the system does not reward careers less than 20 years.   
Research should be conducted on how retention, morale, and job satisfaction are impacted 
for junior acquisitions officers with commanders that are not from acquisitions, such as a pilot.  
This research should look at how junior officers perceive non-acquisitions leadership.  For those 
intending an AF career, how they rate their own chances of attaining such leadership levels.   
Yet another area that should be studied is that of education opportunities, as this was consid-
ered important to some, but ultimately not a separation factor.  Educational opportunities did ap-
pear to have some influence to remain in the AF, though there were several open-ended com-
ments expressing frustration with these opportunities and their limitations.   
Finally, a system dynamics modeling should be done of all retention issues.81  This powerful 
and insightful approach has never yet been conducted on these issues, and would allow a model-
ing of all of the variables, such as job satisfaction, the assignment system, etc.  System dynamics 
                                                 
81 See http://web.mit.edu/sdg/www and click on “what is system dynamics”. 
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also captures the feedback loops inherent in any system, and so could quantitatively forecast re-
tention rates and how they would be impacted by fixing issues like job satisfaction, changing in-
centives, etc.  The power offered by system dynamics is that it can simulate “what-if” scenarios, 
and see how the feedback or backlash of policy changes will ripple through the system, thereby 
forecasting both short and long-term outcomes.  This is useful because many policy changes in 
an organization can apparently have no effect simply because of the momentum of the previous 
policies.  If leadership does not adequately understand the system (Air Force manpower is the 
system in this case), it may lead to canceling a new and what would become successful policy 
even before it had time to change the system for the better.  For example, changing the assign-
ment system would likely not have a positive impact for at least three years, due the average 
length of an assignment.  Other policy changes may also yield delayed results, though due to 
more complicated interactions with competing forces in the system.  Hence, the need for such a 
model, which would give leadership insight into the system, and help avoid canceling new pro-
retention policies before they have had sufficient time to affect positive results.  With a system 
dynamics model, one could test my hypothesis that overstocking new Lieutenants, who appear to 
be given less meaningful work, thus leading to more Lieutenants with even less work, and 
thereby leads to decreased job satisfaction for all.  (That is, assuming there is only so much valu-
able and meaningful work that will be entrusted to Lieutenants, recruiting more Lieutenants 
means each officer gets a smaller piece of that pie.)  Other such interaction would also become 
apparent in a system dynamics model.   
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Appendix A Survey Questions 
The following pages show the actual survey with simplified explanations of the answer types.  
This example of the survey clearly depicts the logic behind the questions which would reroute 
the respondent to different branches of the survey depending upon their responses. 
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Appendix B Survey Solicitation Email 
The following is the email used to invite Air Force officers and former officers to take the 
web-based survey for this thesis: 
 
 
From: Derek W Beck [survey@cartala.com] 
Sent: Thursday, August 05, 2004 4:47 PM 
Subject: USAF Issues: MIT survey by a fellow AF officer 
Flag Status: Flagged 
 
Greetings.  My name is Derek Beck and I am a CGO at Los Angeles AFB, currently on a special 
assignment to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  For my master's thesis, I am conducting an 
independent survey on issues related to US Air Force officers in the Acquisitions and related career 
fields. 
  
Please take a few minutes to complete my survey.  Not only will you be helping me out on my research, 
but also your responses will help to shape policy recommendations to the US Air Force through the MIT 
Lean Aerospace Initiative.  This survey is independent and is NOT conducted by the USAF. 
  
Your participation is completely voluntary and completely anonymous.  The survey will take LESS than 10 
minutes.  If you leave the survey early, you can come back to it and it will pick up where you left off 
(assuming you are using the same computer).  Please complete the survey by September 15th, 2004. 
  
To take the survey, go to: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.asp?u=88505559795 
The password is:  goairforce 
  
Feel free to pass along this email to Acquisitions people outside of LA AFB, and especially to any people 
you know that have recently retired or separated from the USAF and these career fields. 
  
If you have any questions or comments, don't hesitate to email me directly at survey@cartala.com 
  
Thank you for your time!  Your participation is greatly appreciated! 
  
Sincerely, 
Derek Beck 
  
Derek W Beck 
Systems Design and Management Fellow 
MIT Sloan School of Management 
MIT School of Engineering 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
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Appendix C Survey Key 
Question 
# 
Question Text Question Key Data 
Type 
Variable Name 
0 Record# Auto Nominal Records 
Post-
Survey 
Completed Survey Switch Nominal CompletedSurvey
Post-
Survey 
Suspect Data Switch Nominal SuspectData 
Post-
Survey 
CSRB Suspect Switch Nominal CSRBSuspect 
0 RespondentID Auto Nominal Respondents 
0 StartDate Auto Scale StartDate 
0 EndDate Auto Scale EndDate 
1 1. What is your current military status? Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question1 
Post-
Survey 
Officer Class Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q2 
Ordinal OfficerClass 
Post-
Survey 
Rank Class Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q2 
Ordinal RankClass 
2 2. What is your military pay grade (or 
highest pay grade achieved)? 
Select 
Demographic 
Ordinal Question2 
Post-
Survey 
Min Age Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q3 
Scale MinAge 
Post-
Survey 
Max Age Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q3 
Scale MaxAge 
3 3. How old are you? Select 
Demographic 
Ordinal Question3 
Post-
Survey 
Undergrad Class Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q4 
Nominal UgradClass 
4 4. What field is your undergraduate 
degree? 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question4 
5 5. Do you have an advanced degree(s) 
(masters level or higher)? 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question5 
6 6. Do you intend to pursue (another) 
advanced degree? 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question6 
Post-
Survey 
Min ADT Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q7 
Scale MinADT 
Post-
Survey 
Max ADT Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q7 
Scale MaxADT 
7 7. What is your total time on active duty?   
(Do not include reserve duty unless you 
were active reserve.) 
Select 
Demographic 
Ordinal Question7 
8 8. Which field of the USAF do you 
currently work in?    (If you are separated 
or retired, answer for your last AF job.) 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question8 
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Post-
Survey 
Initial Job Class Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q9 
Nominal JobClass 
9 9. Did you join the Acquisitions career 
field immediately upon being 
commissioned an officer, or were you in 
a different career field or training first? 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question9 
10a 10a. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Job Satisifaction 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10a 
10b 10b. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Pay and Allowances 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10b 
10c 10c. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Educational Opportunities 
(Advanced Degrees) 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10c 
10d 10d. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Promotion System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10d 
10e 10e. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Reward System and 
Recognition 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10e 
10f 10f. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Officer Performance 
Report (Evaluation System) 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10f 
10g 10g. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Leadership Opportunities 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10g 
10h 10h. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Retirement System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10h 
10i 10i. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Operational Opportunities 
or Deployments 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10i 
10j 10j. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Travel/TDY Opportunities 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10j 
10k 10k. For PEERS in your unit, their 
satisfaction on: Assignment System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question10k 
11a 11a. How satisfied are YOU with your 
immediate supervisor 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question11a 
11b 11b. How satisfied are YOU with your 
unit leadership 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question11b 
11c 11c. How satisfied are YOU with your 
base leadership 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question11c 
11d 11d. How satisfied are YOU with your 
command leadership 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question11d 
11e 11e. How satisfied are YOU with Air 
Force HQ leadership 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question11e 
12 12. What are your current intentions 
toward remaining (active duty) in the Air 
Force for at least 20 years? 
1=Definitely 
Will Remain, 
8=Definitely 
Will Not 
Remain 
Ordinal Question12 
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Post-
Survey 
AFSC Class Demographic 
Inferred from 
Q13 
Nominal AFSCclass 
13 13. What is your primary Air Force 
Specialty Code (AFSC)?    (If you are 
separated or retired, answer for your last 
AF job.) 
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question13 
14a 14a. I understood how S&E's were 
utilized in the AF before I joined this 
career field. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question14a 
14b 14b. If 'Engineering Pay' (similar to Flight 
Pay for pilots) was offered for S&E's, I'd 
be MORE likely to make the AF a career. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question14b 
14c 14c. I am NOT satisfied with the 
opportunity to use my 
science/engineering degree(s). 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question14c 
14d 14d. I am NOT satisfied with the 
opportunity to apply my 
science/engineering skills. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question14d 
15 15. Imagine a new AF policy that allows 
you to stay in science/engineering, never 
go into management, and still be 
promoted on time.  However, if you 
accept this policy, you will never get 
promoted beyond Lt Colonel.  With such 
a policy, I would be MORE likely to make 
the AF a career. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question15 
16 16. If S&E's with advanced technical 
degrees were paid more, I would be 
MORE likely to make the AF a career. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question16 
17 17. I understood what acquisitions was 
before joining this career field. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question17 
18a 18a. How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your current job: 
Meaningfulness to Unit 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question18a 
18b 18b. How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your current job: 
Challenge of your Job 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question18b 
18c 18c. How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your current job: Use 
of your Skills/Degree 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question18c 
18d 18d. How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your current job: 
Feeling Valued by your Unit 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question18d 
18e 18e. How satisfied are you with the 
following aspects of your current job: 
Amount of Additional Duties 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question18e 
19 19. When you compare your Air Force 
job to the equivalent civilian job, how 
does your Air Force job compare?  
1=Better, 
5=Worse 
Ordinal Question19 
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20 20. Imagine a new AF policy that allows 
you to stay at one Air Force Base for 
your entire career.  If you accept this 
policy, you will still be promoted on time, 
but will never get promoted beyond Lt 
Colonel.  With such a policy, I would be 
MORE likely to make the AF a career. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question20 
21 21. My skills, work experience, and 
workload are adequately compensated in 
terms of pay and benefits. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question21 
22 22. Could you have accepted (did you 
qualify for) the Critical Skills Retention 
Bonus (CSRB, aka 'Engineering Bonus') 
in 2003?   
Select 
Demographic 
Nominal Question22 
23 23. Being offered the CSRB bonus 
increased how long I was planning to 
stay in the AF. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question23 
24 24. The CSRB Bonus has been 
discontinued indefinitely.  This has had a 
significant impact on my AF career 
decision. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question24 
25 25. The promotion system, especially for 
junior officers, is essentially service-
based (promotions occur after a length of 
time).  If the promotion system were 
changed to be merit-based 
(performance-based), I would be MORE 
likely to stay in the AF. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question25 
26a 26a. More opportunities to relocate would 
increase my likelihood of remaining in the 
AF. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question26a 
26b 26b. More operational experience would 
increase my likelihood of remaining in the 
AF. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question26b 
27 27. Imagine a new AF policy that allows 
you to transfer your accrued retirement 
benefits to your new job (like a 401K 
plan) if you separate before 20 years. If 
this policy existed, I would be MORE 
likely to remain in the AF. 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question27 
28 28. I am in favor of the policy described 
in the last question (a 401K-like 
retirement plan). 
1=Agree, 
5=Disagree 
Ordinal Question28 
29 29. Do you expect to SEPARATE (before 
retirement) from the Air Force? 
1=Probably 
NOT, 
5=Probably 
Ordinal Question29 
Post-
Survey 
Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt 
Average 
1=Stay in AF, 
5=Leave AF 
Ordinal CareerIntentTrue
5pt 
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30a 30a. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Job Satisfaction 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30a 
30b 30b. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Pay and Allowances 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30b 
30c 30c. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Educational Opportunities 
(Advanced Degrees) 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30c 
30d 30d. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Promotion System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30d 
30e 30e. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Reward System and 
Recognition 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30e 
30f 30f. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Officer Performance 
Report (Evaluation System) 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30f 
30g 30g. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Leadership Opportunities 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30g 
30h 30h. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Retirement System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30h 
30i 30i. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Operational Opportunities 
or Deployments 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30i 
30j 30j. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Travel/TDY Opportunities 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30j 
30k 30k. For YOU, what is your level of 
satisfaction on: Assignment System 
1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Question30k 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30a: Job 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30a 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30b: Pay 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30b 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30c: Edu 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30c 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30d 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30e: Recognition 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30e 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30f: OPRs 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30f 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30g: Leadership Opp 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30g 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30h: Retirement 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30h 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30i: Deployments 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30i 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30j: TDY 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30j 
Post-
Survey 
Ave 10&30k: Assignment Sys 1=Satisfied, 
5=Dissatisfied 
Ordinal Ave10and30k 
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31a 31a. Please rank the reasons you are 
considering (or have) separating or 
retired: Pay & Allowances 
1=Most 
Important, 
5=Least 
Ordinal Question31a 
31b 31b. Please rank the reasons you are 
considering (or have) separating or 
retired: Promotion System 
1=Most 
Important, 
5=Least 
Ordinal Question31b 
31c 31c. Please rank the reasons you are 
considering (or have) separating or 
retired: Job Satisfaction 
1=Most 
Important, 
5=Least 
Ordinal Question31c 
31d 31d. Please rank the reasons you are 
considering (or have) separating or 
retired: Availability of Comparable 
Civilian Jobs 
1=Most 
Important, 
5=Least 
Ordinal Question31d 
31e 31e. Please rank the reasons you are 
considering (or have) separating or 
retired: Assignment System 
1=Most 
Important, 
5=Least 
Ordinal Question31e 
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Appendix D The Survey 
 
The following pages show the actual survey as it appeared in design mode.  The survey was 
built using the website http://www.surveymonkey.com.  Design mode was the best way to show 
the actual survey since the survey, as it appeared to respondents, spanned multiple screens.  
Some questions, such as Q3, appear open-ended but in fact have drop-down menu boxes, 
however these drop-down boxes do not print.  This example of the survey also hides the logic 
behind the questions which would reroute the respondent to different branches of the survey 
depending upon their responses.  To see this logic, it is best to consult Appendix A. 
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er
 
S
a
ti
sf
ie
d
 
n
o
r 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
S
o
m
ew
h
at
 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
N
/A
Y
o
u
r 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 s
u
p
er
vi
so
r
Y
o
u
r 
u
n
it
 l
ea
d
er
sh
ip
Y
o
u
r 
b
as
e 
le
ad
er
sh
ip
Y
o
u
r 
co
m
m
an
d
 l
ea
d
er
sh
ip
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e 
H
Q
 l
ea
d
er
sh
ip
 Y
o
u
r 
C
a
re
e
r 
In
te
n
ti
o
n
s 
(H
)
*
 1
2
. 
W
h
a
t 
a
re
 y
o
u
r 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
in
te
n
ti
o
n
s 
to
w
a
rd
 r
e
m
a
in
in
g
 (
a
ct
iv
e
 d
u
ty
) 
in
 t
h
e
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 f
o
r 
a
t 
le
a
st
 2
0
 
y
e
a
rs
?
 
D
ef
in
it
el
y 
w
ill
 r
em
ai
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
P
ro
b
a
b
ly
 w
ill
 r
em
a
in
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
P
o
ss
ib
ly
 w
ill
 r
em
a
in
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
Le
an
in
g
 t
o
w
ar
d
s 
re
m
ai
n
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
Le
an
in
g
 t
o
w
ar
d
s 
N
O
T
 r
em
ai
n
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
P
o
ss
ib
ly
 w
ill
 N
O
T
 r
em
a
in
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
P
ro
b
a
b
ly
 w
ill
 N
O
T
 r
em
a
in
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
D
ef
in
it
el
y 
w
ill
 N
O
T
 r
em
ai
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
N
/A
 (
A
lr
ea
d
y 
S
ep
a
ra
te
d
 o
r 
R
et
ir
ed
)
N
/A
 (
I'
m
 A
ct
iv
e 
D
u
ty
 b
u
t 
a
lr
ea
d
y 
R
et
ir
em
en
t 
E
lig
ib
le
)
T
h
e
 c
h
o
ic
e
 y
o
u
 m
a
k
e
 f
o
r 
th
is
 q
u
e
st
io
n
 w
il
l 
b
e
 r
e
fe
rr
e
d
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t 
th
is
 s
u
rv
e
y
 a
s 
y
o
u
r 
"C
a
re
e
r 
D
e
ci
si
o
n
".
 
 I
f 
A
lr
e
a
d
y
 O
u
t 
o
f 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 (
H
)
M
o
st
 o
f 
th
e
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
a
ss
u
m
e
 y
o
u
 a
re
 s
ti
ll
 i
n
 t
h
e
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
. 
S
in
ce
 y
o
u
 a
re
 n
o
 l
o
n
g
e
r 
in
 t
h
e
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
, 
p
le
a
se
 a
n
sw
e
r 
e
a
ch
 q
u
e
st
io
n
 b
a
se
d
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
la
st
 a
ss
ig
n
m
e
n
t 
o
r 
h
o
w
 y
o
u
 f
e
lt
 b
e
fo
re
 y
o
u
 l
e
ft
. 
 Y
o
u
r 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 S
p
e
ci
a
lt
y
 C
o
d
e
 (
A
F
S
C
)
*
 1
3
. 
W
h
a
t 
is
 y
o
u
r 
p
ri
m
a
ry
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 S
p
e
ci
a
lt
y
 C
o
d
e
 (
A
F
S
C
)?
  
(I
f 
y
o
u
 a
re
 s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
 o
r 
re
ti
re
d
, 
a
n
sw
e
r 
fo
r 
y
o
u
r 
la
st
 A
F
 j
o
b
.)
 
6
1
X
 S
ci
en
ti
st
6
2
X
 E
n
g
in
ee
r
6
3
X
 P
ro
g
ra
m
 M
an
ag
er
O
th
er
 (
p
le
as
e 
sp
ec
if
y)
 
 6
1
/
6
2
 S
p
e
ci
fi
c 
Q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
(H
)
*
 1
4
. 
P
le
a
se
 s
ta
te
 h
o
w
 m
u
ch
 y
o
u
 a
g
re
e
 o
r 
d
is
a
g
re
e
 w
it
h
 e
a
ch
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
. 
N
o
te
 S
&
E
's
 
m
e
a
n
s 
S
ci
e
n
ti
st
s 
&
 E
n
g
in
e
e
rs
. 
  
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
I 
a
m
 N
O
T
 s
a
ti
sf
ie
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
to
 
u
se
 m
y 
sc
ie
n
ce
/e
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 d
eg
re
e(
s)
.
I 
a
m
 N
O
T
 s
a
ti
sf
ie
d
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y 
to
 
a
p
p
ly
 m
y 
sc
ie
n
ce
/e
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 s
ki
lls
.
I 
u
n
d
er
st
o
o
d
 h
o
w
 S
&
E
's
 w
er
e 
u
ti
liz
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
F 
b
ef
o
re
 I
 j
o
in
ed
 t
h
is
 c
a
re
er
 f
ie
ld
.
If
 "
E
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
 P
a
y"
 (
si
m
ila
r 
to
 F
lig
h
t 
P
a
y 
fo
r 
p
ilo
ts
) 
w
a
s 
o
ff
er
ed
 f
o
r 
S
&
E
's
, 
I'
d
 b
e 
M
O
R
E
 
lik
el
y 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
A
F 
a 
ca
re
er
.
*
 1
5
. 
Im
a
g
in
e
 a
 n
e
w
 A
F
 p
o
li
cy
 t
h
a
t 
a
ll
o
w
s 
y
o
u
 t
o
 s
ta
y
 i
n
 s
ci
e
n
ce
/
e
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
, 
n
e
v
e
r 
g
o
 i
n
to
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t,
 a
n
d
 s
ti
ll
 b
e
 p
ro
m
o
te
d
 o
n
 t
im
e
. 
H
o
w
e
v
e
r,
 i
f 
y
o
u
 a
cc
e
p
t 
th
is
 p
o
li
cy
, 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
n
e
v
e
r 
g
e
t 
p
ro
m
o
te
d
 b
e
y
o
n
d
 L
t 
C
o
lo
n
e
l.
 W
it
h
 s
u
ch
 a
 p
o
li
cy
, 
I 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 M
O
R
E
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 m
a
k
e
 t
h
e
 A
F
 a
 c
a
re
e
r.
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
*
 1
6
. 
If
 S
&
E
's
 w
it
h
 a
d
v
a
n
ce
d
 t
e
ch
n
ic
a
l 
d
e
g
re
e
s 
w
e
re
 p
a
id
 m
o
re
, 
I 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 M
O
R
E
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 m
a
k
e
 t
h
e
 
A
F
 a
 c
a
re
e
r.
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
Y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 c
o
m
p
le
te
d
 m
o
re
 t
h
a
n
 h
a
lf
 o
f 
th
e
 s
u
rv
e
y
. 
Y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 1
2
-1
3
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
le
ft
 (
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
re
sp
o
n
se
s)
. 
 6
3
/
O
th
e
r 
A
F
S
C
 S
p
e
ci
fi
c 
Q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
(H
)
*
 1
7
. 
I 
u
n
d
e
rs
to
o
d
 w
h
a
t 
a
cq
u
is
it
io
n
s 
w
a
s 
b
e
fo
re
 j
o
in
in
g
 t
h
is
 c
a
re
e
r 
fi
e
ld
. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
 
Y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 c
o
m
p
le
te
d
 m
o
re
 t
h
a
n
 h
a
lf
 o
f 
th
e
 s
u
rv
e
y
. 
Y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 1
2
-1
3
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
le
ft
 (
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
re
sp
o
n
se
s)
. 
 J
o
b
 S
a
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
 (
H
)
*
 1
8
. 
H
o
w
 s
a
ti
sf
ie
d
 a
re
 y
o
u
 w
it
h
 t
h
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 a
sp
e
ct
s 
o
f 
y
o
u
r 
cu
rr
e
n
t 
jo
b
: 
  
S
a
ti
si
fi
ed
S
o
m
ew
h
at
S
a
ti
sf
ie
d
N
ei
th
er
 
S
a
ti
sf
ie
d
 
n
o
r 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
S
o
m
ew
h
at
 
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
D
is
sa
ti
sf
ie
d
A
m
o
u
n
t 
o
f 
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 D
u
ti
es
Fe
el
in
g
 V
al
u
ed
 b
y 
yo
u
r 
U
n
it
M
ea
n
in
g
fu
ln
es
s 
to
 U
n
it
U
se
 o
f 
yo
u
r 
S
ki
lls
/D
eg
re
e
C
h
al
le
n
g
e 
o
f 
yo
u
r 
Jo
b
*
 1
9
. 
W
h
e
n
 y
o
u
 c
o
m
p
a
re
 y
o
u
r 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 j
o
b
 t
o
 t
h
e
 e
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
ci
v
il
ia
n
 j
o
b
, 
h
o
w
 d
o
e
s 
y
o
u
r 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 j
o
b
 
co
m
p
a
re
?
 
B
et
te
r 
th
a
n
 C
iv
ili
a
n
 E
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
Jo
b
S
o
m
ew
h
a
t 
B
et
te
r 
th
a
n
 C
iv
ili
a
n
 E
q
u
iv
al
en
t 
Jo
b
S
im
ili
a
r 
to
 C
iv
ili
a
n
 E
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
Jo
b
 
S
o
m
ew
h
a
t 
W
o
rs
e 
th
a
n
 C
iv
ili
a
n
 E
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
Jo
b
 
W
o
rs
e 
th
a
n
 C
iv
ili
a
n
 E
q
u
iv
a
le
n
t 
Jo
b
N
/A
*
 2
0
. 
Im
a
g
in
e
 a
 n
e
w
 A
F
 p
o
li
cy
 t
h
a
t 
a
ll
o
w
s 
y
o
u
 t
o
 s
ta
y
 a
t 
o
n
e
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 B
a
se
 f
o
r 
y
o
u
r 
e
n
ti
re
 c
a
re
e
r.
 I
f 
y
o
u
 a
cc
e
p
t 
th
is
 p
o
li
cy
, 
y
o
u
 w
il
l 
st
il
l 
b
e
 p
ro
m
o
te
d
 o
n
 t
im
e
, 
b
u
t 
w
il
l 
n
e
v
e
r 
g
e
t 
p
ro
m
o
te
d
 b
e
y
o
n
d
 L
t 
C
o
lo
n
e
l.
 W
it
h
 s
u
ch
 a
 p
o
li
cy
, 
I 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 M
O
R
E
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 m
a
k
e
 t
h
e
 A
F
 a
 c
a
re
e
r.
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
Y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 j
u
st
 9
-1
0
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
le
ft
 (
d
e
p
e
n
d
in
g
 o
n
 y
o
u
r 
re
sp
o
n
se
s)
. 
 P
a
y
 a
n
d
 A
ll
o
w
a
n
ce
s 
(H
)
*
 2
1
. 
M
y
 s
k
il
ls
, 
w
o
rk
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
ce
, 
a
n
d
 w
o
rk
lo
a
d
 a
re
 a
d
e
q
u
a
te
ly
 c
o
m
p
e
n
sa
te
d
 i
n
 t
e
rm
s 
o
f 
p
a
y
 a
n
d
 
b
e
n
e
fi
ts
. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
*
 2
2
. 
C
o
u
ld
 y
o
u
 h
a
v
e
 a
cc
e
p
te
d
 (
d
id
 y
o
u
 q
u
a
li
fy
 f
o
r)
 t
h
e
 C
ri
ti
ca
l 
S
k
il
ls
 R
e
te
n
ti
o
n
 B
o
n
u
s 
(C
S
R
B
, 
a
k
a
 
"E
n
g
in
e
e
ri
n
g
 B
o
n
u
s"
) 
in
 2
0
0
3
?
 
Y
es
, 
I 
Q
u
a
lif
ie
d
 A
N
D
 A
cc
ep
te
d
 t
h
e 
C
S
R
B
Y
es
, 
I 
Q
u
a
lif
ie
d
 B
U
T
 d
id
 N
O
T
 A
cc
ep
t 
th
e 
C
S
R
B
N
o
, 
D
id
n
't
 Q
u
a
lif
y 
d
u
e 
to
 N
O
T
 E
N
O
U
G
H
 t
im
e 
o
n
 a
ct
iv
e 
d
u
ty
N
o
, 
D
id
n
't
 Q
u
a
lif
y 
d
u
e 
to
 T
O
O
 M
U
C
H
 t
im
e 
o
n
 a
ct
iv
e 
d
u
ty
N
o
, 
D
id
n
't
 Q
u
a
lif
y 
d
u
e 
to
 m
y 
A
FS
C
D
o
n
't
 K
n
o
w
 C
S
R
B
Y
e
sY
e
s 
(H
)
*
 2
3
. 
B
e
in
g
 o
ff
e
re
d
 t
h
e
 C
S
R
B
 b
o
n
u
s 
in
cr
e
a
se
d
 h
o
w
 l
o
n
g
 I
 w
a
s 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 t
o
 s
ta
y
 i
n
 t
h
e
 A
F
. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
 C
S
R
B
N
o
N
o
tE
n
o
u
g
h
O
rD
id
n
't
A
cc
e
p
t 
(H
)
*
 2
4
. 
T
h
e
 C
S
R
B
 B
o
n
u
s 
h
a
s 
b
e
e
n
 d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
e
d
 i
n
d
e
fi
n
it
e
ly
. 
T
h
is
 h
a
s 
h
a
d
 a
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
im
p
a
ct
 o
n
 m
y
 A
F
 
ca
re
e
r 
d
e
ci
si
o
n
. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
 (
I 
am
 n
o
w
 S
ep
ar
at
ed
)
 A
ir
 F
o
rc
e
 P
o
li
ci
e
s 
(H
)
*
 2
5
. 
T
h
e
 p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 s
y
st
e
m
, 
e
sp
e
ci
a
ll
y
 f
o
r 
ju
n
io
r 
o
ff
ic
e
rs
, 
is
 e
ss
e
n
ti
a
ll
y
 s
e
rv
ic
e
-b
a
se
d
 (
p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
s 
o
cc
u
r 
a
ft
e
r 
a
 l
e
n
g
th
 o
f 
ti
m
e
).
 I
f 
th
e
 p
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 s
y
st
e
m
 w
e
re
 c
h
a
n
g
e
d
 t
o
 b
e
 m
e
ri
t-
b
a
se
d
 (
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
-
b
a
se
d
),
 I
 w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 M
O
R
E
 l
ik
e
ly
 t
o
 s
ta
y
 i
n
 t
h
e
 A
F
. 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
*
 2
6
. 
P
le
a
se
 s
ta
te
 h
o
w
 m
u
ch
 y
o
u
 a
g
re
e
 o
r 
d
is
a
g
re
e
 w
it
h
 e
a
ch
 o
f 
th
e
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
ts
. 
  
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
M
o
re
 o
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 w
o
u
ld
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 
m
y 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
 o
f 
re
m
a
in
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
F.
M
o
re
 o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s 
to
 r
el
o
ca
te
 w
o
u
ld
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 
m
y 
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
 o
f 
re
m
a
in
in
g
 i
n
 t
h
e 
A
F.
*
 2
7
. 
Im
a
g
in
e
 a
 n
e
w
 A
F
 p
o
li
cy
 t
h
a
t 
a
ll
o
w
s 
y
o
u
 t
o
 t
ra
n
sf
e
r 
y
o
u
r 
a
cc
ru
e
d
 r
e
ti
re
m
e
n
t 
b
e
n
e
fi
ts
 t
o
 y
o
u
r 
n
e
w
 j
o
b
 (
li
k
e
 a
 4
0
1
K
 p
la
n
) 
if
 y
o
u
 s
e
p
a
ra
te
 b
e
fo
re
 2
0
 y
e
a
rs
. 
If
 t
h
is
 p
o
li
cy
 e
x
is
te
d
, 
I 
w
o
u
ld
 b
e
 M
O
R
E
 
li
k
e
ly
 t
o
 r
e
m
a
in
 i
n
 t
h
e
 A
F
. 
 
 (I
f 
y
o
u
 a
re
 a
lr
e
a
d
y
 s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
, 
a
n
sw
e
r 
b
a
se
d
 o
n
 h
o
w
 y
o
u
 f
e
lt
 b
e
fo
re
 y
o
u
 s
e
p
a
ra
te
d
.)
 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 A
g
re
e
A
g
re
e
N
eu
tr
al
D
is
ag
re
e
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 D
is
ag
re
e
N
/A
 (
I'
m
 R
et
ir
em
en
t 
E
lig
ib
le
 o
r 
a
lr
ea
d
y 
R
et
ir
ed
)
*
 2
8
. 
I 
a
m
 i
n
 f
a
v
o
r 
o
f 
th
e
 p
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Appendix E Manning Statistics 
The following data are the actual manning statistics82 of the USAF from 1997 to 2004.  
Manning is determined by taking the number of actual officers assigned83 and dividing by the 
number of authorizations (or job slots) that are available for a given category.  Authorizations are 
determined by the individual organizations and are in flux throughout the fiscal year, which runs 
from October 1st to September 30th for the US Government.  The numbers then that appear for 
2004 may not be the final numbers for FY04, but are accurate as of the end of August 2004.   
  2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
LT 266.0% 241.4% 190.4% 183.8% 166.7% 152.9% 140.4% 158.4% 
CPT 60.0% 58.8% 66.7% 60.3% 57.0% 63.0% 65.3% 64.3% 
MAJ 73.6% 65.4% 70.4% 67.5% 75.4% 86.0% 86.2% 94.5% 
LTC 87.9% 94.4% 96.6% 84.9% 85.1% 81.5% 87.7% 89.4% 
61
S
 
COL 85.0% 95.0% 70.0% 71.9% 82.8% 80.6% 78.3% 80.0% 
LT 185.2% 146.0% 108.1% 88.6% 84.0% 73.4% 88.2% 102.3% 
CPT 59.4% 57.1% 57.8% 57.3% 56.5% 60.1% 65.6% 70.3% 
MAJ 76.3% 75.0% 69.0% 68.3% 79.5% 85.7% 88.6% 96.0% 
LTC 91.3% 88.7% 90.7% 79.8% 77.7% 76.4% 86.8% 87.0% 
62
E
 
COL 61.9% 85.0% 67.4% 74.5% 83.7% 95.8% 64.9% 80.0% 
LT 326.8% 325.1% 246.8% 162.4% 172.7% 166.1% 171.0% 182.5% 
CPT 83.8% 77.0% 69.4% 64.1% 55.0% 59.2% 60.1% 64.2% 
MAJ 73.4% 74.3% 74.0% 76.9% 87.2% 94.5% 95.3% 113.3% 
LTC 83.5% 82.8% 82.0% 76.6% 79.7% 83.8% 91.4% 82.8% 
63
A
 
COL 85.0% 78.6% 81.3% 77.0% 75.0% 74.0% 77.8% 78.2% 
LT 236.8% 209.6% 157.5% 120.3% 115.7% 104.9% 113.6% 126.8% 
CPT 67.1% 63.5% 62.8% 59.8% 56.1% 60.3% 63.9% 67.5% 
MAJ 74.5% 73.3% 71.7% 72.4% 82.8% 90.1% 91.3% 103.2% 
LTC 85.7% 85.2% 85.3% 78.1% 79.7% 81.8% 89.8% 84.8% 61
+6
2+
63
 
COL 81.4% 80.7% 77.8% 76.0% 77.4% 78.6% 75.1% 78.8% 
LT 185.4% 168.1% 148.9% 119.0% 112.8% 103.6% 99.4% 103.0% 
CPT 89.7% 81.7% 81.9% 79.9% 81.3% 84.0% 88.3% 94.3% 
MAJ 94.0% 94.1% 92.4% 87.5% 94.5% 94.3% 94.4% 93.8% 
LTC 99.5% 99.1% 98.1% 90.6% 96.8% 97.6% 98.8% 94.6% A
F-
W
id
e 
COL 98.0% 100.5% 100.1% 97.3% 97.5% 101.0% 97.4% 96.0% 
 
Table 5 Official manning rates for 61, 62, and 63 AF officers as well as AF-wide. 
                                                 
82 Source: Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), Randolph AFB, San Antonio, TX.  Additional sources include the 
AFPC online and public personnel database http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/sasdemog , which is particularly im-
portant for inventory numbers.  Additionally, the authorization numbers are available to government officials from 
the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/drs .  
83 The number of officers assigned may be less than the actual inventory of officers of a given category due to those 
officers in Student status, Transient status (reassignment), or Personnel Holdee status (covering unusual circum-
stances like extended medical leave, prisoners, etc).  This group of exceptions is collectively referred to as STP.   
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  2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
LT 375 350 278 250 235 214 212 236 
CPT 259 250 291 282 289 317 337 349 
MAJ 162 142 140 133 147 172 187 207 
LTC 80 85 85 73 80 88 100 110 
COL 17 19 21 23 24 25 18 20 
61
S
 
TOTAL 893 846 815 761 775 816 854 922 
LT 1039 867 684 607 595 524 649 787 
CPT 776 767 801 835 878 947 1052 1185 
MAJ 424 420 398 399 422 438 480 553 
LTC 230 220 215 205 181 172 190 194 
COL 26 34 31 38 41 46 37 48 
62
E
 
TOTAL 2495 2308 2129 2084 2117 2127 2408 2767 
LT 902 933 733 505 461 427 436 460 
CPT 663 606 558 507 496 534 553 580 
MAJ 566 576 570 572 634 648 625 681 
LTC 590 596 574 531 521 517 511 447 
COL 176 165 169 154 147 142 147 147 
63
A
 
TOTAL 2897 2876 2604 2269 2259 2268 2272 2315 
LT 2316 2150 1695 1362 1291 1165 1297 1483 
CPT 1698 1623 1650 1624 1663 1798 1942 2114 
MAJ 1152 1138 1108 1104 1203 1258 1292 1441 
LTC 900 901 874 809 782 777 801 751 
COL 219 218 221 215 212 213 202 215 
61
S
+6
2E
+6
3A
 
TOTAL 6285 6030 5548 5114 5151 5211 5534 6004 
LT 15553 14405 13107 10731 10266 9833 9724 10448 
CPT 22001 20306 20579 20197 21883 23313 25018 27318 
MAJ 14336 14314 13987 13363 13838 14113 14198 14308 
LTC 10109 10065 9877 9199 9402 9540 9668 9401 
COL 3677 3707 3668 3552 3585 3784 3658 3651 A
F-
W
id
e 
TOTAL 65676 62820 61227 57124 58974 60583 62266 65126 
 
Table 6 Official assigned officers for 61, 62, and 63 career fields as well as AF-wide.84 
                                                 
84 STP numbers excluded.  See previous footnote. 
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  2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 
LT 141 145 146 136 141 140 151 149 
CPT 432 425 436 468 507 503 516 543 
MAJ 220 217 199 197 195 200 217 219 
LTC 91 90 88 86 94 108 114 123 
COL 20 20 30 32 29 31 23 25 
61
S
 
TOTAL 904 898 899 919 966 982 1021 1059 
LT 561 594 633 685 708 714 736 769 
CPT 1306 1343 1386 1458 1553 1576 1603 1686 
MAJ 556 560 577 584 531 511 542 576 
LTC 252 248 237 257 233 225 219 223 
COL 42 40 46 51 49 48 57 60 
62
E
 
TOTAL 2717 2791 2879 3035 3074 3074 3157 3314 
LT 276 287 297 311 267 257 255 252 
CPT 791 787 804 791 902 902 920 904 
MAJ 771 775 770 744 727 686 656 601 
LTC 707 720 700 693 654 617 559 540 
COL 207 210 208 200 196 192 189 188 
63
A
 
TOTAL 2752 2779 2779 2739 2746 2654 2579 2485 
LT 978 1026 1076 1132 1116 1111 1142 1170 
CPT 2529 2555 2626 2717 2962 2981 3039 3133 
MAJ 1547 1552 1546 1525 1453 1397 1415 1396 
LTC 1050 1058 1025 1036 981 950 892 886 
COL 269 270 284 283 274 271 269 273 
61
S
+6
2E
+6
3A
 
TOTAL 6373 6468 6557 6693 6786 6710 6757 6858 
LT 8388 8570 8801 9015 9098 9493 9778 10141 
CPT 24515 24868 25116 25263 26920 27766 28329 28984 
MAJ 15257 15208 15131 15271 14640 14964 15038 15258 
LTC 10163 10153 10073 10159 9708 9779 9787 9935 
COL 3753 3690 3663 3651 3678 3748 3754 3805 A
F-
W
id
e 
TOTAL 62076 62505 62784 63359 64044 65750 66686 68123 
 
Table 7 Official authorizations of officers for 61, 62, and 63 career fields as well as AF-wide.85 
                                                 
85 In reality, all LT authorizations are specifically First Lieutenant authorizations.  2LT authorizations do not exist 
for these career fields. 
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Appendix F Summary of All Non-Suspect Data (N=592) 
 
The following pages show the summarized demographics for the entire data set (N=592).  
The CSRB page depicts only the data considered valid for the CSRB analysis (N=482). 
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Appendix G Summary of Non-Suspect Data (<5 YOS) 
 
The following pages show the summarized demographics for the entire data set (N=285).  
The CSRB page depicts only the data considered valid for the CSRB analysis (N=264). 
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Appendix H Methodology for Determining Suspect Data 
The following was the process to determine what data records would be declared “suspect” 
and therefore not used in analysis.  This process uses a comparison of Q12 and Q29 on 
separation or career intent.  Q12 was an 8-point non-neutral question, and Q29 was a 5-point 
question with the middle being neutral.  Q29 was intentionally reversed to insure people had to 
read it before answering.  The questions, verbatim, appeared in the survey as follows (the Likert 
Scale number shown in parentheses did NOT appear in the administered survey): 
Q12: What are your current intentions toward remaining (active duty) in the Air Force for at least 
20 years? 
Definitely will remain in the Air Force   (1) 
Probably will remain in the Air Force   (2) 
Possibly will remain in the Air Force    (3) 
Leaning towards remaining in the Air Force   (4) 
Leaning towards NOT remaining in the Air Force  (5) 
Possibly will NOT remain in the Air Force   (6) 
Probably will NOT remain in the Air Force   (7) 
Definitely will NOT remain in the Air Force   (8) 
N/A (Already Separated or Retired) 
N/A (I'm Active Duty but already Retirement Eligible) 
 
Q29: Do you expect to SEPARATE (before retirement) from the Air Force? 
Probably  (5) 
Possibly  (4) 
Undecided  (3) 
Possibly NOT  (2) 
Probably NOT (1) 
N/A (Already Separated or Retired) 
N/A (I'm Active Duty but already Retirement Eligible) 
 
Note the intentional reverse logic on Q29 and the resulting reverse of the scale.   
 
In the original data, a new variable called “Suspect Data” was added.   
 
Records received a “0” for the Suspect Data variable if not suspect.   
 
Records received a “2” for the Suspect Data variable if they didn't finish the survey to at least 
Q29, thereby preventing the suspect test (as explained below) from being conducted on the data.  
(Of the respondents that did not finish the survey, all of them had stopped before Q29.  
Therefore, every respondent that didn't finish received a “2” in the Suspect Data column.)  This 
was true of 40 datasets. 
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Otherwise, records received a “1” (for “True”) for the Suspect Data variable if any of the 
following filters indicated their dataset.  (In essence, these checks insure that both questions have 
similar answers, though it is not required to have identical answers.) 
 
1. All Data with an N/A response were checked to confirm they answered the same N/A type 
for both Q12 and Q29.  (9 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
2. Any responses that said they were retirement eligible for either Q12 or Q29 but did not list a 
Total Time on Active Duty of 20+ years were checked.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
3. Answered anything leaning towards staying in the AF for Q12 (1, 2, 3, or 4), but answered 5 
on Q29. (3 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
4. Answered anything leaning towards NOT staying in the AF for Q12 (5, 6, 7, or 8), but 
answered 1 on Q29. (2 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
5. Answered “Leaning” (4 or 5) on Q12, but answered an extreme (1 or 5) on Q29. (31 Datasets 
were labeled suspect) 
6. Answered “Undecided” (3) on Q29, but answered an extreme (1, 2, 7 or 8) on Q12. (34 
Datasets were labeled suspect) 
7. Answered extreme of (1) on Q12, but not a (1 or 2) on Q29, or the reverse, answered extreme 
of (8) on Q12, but not a (4 or 5) on Q29. (1 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
8. Answered extreme (1) on Q29, but not a (1 or 2 or 3) on Q12, or the reverse, answered 
extreme (5) on Q29, but not a (6 or 7 or 8) on Q12.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
9. Answered (1 or 2) on Q12, but (3 or greater) on Q29.  (16 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
10. Answered (7 or 8) on Q12, but (3 or less) on Q29.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
11. Answered (4 or 5) on Q29, but (4 or less) on Q12.  (34 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
12. Answered (1 or 2) on Q29, but (5 or greater) on Q12.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
13. Answered (3 or 4) on Q12, but (4 or 5) on Q29.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
14. Answered (5 or 6) on Q12, but (1 or 2) on Q29.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
15. Answered (3 or 4) on Q12, but (1) on Q29.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
16. Answered (5 or 6) on Q12, but (5) on Q29.  (0 Datasets were labeled suspect) 
17. Confirmed that Total Active Duty Service Time and Age made sense (0 Datasets were 
labeled suspect) 
 
Summary: 
Not Suspect: (Suspect Data = 0) 592 Records 
Suspect: (Suspect Data = 1) 130 Records 
Incomplete Records: (Suspect Data = 2) 40 Records 
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Appendix I Methodology for Determining CSRB Suspect Data 
The Continuing Skills Retention Bonus, or “Engineering Bonus”, hereinafter referred to as 
the CSRB, was available from 6 Feb 2003 to 30 Sept 2003.  To accept this bonus, the applicant 
must have been fully qualified at some point within this window.  The details of the qualification 
are listed elsewhere86, but the most important requirements are: 
• Completed 4 years but less than 14 years of total active federal commissioned service87 
• Core AFSC (Air Force Specialty code) is 32E, 33S, 61S, 62E, or 63A  
• Have fulfilled initial commissioning ADSC (4 years ROTC/OTS, 5 years USAFA)  
 
Given these dates, the requirements for the CSRB that are listed herein, and the dates my 
survey were open, from 23 July 2004 to 30 Sept 2004, it is fairly simple to calculate what the 
YOS range is now of those that could have been qualified for the CSRB, down to the month.  
The older qualified group of respondents would have had an YOS of 15 years, 5 months, and 17 
days to 15 years, 7 months, and 24 days, and regardless of where in this range they were, the 
would have responded to Q7 with “15-16 years”.  The younger qualified group of respondents 
would have had an YOS of 4 years, 10 months, and 13 days to 5 years, 0 months, and 0 days 
(exactly), and regardless of where in this range they were, the would have responded to Q7 with 
“4-5 years”.  Thus, the range of minimum YOS is, at the time of the survey, 4-16 years, to have 
been qualified for the CSRB. 
The following is the method used to determine what data records were valid for CSRB 
analysis and what records were not.88  Records considered suspect were labeled as such in a 
special variable in the data set.  Those that were suspect in regards to CSRB were still used in all 
analysis described in this thesis, save that analysis specific to the CSRB.   
In the original data, a new variable called “CSRB Suspect” was added.   
 
                                                 
86 http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/csrb/csrb/faq.htm 
87 With other qualifications, see the AFPC for details. 
88 minADT and maxADT are minimum and maximum Active Duty Time, derived from the respondent’s answer to 
Q7, which were ranges of ADT (YOS), each of 1 year of span.  For example, if the respondent selected “4-5 years” 
for Q7, then minADT = 4 yrs and maxADT = 5 yrs.   
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Of the non-suspect data (that is, of the 592 records that survived from the tests described in 
Appendix H)89: 
 
If the record responded as “CSRB - Yes, qualified but did not accept” 
Then all records are required to meet these criteria: 
NOT minADT≥4 and NOT maxADT≤16) 
3 records came out to be too young; CSRB Suspect code = 1 
0 records came out to be too old 
20 records valid 
For the invalids: could have thought they qualified but were wrong 
 
If the record responded as “CSRB - Yes, qualified and accepted” 
Then all records are required to meet these criteria: 
NOT minADT≥4 and NOT maxADT≤16  
13 records came out to be too old; CSRB Suspect code = 2 
0 records came out to be too young 
119 records valid 
For the invalids: may have accepted previously offered CSRB’s...may be a source of error for 
senior respondents still not in the too old category 
 
(CSRB Suspect code 3 not used) 
 
If the record responded as “CSRB - No, didn't qualify due to too much time” 
Then all records are required to meet these criteria: 
maxADT>16 
4 records came out to be too young; CSRB Suspect code = 4 
(3 of which have now reported they have separated/retired; these 4 in fact likely qualified) 
0 records came out to be too young 
46 records valid 
For the invalids: could have misunderstood CSRB, but are potential suspect data risks.  
However, since no other data points tested suggest problems, their records are still used outside 
of CSRB analysis. 
 
If the record responded as “CSRB - No, didn't qualify due to not enough time” 
Then all records are required to meet these criteria: 
minADT>4 
62 records came out to be too old; CSRB Suspect code = 5 
(10 of which should have marked "CSRB - No, didn't qualify due to too much time", otherwise 
the other 52 likely qualified based on time and AFSC, though for some their AFSC may have 
changed since the end of the CSRB offer) 
N/A records came out to be too young 
203 records valid 
 
                                                 
89 For those records that were declared a “1” or “2” in the Suspect Data variable according to the rules described in 
Appendix H, they received a CSRB Suspect code = 99. 
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For the record responded as “CSRB - No, didn't qualify due to my AFSC” 
7 records are retirement eligible, and therefore were too old for CSRB, CSRB Suspect code = 6 
Of the remaining (not counting the 7 above), 
2 are 62’s, but started in another field and had a different AFSC (1 of which is too young 
anyways and is CSRB Suspect code = 7) 
30 are 63’s, and may have qualified, but 15 are too young (CSRB Suspect code = 8), 1 is too old 
(CSRB Suspect code = 9), and 4 others may be valid and have had other AFSC’s based on their 
reporting having been in a different career field before acquisitions, otherwise, the other 10 may 
have qualified but didn't know it 
22 are Other AFSC’s, 1 of which is too old anyhow, and 5 are too young, but since they have the 
wrong AFSC, it could've been coded either way and are not marked suspect.  All 22 appear valid 
therefore. 
The grand total then is 39 likely valid records (24 were suspect) 
 
For the record responded as “Don't Know” 
59 records, 13 of which likely qualified based on YOS and AFSC (though 6 of these may have 
just earned the necessary AFSC) 
 
Of the remaining that appeared to be qualified, 4 reported they were retired (CSRB Suspect code 
= 10) 
 
This leaves 482 records that likely answered the CSRB questions correctly (CSRB Suspect code 
= 0).   
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Appendix J Methodology for Averaging 
Q12 and Q29 each asked the survey respondent their career intent.  Q12 did so in a positive 
way: “What are your current intentions toward remaining (active duty) in the Air Force for at 
least 20 years?”  There were then two N/A choices (one for those separated or retired, and one 
for those that were already retirement eligible because they had 20+ years of active duty service).  
Otherwise, the choices were on an 8-point Likert Scale (note this even-point scale doesn’t allow 
for a neutral response): 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Definitely 
Will 
Remain 
Probably 
Will 
Remain 
Possibly 
Will 
Remain 
Leaning 
towards 
Remaining 
Leaning 
towards 
NOT 
Remaining 
Possibly 
Will NOT 
Remain 
Probably 
Will NOT 
Remain 
Definitely 
Will NOT 
Remain 
 
Q29 sought the same information but asked the question in a negative way90: “Do you expect to 
SEPARATE (before retirement) from the Air Force?”  Q29 gave the same two N/A choices, but 
otherwise gave a typical 5-poin Likert Scale: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Probably Possibly Undecided Possibly NOT 
Probably 
NOT 
 
For the purposes of this survey, Q12 and Q29 were first used to determine what might be bad 
data91, and then was averaged into a new variable called “Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt 
Average”, or referred to throughout the thesis as just “career intent”.   
The method to determine the averaged career intent in a true 5-point Likert Scale form is as 
follows.  First, this averaging is used only after the suspect data check described in Appendix H 
has been completed.  Starting with Q12, it was converted to a new Temp value by following this 
format: 
If Q12 is 1 or 2 Æ Then Temp is 1 
If Q12 is 3 Æ Then Temp is 2 
If Q12 is 4 or 5 Æ Then Temp is 3 
If Q12 is 6 Æ Then Temp is 4 
If Q12 is 7 or 8 Æ Then Temp is 5 
 
Then take this “Temp” value and average it with the value from Q29 to get the result in as a 
9-point average.  (It is 9-point because you can have the values of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5, and 4.5, in 
addition to 1-5.)  This 9-point Temp value is then rounded:  if it is under 3, round down (so 1.5 
                                                 
90 If the respondent might be confused by the wording of this question, then hopefully they were forced to think 
carefully before answering.  Those that did not understand this wording, or did not note that the polarity of the ques-
tion was different, would give a response completely different than in Q12.  Those that gave hugely varied responses 
were removed from the data set used for analysis, and the process to select those bad records is described in 
Appendix H.   
91 See Appendix H for the methodology on determining suspect data records. 
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becomes 1, 2.5 becomes 2), if it is 3 it stays 3, and if it is greater than 3 it is rounded up (so 3.5 
becomes 4, 4.5 becomes 5).  Any N/A responses of course stay the same.   
The results of all key variables analyzed were check against Q12, Q29, and this “Career 
Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average”, to insure in each case the Significance was the same or 
nearly so.  (At the very least, in each case the Significance was well below 0.1, and often the 
difference in the Significance between each measure was non-existent to three significant 
figures.)  Additionally, running cross tabulations of Q12 versus Q29 or the new career intent true 
5pt average, or any permutation thereof, showed perfect correlation with Sig. = 0.000.   
The second step of the method described above was also conducted on the averaging of Q10 
and Q30.  The logic in averaging these two92 is that people tend to answer a bit more truthfully 
for their peers, as if they are projecting their own feelings to their peers, while the ratings they 
give for themselves are likely a bit biased to a more conservative number.  Q10 asked the 
respondent to rate the satisfaction level of their peers on eleven different aspects of the AF.  Q30 
asked the same question, but of the respondent.  In each case, the eleven elements were given in 
a random order.  Simply averaging the two produced the Temp 9-point average.  This 9-point 
Temp value is then rounded as above:  if it is under 3, round down (so 1.5 becomes 1, 2.5 
becomes 2), if it is 3 it stays 3, and if it is greater than 3 it is rounded up (so 3.5 becomes 4, 4.5 
becomes 5).  The result is referred to throughout the thesis as 1030Ave, followed by the 
reference to which of the eleven sub-questions:  1030Ave(a) for instance. 
The way then to insure the averaging of 1030Ave is reasonable is to compare the resulting 
significance statistics of Q10 and Q30 to each other to insure correlation, and indeed the 
Significance for each cross tabulation was 0.000.  Additionally, I compared the resulting 
significance statistics of Q10, Q30, and the 1030Ave to the career intent (5pt true average) 
independently, as well as to Q10 and Q30, thereby insuring that no bias or inaccuracies were 
created by either variables that were averaged, and indeed there was only one inconsistency. 
This one case was where 1030Ave(e) on the recognition system did not seem to match the 
correlation found by looking at its constituents of Q10 and Q30.  For 1030Ave(e) and Q30e, they 
both showed high correlation to career intent (Sig. = 0.017 and 0.000 respectively).  However, 
Q10e did not show correlation to career intent (Sig. = 0.781), nor did it show correlation if 
compared to the constituents of career intent (Q12 or Q29).  Since this was the only example 
found of inconsistency with using the averaging method employed, a further investigation was 
conducted.  This investigation led me to conclude that there is a significant difference in the data 
for Q10e and Q30e, and that this variation, and not the averaging method, is to blame for this one 
inconsistency.   
 
 
                                                 
92 In fact, it was always the intent, even in designing the survey, to average these two questions. 
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Appendix K Overview of the Entire Population (Supplement) 
 
Lean to AF
58%
Lean to Leave 
AF
30%
Neutral
12%
 
Figure 11 Career intention of all active duty respondents; N=522. 
Lean to AF
47%
Lean to Leave 
AF
37%
Neutral
16%
 
Figure 12 Career intentions for Lieutenants; N=279. 
Lean to AF
59%
Neutral
11%
Lean to Leave 
AF
30%
 
Figure 13 Career intentions for Captains; N=165. 
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Figure 14 Career intentions for Majors; N=64. 
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Appendix L Why Officers Separate (Supplement) 
The following figures shows the how respondents ranked the choices given in Q31, asked to 
those who either are leaning to leave the AF or have a neutral (undecided) career intent.  In each 
case, 4 Lt Colonels and 1 Colonel were removed from the plot (though were part of the data and 
so the Significance number given reflects them).  Note the breakout of actual numbers by rank is 
given in each diagram.  The Significance shows a strong correlation of ranking choice by pay 
grade for all five components of Q31 except for Q31a, which has a Sig. of 0.651 (or a 
Confidence of 34.9%).  However, correlated or not, the figures here are given more as a 
demographic.  Any conclusions that may be inferred from them are discussed in the analysis 
section of this report.  Note also that Q31 likely doesn’t account for every possible (or even 
every major) influence to separate from the AF.  It only offered, in a random order, five 
prescribed possible elements, and respondents ranked those five or selected N/A (N/A is why N 
varies for each figure).  The survey software insured no two elements could be ranked the same.   
In the figures, each axis of the radar plot is the order of the ranking of that element of Q31, 
while the height on a given axis is the percentage by rank.  The area in each pentagon the 
represents 100% of respondents of that rank, and so the area of each of the three colored 
pentagons is always equal.  For example, in Figure 15 below, Majors, represented by the red 
pentagon (line with triangles), seem to have been evenly split on ranking pay as either their 3rd 
most, 4th most, or 5th (last) most important influence to leave the AF.  30% of Majors ranked 
Q31a a 3, 30% a 4, 30% a 5, while none gave Q31a a 1, and 10% gave it a 2.  However, and this 
is the reason the breakout of actual numbers by rank is given with each figure, for the case of 
Majors, this shape of the Major’s red (line with triangles) pentagon is likely highly uncertain 
since it is the result of just 10 Majors.  For the cases of Lieutenants and Captains, the shape is 
likely much more accurate. 
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Figure 15 Ranking of Q31a on pay by rank. 
N=274; Sig. = 0.651.(160 LT, 104 CPT, 10 MAJ) 
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Figure 16 Ranking of Q31b on promotion system by rank. 
N=274; Sig. = 0.044. (161 LT, 102 CPT, 11 MAJ) 
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Figure 17 Ranking of Q31a on job satisfaction by rank. 
N=278; Sig. = 0.005. (163 LT, 104 CPT, 11 MAJ) 
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Figure 18 Ranking of Q31d on availability of civilian jobs by rank. 
N=270; Sig. = 0.038. (155 LT, 104 CPT, 11 MAJ) 
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Figure 19 Ranking of Q31e on the assignment system by rank. 
N=272; Sig. = 0.079 (159 LT, 102 CPT, 11 MAJ) 
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Figure 20 #1 (Top) and #2 (Bottom) reasons officers said they were separating. 
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Appendix M Overall Air Force Satisfaction (Supplement) 
   Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 16.5% 2.1% 2.3% 0.4% 1.3% 22.6% 
2 16.5% 2.1% 3.3% 4.0% 5.4% 31.2% 
3 3.8% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.5% 12.1% 
4 6.5% 2.5% 1.9% 2.5% 5.7% 19.2% A
ve
 1
0&
30
a:
 
Jo
b 
5 Dissatisfied 5.0% 1.0% 2.9% 1.3% 4.8% 14.9% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 73.676 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 37.2% 64.2% 11.1% 37.2% 53.8% 
 Neutral 5.7% 9.9% 4.4% 14.7% 12.1% 
 Dissatisfied 14.9% 25.8% 14.4% 48.1% 34.1% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 23.8% 2.3% 3.8% 2.3% 7.3% 39.5% 
2 16.9% 5.4% 4.6% 4.6% 7.1% 38.5% 
3 3.4% 1.0% 1.5% 1.1% 2.1% 9.2% 
4 3.3% 1.0% 1.7% 1.1% 3.1% 10.2% A
ve
 1
0&
30
b:
 
P
ay
 
5 Dissatisfied 1.0% 0.0% 0.6% 1.0% 0.2% 2.7% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 42.004 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All  
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 48.3% 83.4% 21.3% 71.2% 78.0% 
 Neutral 4.4% 7.6% 3.3% 10.9% 9.2% 
 Dissatisfied 5.2% 8.9% 5.4% 17.9% 12.8% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 27.8% 3.6% 4.4% 3.3% 7.7% 46.7% 
2 11.9% 3.6% 4.8% 3.3% 6.1% 29.7% 
3 3.4% 1.5% 1.3% 1.3% 2.1% 9.8% 
4 3.6% 0.8% 1.0% 1.3% 1.7% 8.4% A
ve
 1
0&
30
c:
 
E
du
 
5 Dissatisfied 1.5% 0.0% 0.8% 1.0% 2.1% 5.4% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 36.335 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.003  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 46.9% 81.1% 20.3% 67.9% 76.4% 
 Neutral 5.0% 8.6% 3.4% 11.5% 9.8% 
 Dissatisfied 5.9% 10.3% 6.1% 20.5% 13.8% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 15.5% 2.5% 1.5% 1.7% 2.7% 23.9% 
2 20.7% 4.0% 5.6% 3.8% 6.1% 40.2% 
3 4.6% 0.6% 1.9% 2.1% 3.6% 12.8% 
4 5.0% 2.1% 2.1% 1.5% 4.8% 15.5% A
ve
 1
0&
30
d:
 
P
ro
m
ot
io
n 
Sy
s 
5 Dissatisfied 2.5% 0.4% 1.1% 1.0% 2.5% 7.5% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 46.740 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 42.7% 73.8% 14.4% 48.1% 64.2% 
 Neutral 5.2% 8.9% 5.7% 19.2% 12.8% 
 Dissatisfied 10.0% 17.2% 9.8% 32.7% 23.0% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 9.6% 1.3% 0.8% 0.8% 2.3% 14.8% 
2 14.6% 2.3% 3.3% 3.4% 3.6% 27.2% 
3 10.0% 2.3% 2.7% 1.5% 4.2% 20.7% 
4 10.0% 2.5% 3.8% 3.1% 5.2% 24.5% A
ve
 1
0&
30
e:
 
R
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
5 Dissatisfied 4.2% 1.1% 1.7% 1.3% 4.4% 12.8% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 30.295 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.017  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 27.8% 48.0% 10.2% 34.0% 42.0% 
 Neutral 12.3% 21.2% 5.7% 19.2% 20.7% 
 Dissatisfied 17.8% 30.8% 14.0% 46.8% 37.4% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 11.3% 1.5% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 15.5% 
2 16.3% 2.7% 4.0% 3.1% 5.4% 31.4% 
3 6.3% 2.3% 1.7% 0.8% 3.1% 14.2% 
4 9.2% 1.5% 3.1% 3.6% 5.4% 22.8% A
ve
 1
0&
30
f: 
O
P
R
’s
 
5 Dissatisfied 5.2% 1.5% 2.5% 1.7% 5.2% 16.1% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 48.839 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 31.8% 55.0% 10.2% 34.0% 46.9% 
 Neutral 8.6% 14.9% 3.8% 12.8% 14.2% 
 Dissatisfied 17.4% 30.1% 15.9% 53.2% 38.9% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 12.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.4% 2.7% 17.4% 
2 14.2% 2.5% 4.0% 4.2% 4.0% 28.9% 
3 5.4% 2.3% 1.7% 1.9% 2.9% 14.2% 
4 10.3% 2.3% 3.1% 2.5% 5.7% 23.9% A
ve
 1
0&
30
g:
 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
O
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
5 Dissatisfied 6.3% 1.3% 2.3% 1.1% 4.4% 15.5% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 36.954 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.002  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 29.9% 51.7% 11.3% 37.8% 46.4% 
 Neutral 7.7% 13.2% 4.8% 16.0% 14.2% 
 Dissatisfied 20.3% 35.1% 13.8% 46.2% 39.5% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 25.5% 3.8% 4.4% 4.4% 6.9% 45.0% 
2 16.9% 3.6% 4.0% 3.1% 5.4% 33.0% 
3 4.2% 1.5% 1.9% 1.9% 4.8% 14.4% 
4 1.5% 0.6% 1.5% 0.6% 2.1% 6.3% A
ve
 1
0&
30
h:
 
R
et
ire
m
en
t 
5 Dissatisfied 0.2% 0.0% 0.4% 0.2% 0.6% 1.3% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.365 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 49.8% 86.1% 19.7% 66.0% 78.0% 
 Neutral 5.7% 9.9% 6.7% 22.4% 14.4% 
 Dissatisfied 2.3% 4.0% 3.4% 11.5% 7.7% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 8.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.8% 1.3% 12.5% 
2 14.8% 3.3% 1.9% 1.7% 3.3% 24.9% 
3 5.9% 1.7% 2.5% 3.4% 5.2% 18.8% 
4 9.2% 1.3% 3.8% 2.1% 6.5% 23.0% A
ve
 1
0&
30
i: 
D
ep
lo
ym
en
ts
 
5 Dissatisfied 10.2% 2.1% 3.1% 2.1% 3.4% 20.9% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 46.816 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 27.4% 47.4% 7.1% 23.7% 37.4% 
 Neutral 7.7% 13.2% 8.6% 28.8% 18.8% 
 Dissatisfied 22.8% 39.4% 14.2% 47.4% 43.9% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 8.8% 1.0% 0.8% 0.6% 1.3% 12.5% 
2 19.0% 3.3% 3.6% 2.7% 5.0% 33.5% 
3 6.3% 1.9% 2.1% 1.9% 2.7% 14.9% 
4 9.6% 2.1% 3.1% 2.7% 5.7% 23.2% A
ve
 1
0&
30
k:
 
As
si
gn
m
en
t 
S
ys
 
5 Dissatisfied 4.6% 1.3% 2.7% 2.3% 5.0% 15.9% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.952 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 32.0% 55.3% 9.6% 32.1% 46.0% 
 Neutral 8.2% 14.2% 4.6% 15.4% 14.9% 
 Dissatisfied 17.6% 30.5% 15.7% 52.6% 39.1% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
Table 8 Cross tabulations of (1030Ave) satisfaction of aspects of the AF vs. career intent. 
1030Ave(j) is not shown because it was not significant (Sig. = 0.795).  Red (dark gray) cells are with percentages 
greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 4% and up to and including 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells 
are for ranges between 2% and 4% (inclusive), and white cells are less than 2%.  Percentages are percent of the 
whole group N.  The summarized portion at the bottom lumps satisfaction of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains 
“Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, and categorizes by those leaning to an AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or 
leaning to leaving the AF (career intent of 4 or 5). 
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Figure 21 Satisfaction in ten Air Force factors (1030Ave), divided by career intent. 
(Top) is for those leaning to leave the AF (N=156), (Bottom) depicts those leaning to a career in the AF (N=302).   
 147
   
0%
15%
30%
45%
60%
75%
90%
(a) Overall Job
(g) Leadership Opp(k) Assignments
Lieutenant Captain Major
 
Figure 22 1030Ave AF satisfaction factors:  dissatisfaction by rank (Major and below).93 
                                                 
93 N varies by sub-question for this plot.  Missing sub-questions are due to high Sig. (low Confidence) and so pre-
sent no correlation. 
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% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 
N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 30.0% 22.0% 21.3% 46.2% 23.6% 
2 36.7% 32.2% 28.6% 30.8% 30.6% 
3 6.7% 11.0% 13.6% 2.6% 11.5% 
4 16.7% 18.2% 22.6% 10.3% 19.8% 
A
ve
 
10
&
30
a:
 J
ob
 
5 Dissatisfied 10.0% 16.5% 13.9% 10.3% 14.5% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 20.278 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.062 
 Satisf. 54.2% Neutral 11.5% Dissatisf. 34.3% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 
N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 43.3% 31.4% 42.2% 46.2% 38.2% 
2 40.0% 36.0% 39.4% 35.9% 37.8% 
3 3.3% 11.4% 10.1% 7.7% 10.1% 
4 10.0% 16.9% 6.3% 5.1% 10.6% 
A
ve
 
10
&
30
b:
 
P
ay
 
5 Dissatisfied 3.3% 4.2% 2.1% 5.1% 3.2% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 24.829 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.016 
 Satisf. 76.0% Neutral 10.1% Dissatisf. 13.9% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 
N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 6.7% 16.9% 18.1% 33.3% 18.1% 
2 33.3% 25.0% 30.3% 43.6% 29.2% 
3 23.3% 11.9% 14.3% 7.7% 13.3% 
4 33.3% 27.1% 22.3% 12.8% 24.2% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
g:
 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
O
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
5 Dissatisfied 3.3% 19.1% 15.0% 2.6% 15.2% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 29.183 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.004 
 Satisf. 47.3% Neutral 13.3% Dissatisf. 39.4% 
 
(continued on next page) 
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% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 16.7% 40.7% 49.8% 56.4% 44.9% 
2 60.0% 32.6% 30.7% 20.5% 32.3% 
3 16.7% 17.4% 12.5% 5.1% 14.2% 
4 6.7% 8.1% 5.2% 15.4% 7.1% 
A
ve
 
10
&
30
h:
 
R
et
ire
m
en
t 
5 Dissatisfied 0.0% 1.3% 1.7% 2.6% 1.5% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 29.065 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.004 
 Satisf. 77.2% Neutral 14.2% Dissatisf. 8.6% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 10.0% 9.7% 11.1% 35.9% 12.2% 
2 23.3% 27.5% 22.3% 33.3% 25.2% 
3 30.0% 19.1% 18.5% 20.5% 19.4% 
4 13.3% 23.7% 25.8% 7.7% 23.1% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
i: 
D
ep
lo
ym
en
ts
 
5 Dissatisfied 23.3% 19.9% 22.3% 2.6% 20.1% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 36.985 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.000 
 Satisf. 37.3% Neutral 19.4% Dissatisf. 43.2% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 16.7% 10.2% 12.2% 33.3% 13.0% 
2 23.3% 30.9% 32.8% 38.5% 31.9% 
3 16.7% 14.8% 15.7% 15.4% 15.4% 
4 20.0% 25.4% 24.7% 2.6% 23.3% 
A
ve
 
10
&
30
k:
 
A
ss
ig
nm
en
t 
S
ys
 
5 Dissatisfied 23.3% 18.6% 14.6% 10.3% 16.4% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.844 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.008 
 Satisf. 44.9% Neutral 15.4% Dissatisf. 39.7% 
 
Table 9 Cross tabulations of AFSC vs. 1030Ave.94 
 
                                                 
94 No correlation exists for (c), (d), (e), (f), or (j), and so their cross tabulations are not presented here. 
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For all tables on this page, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 6%, orange 
(gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 
1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N. 
 N=283 18a Job: Meaningful to Unit  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 5.3% 14.5% 8.1% 12.0% 9.9% 49.8% 
2 3.2% 7.4% 3.2% 2.5% 1.8% 18.0% 
3 2.8% 2.8% 3.5% 1.4% 0.7% 11.3% 
4 2.1% 4.2% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 7.4% 4.2% 0.7% 0.4% 0.0% 12.7% 
 Total 20.8% 33.2% 16.6% 16.6% 12.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 68.445 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
 N=283 18b Job: Challenge  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 8.8% 13.8% 5.7% 11.3% 10.2% 49.8% 
2 3.9% 7.4% 1.8% 2.8% 2.1% 18.0% 
3 4.6% 3.5% 1.4% 0.4% 1.4% 11.3% 
4 2.8% 2.8% 1.1% 1.1% 0.4% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 7.4% 4.6% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 
 Total 27.6% 32.2% 10.6% 15.5% 14.1% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 48.549 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
 N=283 18c Job: Use Degree  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 3.9% 9.2% 4.6% 12.4% 19.8% 49.8% 
2 2.5% 5.7% 2.5% 4.9% 2.5% 18.0% 
3 2.5% 3.2% 1.4% 2.5% 1.8% 11.3% 
4 2.5% 2.1% 1.8% 1.4% 0.4% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 4.2% 5.3% 1.8% 1.1% 0.4% 12.7% 
 Total 15.5% 25.4% 12.0% 22.3% 24.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 58.848 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
 N=283 18d Job: Feel Valued  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 6.0% 14.1% 5.7% 15.5% 8.5% 49.8% 
2 3.5% 7.8% 2.8% 1.8% 2.1% 18.0% 
3 2.8% 3.2% 2.8% 2.1% 0.4% 11.3% 
4 2.8% 2.8% 1.4% 1.1% 0.0% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 6.4% 4.2% 0.7% 1.1% 0.4% 12.7% 
 Total 21.6% 32.2% 13.4% 21.6% 11.3% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 54.148 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
(continued on next page) 
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For all tables on this page, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 6%, orange 
(gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 
1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N. 
 N=283 18e Job: Add'l Duties  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 7.8% 9.2% 13.4% 10.6% 8.8% 49.8% 
2 2.1% 4.9% 3.2% 3.9% 3.9% 18.0% 
3 2.5% 3.2% 3.5% 0.7% 1.4% 11.3% 
4 1.8% 3.5% 1.4% 1.1% 0.4% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 4.6% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 0.7% 12.7% 
 Total 18.7% 23.3% 24.0% 18.7% 15.2% 100.0%
 Chi-Sq. = 27.182 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.040  
 
Table 10 Cross tabulations of ranking of job satisfaction (Q31c) to Q18. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF.  Percentages are as a percent of the whole group of 
N=283 that answered both Q18 and were at least neutral on career intent, thereby going to the branch of the survey 
that revealed Q31, which required the respondent to rank, among other factors, job satisfaction, as to how influential 
it is for their career intent. 
 N=283 Ave 10&30a: Job  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 1.8% 8.5% 6.4% 18.4% 14.8% 49.8% 
2 2.1% 7.1% 2.1% 3.9% 2.8% 18.0% 
3 1.4% 3.9% 3.2% 1.1% 1.8% 11.3% 
4 1.4% 4.2% 1.4% 1.1% 0.0% 8.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 5.3% 4.9% 1.4% 1.1% 0.0% 12.7% 
 Total 12.0% 28.6% 14.5% 25.4% 19.4% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 91.361 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 11 Cross tabulation of ranking of job satisfaction (Q31c) to 1030Ave(a) overall job satisfaction. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF.   
 N=278 11c Base Leadership  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 9.4% 14.7% 18.7% 5.0% 1.8% 49.6% 
2 4.7% 5.8% 5.8% 1.4% 0.7% 18.3% 
3 2.9% 2.2% 4.7% 1.1% 0.7% 11.5% 
4 1.4% 5.0% 1.8% 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 5.0% 1.4% 4.3% 0.7% 0.7% 12.2% 
 Total 23.4% 29.1% 35.3% 8.3% 4.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 25.441 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.062  
 
Table 12 Cross tabulation for ranking of job satisfaction (Q31c) to base leadership. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF.   
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For all tables on this page, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 6%, orange 
(gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 
1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N. 
 N=144 14c NOT Satisfied with Opportunity of Using Degree  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 20.8% 16.7% 6.9% 3.5% 2.1% 50.0% 
2 2.1% 7.6% 1.4% 1.4% 3.5% 16.0% 
3 2.8% 2.8% 3.5% 2.8% 0.0% 11.8% 
4 0.7% 4.2% 2.1% 2.1% 0.0% 9.0% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 2.1% 4.2% 0.7% 5.6% 0.7% 13.2% 
 Total 28.5% 35.4% 14.6% 15.3% 6.3% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 42.078 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
 N=143 14d NOT Satisfied with Opportunity of Using Tech Skills  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 21.7% 16.1% 4.9% 4.9% 2.8% 50.3% 
2 2.1% 7.7% 2.1% 0.7% 2.8% 15.4% 
3 2.1% 2.8% 4.2% 2.8% 0.0% 11.9% 
4 0.7% 3.5% 2.1% 2.8% 0.0% 9.1% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 2.1% 3.5% 2.1% 4.9% 0.7% 13.3% 
 Total 28.7% 33.6% 15.4% 16.1% 6.3% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 37.874 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.002  
 
Table 13 Cross tabulations for ranking of job satisfaction (Q31c) to use of skills and degree (Q14c & Q14d).   
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF.  These questions were part of a branch in the survey that 
were only revealed to respondents who identified themselves as being a 61 Scientist or 62 Engineer, hence the 
smaller N. 
 N=145 18c Job: Use Degree  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 6.2% 7.6% 4.1% 12.4% 19.3% 49.7% 
2 4.1% 4.1% 1.4% 3.4% 2.8% 15.9% 
3 2.1% 3.4% 1.4% 3.4% 2.1% 12.4% 
4 2.1% 2.1% 2.8% 1.4% 0.7% 9.0% 
Jo
b 
S
at
is
fa
ct
io
n 
as
 R
ea
so
n 
to
 
S
ep
ar
at
e 
5 1.4% 5.5% 3.4% 2.1% 0.7% 13.1% 
 Total 15.9% 22.8% 13.1% 22.8% 25.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 27.235 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.039  
 
Table 14 Cross tabulation of ranking of job satisfaction (Q31c) to use of skills and degree (Q18c).   
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF, limited to only 61S and 62E respondent.  This is useful 
to compare to the two tables above (Table 12 and Table 13), as it shows an error in the understanding or 
interpretation of one or more of these three questions. 
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 <5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 7.1% 1.1% 3.8% 0.8% 2.3% 15.0% 
2 6.0% 3.4% 3.8% 5.3% 8.6% 27.1% 
3 2.6% 2.3% 2.3% 3.4% 4.5% 15.0% 
4 1.9% 3.4% 2.6% 3.8% 10.5% 22.2% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
a:
 J
ob
 
5 Dissatisfied 3.8% 1.5% 4.1% 2.3% 9.0% 20.7% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 38.280 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 17.7% 53.4% 16.9% 33.6% 42.1% 
 Neutral 4.9% 14.8% 7.9% 15.7% 15.0% 
 Dissatisfied 10.5% 31.8% 25.6% 50.7% 42.9% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 11.7% 2.3% 6.8% 4.1% 12.4% 37.2% 
2 6.0% 6.8% 4.9% 7.1% 12.8% 37.6% 
3 1.1% 0.8% 2.6% 0.8% 3.4% 8.6% 
4 2.3% 1.9% 1.9% 2.3% 6.0% 14.3% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
b:
 P
ay
 
5 Dissatisfied 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 1.1% 0.4% 2.3% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.898 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.043  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 26.7% 80.7% 36.5% 72.4% 74.8% 
 Neutral 1.9% 5.7% 4.1% 8.2% 8.6% 
 Dissatisfied 4.5% 13.6% 9.8% 19.4% 16.5% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
(continued on next page) 
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<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 7.5% 3.4% 2.6% 3.4% 4.1% 21.1% 
2 9.8% 4.5% 8.6% 5.6% 12.0% 40.6% 
3 0.8% 0.8% 2.6% 3.0% 6.8% 13.9% 
4 2.6% 2.3% 1.5% 2.3% 7.5% 16.2% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
d:
 
P
ro
m
ot
io
n 
Sy
s 
5 Dissatisfied 0.8% 0.8% 1.1% 1.1% 4.5% 8.3% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 30.250 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.017  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 25.2% 76.1% 25.2% 50.0% 61.7% 
 Neutral 1.5% 4.5% 9.8% 19.4% 13.9% 
 Dissatisfied 6.4% 19.3% 15.4% 30.6% 24.4% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 4.9% 1.5% 1.9% 1.9% 1.5% 11.7% 
2 7.9% 4.1% 5.6% 4.5% 9.4% 31.6% 
3 1.9% 2.3% 2.3% 1.5% 5.3% 13.2% 
4 4.9% 1.9% 4.5% 5.6% 10.2% 27.1% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
f: 
O
P
R
’s
 
5 Dissatisfied 1.9% 1.9% 2.3% 1.9% 8.6% 16.5% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 24.075 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.088  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 18.4% 55.7% 17.3% 34.3% 43.2% 
 Neutral 4.1% 12.5% 6.8% 13.4% 13.2% 
 Dissatisfied 10.5% 31.8% 26.3% 52.2% 43.6% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
(continued on next page) 
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<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 5.6% 1.1% 1.5% 0.4% 4.5% 13.2% 
2 6.0% 2.3% 4.5% 5.3% 6.8% 24.8% 
3 2.3% 3.8% 1.9% 3.4% 5.6% 16.9% 
4 3.8% 2.6% 5.3% 4.1% 10.5% 26.3% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
g:
 
Le
ad
er
sh
ip
 
O
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s 
5 Dissatisfied 3.8% 1.9% 3.4% 2.3% 7.5% 18.8% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.161 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.052  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 15.0% 45.5% 16.9% 33.6% 38.0% 
 Neutral 6.0% 18.2% 9.0% 17.9% 16.9% 
 Dissatisfied 12.0% 36.4% 24.4% 48.5% 45.1% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 3.8% 1.1% 1.9% 1.5% 2.6% 10.9% 
2 4.1% 2.3% 1.5% 2.6% 5.3% 15.8% 
3 0.8% 2.3% 2.6% 4.5% 9.0% 19.2% 
4 4.9% 2.6% 6.0% 3.8% 11.7% 28.9% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
i: 
D
ep
lo
ym
en
ts
 
5 Dissatisfied 7.9% 3.4% 4.5% 3.0% 6.4% 25.2% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 25.794 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.057  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 11.3% 34.1% 12.0% 23.9% 26.7% 
 Neutral 3.0% 9.1% 13.5% 26.9% 19.2% 
 Dissatisfied 18.8% 56.8% 24.8% 49.3% 54.1% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
Table 15 Cross tabulations of (1030Ave) satisfaction of aspects of the AF vs. career intent, <5yrs. 
Limited to respondents with less than 5 YOS.  1030Ave(c), (e), (h), (j), and (k) are not shown because they were not 
significant.  Red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 11%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 7% 
and up to and including 11%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 3% and 7% (inclusive), and 
white cells are less than 3%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N.  The summarized portion at the bottom 
lumps satisfaction of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains “Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, and categorizes by 
those leaning to an AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or leaning to leaving the AF (career intent of 4 or 5).   
 156
 
 
≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 26.2% 3.1% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4% 30.5% 
2 27.3% 0.8% 2.7% 2.7% 2.0% 35.5% 
3 5.1% 1.6% 1.6% 0.4% 0.4% 9.0% 
4 11.3% 1.6% 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 16.0% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
a:
 
Jo
b 
5 Dissatisfied 6.3% 0.4% 1.6% 0.4% 0.4% 9.0% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.574 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.046  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 57.4% 68.7% 5.1% 59.1% 66.0% 
 Neutral 6.6% 7.9% 0.8% 9.1% 9.0% 
 Dissatisfied 19.5% 23.4% 2.7% 31.8% 25.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 36.3% 2.3% 0.8% 0.4% 2.0% 41.8% 
2 28.1% 3.9% 4.3% 2.0% 1.2% 39.5% 
3 5.9% 1.2% 0.4% 1.6% 0.8% 9.8% 
4 4.3% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
b:
 
P
ay
 
5 Dissatisfied 1.6% 0.0% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 3.1% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 43.792 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 70.7% 84.6% 5.5% 63.6% 81.3% 
 Neutral 7.0% 8.4% 2.3% 27.3% 9.8% 
 Dissatisfied 5.9% 7.0% 0.8% 9.1% 9.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
(continued on next page) 
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≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 45.3% 2.0% 3.1% 1.2% 2.0% 53.5% 
2 18.4% 2.7% 1.6% 1.2% 0.4% 24.2% 
3 4.7% 1.6% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 8.6% 
4 5.5% 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 9.0% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
c:
 
E
du
 
5 Dissatisfied 2.3% 0.0% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 4.7% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.521 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 68.4% 81.8% 4.7% 54.5% 77.7% 
 Neutral 6.3% 7.5% 1.2% 13.6% 8.6% 
 Dissatisfied 9.0% 10.7% 2.7% 31.8% 13.7% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 23.8% 1.6% 0.4% 0.0% 1.2% 27.0% 
2 32.0% 3.5% 2.3% 2.0% 0.0% 39.8% 
3 8.6% 0.4% 1.2% 1.2% 0.4% 11.7% 
4 7.4% 2.0% 2.7% 0.8% 2.0% 14.8% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
d:
 
P
ro
m
ot
io
n 
Sy
s 
5 Dissatisfied 4.3% 0.0% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 6.6% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 40.733 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 60.9% 72.9% 3.1% 36.4% 66.8% 
 Neutral 9.0% 10.7% 1.6% 18.2% 11.7% 
 Dissatisfied 13.7% 16.4% 3.9% 45.5% 21.5% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
(continued on next page) 
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≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 18.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 19.5% 
2 25.0% 1.2% 2.3% 1.6% 1.2% 31.3% 
3 10.9% 2.3% 1.2% 0.0% 0.8% 15.2% 
4 13.7% 1.2% 1.6% 1.6% 0.4% 18.4% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
f: 
O
P
R
s 
5 Dissatisfied 8.6% 1.2% 2.7% 1.6% 1.6% 15.6% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 32.249 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.009  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 45.7% 54.7% 2.7% 31.8% 50.8% 
 Neutral 13.3% 15.9% 0.8% 9.1% 15.2% 
 Dissatisfied 24.6% 29.4% 5.1% 59.1% 34.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 38.7% 3.9% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 47.3% 
2 27.3% 2.3% 3.1% 0.8% 0.4% 34.0% 
3 7.0% 0.8% 0.8% 2.0% 1.2% 11.7% 
4 2.7% 0.4% 2.0% 0.0% 0.8% 5.9% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
h:
 
R
et
ire
m
en
t 
5 Dissatisfied 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 1.2% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 47.881 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 72.3% 86.4% 4.3% 50.0% 81.3% 
 Neutral 7.8% 9.3% 3.1% 36.4% 11.7% 
 Dissatisfied 3.5% 4.2% 1.2% 13.6% 7.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
(continued on next page) 
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≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 12.9% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 14.1% 
2 25.8% 4.3% 2.3% 0.8% 1.2% 34.4% 
3 11.3% 1.2% 2.3% 2.3% 1.2% 18.4% 
4 13.7% 0.0% 1.6% 0.4% 1.2% 16.8% 
A
ve
 1
0&
30
i: 
D
ep
lo
ym
en
ts
 
5 Dissatisfied 12.5% 0.8% 1.6% 1.2% 0.4% 16.4% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 27.900 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.033  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 44.1% 52.8% 2.0% 22.7% 48.4% 
 Neutral 12.5% 15.0% 3.5% 40.9% 18.4% 
 Dissatisfied 27.0% 32.2% 3.1% 36.4% 33.2% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
Table 16 Cross tabulations of (1030Ave) satisfaction of aspects of the AF vs. career intent, ≥5yrs. 
Limited to respondents with 5 or more and less than 10 YOS.  1030Ave (e), (g), (j), and (k) are not shown because 
they were not significant.  Red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 11%, orange (gray) is for ranges 
between 7% and up to and including 11%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 3% and 7% 
(inclusive), and white cells are less than 3%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N.  The summarized 
portion at the bottom lumps satisfaction of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains “Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, 
and categorizes by those leaning to an AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or leaning to leaving the AF (career intent 
of 4 or 5).   
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Appendix N Regression Analysis on Job Satisfaction 
Regression Analysis for All Respondents with <5 YOS 
 Notes 
 
Output Created 11-DEC-2004 02:38:13
Comments  
Data C:\DOCUME~1\DEREKB~1\MYD
OCU~1\Thesis\SURVEY~1\SURV
EY~1.SAV
Filter Min_ADT_Range<5 (FILTER)
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
Input 
N of Rows in 
Working Data 
File 
285
Definition of 
Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing.
Missing Value 
Handling 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used.
Syntax 
REGRESSION  /MISSING 
LISTWISE  /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  /DEPENDENT Ca-
reerIntentNormalizedto-
True5ptAverage  
/METHOD=STEPWISE 
Ave1030aJob Ave1030bPay 
Ave1030cEdu 
Ave1030dPromotionSys 
Ave1030eRecognition 
Ave1030fOPRs  
Ave1030gLeadershipOpp 
Ave1030hRetirement 
Ave1030iDeployments 
Ave1030jTDY 
Ave1030kAssignmentSys 
Min_ADT_Range  .
Elapsed Time 0:00:00.11
Memory Re-
quired 9684 bytes
Resources 
Additional Mem-
ory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes
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 Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
Ave 
10&30d: 
Promotion 
Sys 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
2 
Ave 
10&30a: 
Job 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
3 
Ave 
10&30h: 
Retirement 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
4 
Ave 
10&30i: 
Deploy-
ments 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
a  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .257(a) .066 .062 1.513
2 .304(b) .092 .086 1.494
3 .336(c) .113 .103 1.480
4 .360(d) .129 .116 1.469
a  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
b  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Retirement 
d  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Retirement, Ave 
10&30i: Deployments 
 
 
 ANOVA(e) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regres-
sion 42.623 1 42.623 18.627 .000(a) 
Residual 604.099 264 2.288    
1 
Total 646.722 265     
Regres-
sion 59.796 2 29.898 13.397 .000(b) 
Residual 586.926 263 2.232    
2 
Total 646.722 265     
Regres-
sion 73.202 3 24.401 11.147 .000(c) 
Residual 573.520 262 2.189    
3 
Total 646.722 265     
Regres-
sion 83.636 4 20.909 9.692 .000(d) 
Residual 563.086 261 2.157    
4 
Total 646.722 265     
a  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
b  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Retirement 
d  Predictors: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Retirement, Ave 
10&30i: Deployments 
e  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized Coef-
ficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.489 .211  11.774 .0001 
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .328 .076 .257 4.316 .000
2 (Constant) 2.074 .257  8.079 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .256 .079 .200 3.218 .001
  
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .194 .070 .172 2.774 .006
3 (Constant) 1.763 .284  6.216 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .195 .082 .152 2.359 .019
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .197 .069 .175 2.846 .005
  
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .236 .096 .151 2.475 .014
4 (Constant) 2.129 .327  6.508 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .206 .082 .161 2.510 .013
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .252 .073 .224 3.444 .001
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .234 .095 .150 2.469 .014
  
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments -.163 .074 -.137 -2.199 .029
a  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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 Excluded Variables(e) 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model   Beta In t Sig. 
Partial Cor-
relation Tolerance 
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .172(a) 2.774 .006 .169 .892
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .043(a) .691 .490 .043 .935
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .064(a) 1.028 .305 .063 .926
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition .089(a) 1.280 .202 .079 .730
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .145(a) 2.083 .038 .127 .717
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
.064(a) 1.031 .304 .063 .907
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .148(a) 2.391 .018 .146 .904
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments -.066(a) -1.100 .272 -.068 .969
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY -.026(a) -.423 .672 -.026 .970
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.052(a) .785 .433 .048 .817
1 
Min ADT 
Range .098(a) 1.634 .103 .100 .977
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .036(b) .599 .550 .037 .933
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .032(b) .512 .609 .032 .892
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition .020(b) .262 .793 .016 .625
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .104(b) 1.454 .147 .089 .673
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.040(b) -.543 .587 -.034 .641
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .151(b) 2.475 .014 .151 .904
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments -.139(b) -2.205 .028 -.135 .856
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY -.075(b) -1.214 .226 -.075 .901
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
-.026(b) -.368 .713 -.023 .681
2 
Min ADT 
Range .093(b) 1.574 .117 .097 .976
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3 Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .005(c) .083 .934 .005 .892
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .009(c) .147 .883 .009 .871
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition -.007(c) -.092 .927 -.006 .612
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .083(c) 1.164 .246 .072 .662
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.053(c) -.729 .467 -.045 .638
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments -.137(c) -2.199 .029 -.135 .856
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY -.096(c) -1.551 .122 -.096 .887
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
-.040(c) -.570 .569 -.035 .677
  
Min ADT 
Range .093(c) 1.586 .114 .098 .976
4 Ave 10&30b: 
Pay -.002(d) -.032 .974 -.002 .889
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .013(d) .208 .836 .013 .871
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition .030(d) .399 .690 .025 .583
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .099(d) 1.394 .164 .086 .656
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
.009(d) .112 .911 .007 .545
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY -.077(d) -1.238 .217 -.077 .866
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
-.021(d) -.303 .762 -.019 .666
  
Min ADT 
Range .083(d) 1.414 .159 .087 .969
a  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
b  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job 
c  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Re-
tirement 
d  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30a: Job, Ave 10&30h: Re-
tirement, Ave 10&30i: Deployments 
e  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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Regression Analysis for All Respondents with ≥5 YOS 
 Notes 
 
Output Created 11-DEC-2004 02:37:06
Comments  
Data C:\DOCUME~1\DEREKB~1\MYD
OCU~1\Thesis\SURVEY~1\SURV
EY~1.SAV
Filter Min_ADT_Range>=5 (FILTER)
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
Input 
N of Rows in 
Working Data 
File 
307
Definition of 
Missing 
User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing.
Missing Value 
Handling 
Cases Used Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used.
Syntax 
REGRESSION  /MISSING 
LISTWISE  /STATISTICS COEFF 
OUTS R ANOVA  
/CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)  
/NOORIGIN  /DEPENDENT Ca-
reerIntentNormalizedto-
True5ptAverage  
/METHOD=STEPWISE 
Ave1030aJob Ave1030bPay 
Ave1030cEdu 
Ave1030dPromotionSys 
Ave1030eRecognition 
Ave1030fOPRs  
Ave1030gLeadershipOpp 
Ave1030hRetirement 
Ave1030iDeployments 
Ave1030jTDY 
Ave1030kAssignmentSys 
Min_ADT_Range  .
Elapsed Time 0:00:00.08
Memory Re-
quired 9684 bytes
Resources 
Additional Mem-
ory Required for 
Residual Plots 
0 bytes
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 Variables Entered/Removed(a) 
 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 
Min ADT 
Range . 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
2 
Ave 
10&30d: 
Promotion 
Sys 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
3 
Ave 
10&30c: 
Edu 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
4 
Ave 
10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
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5 
Ave 
10&30h: 
Retirement 
. 
Stepwise 
(Criteria: 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-enter 
<= .050, 
Probabil-
ity-of-F-
to-
remove 
>= .100).
a  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
 
 
 Model Summary 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 .333(a) .111 .107 1.018
2 .434(b) .188 .182 .974
3 .457(c) .209 .200 .964
4 .482(d) .233 .221 .951
5 .495(e) .245 .229 .945
a  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range 
b  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu 
d  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership Opp 
e  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership Opp, Ave 10&30h: Retirement 
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 ANOVA(f) 
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Regres-
sion 32.819 1 32.819 31.697 .000(a) 
Residual 262.989 254 1.035    
1 
Total 295.809 255     
Regres-
sion 55.668 2 27.834 29.325 .000(b) 
Residual 240.140 253 .949    
2 
Total 295.809 255     
Regres-
sion 61.857 3 20.619 22.210 .000(c) 
Residual 233.952 252 .928    
3 
Total 295.809 255     
Regres-
sion 68.860 4 17.215 19.039 .000(d) 
Residual 226.949 251 .904    
4 
Total 295.809 255     
Regres-
sion 72.346 5 14.469 16.188 .000(e) 
Residual 223.462 250 .894    
5 
Total 295.809 255     
a  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range 
b  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
c  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu 
d  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership Opp 
e  Predictors: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership Opp, Ave 10&30h: Retirement 
f  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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 Coefficients(a) 
 
Unstandardized Coef-
ficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 2.431 .173  14.084 .0001 
Min ADT 
Range -.085 .015 -.333 -5.630 .000
2 (Constant) 1.843 .204  9.031 .000
Min ADT 
Range -.084 .014 -.330 -5.827 .000
  
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .247 .050 .278 4.906 .000
3 (Constant) 1.635 .217  7.521 .000
Min ADT 
Range -.081 .014 -.315 -5.599 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .208 .052 .234 4.000 .000
  
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .139 .054 .152 2.582 .010
4 (Constant) 1.853 .228  8.113 .000
Min ADT 
Range -.083 .014 -.325 -5.833 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .254 .054 .286 4.711 .000
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .174 .055 .191 3.193 .002
  
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.137 .049 -.171 -2.783 .006
5 (Constant) 
1.738 .235  7.408 .000
Min ADT 
Range -.082 .014 -.321 -5.793 .000
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .222 .056 .249 3.952 .000
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .142 .057 .155 2.503 .013
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.142 .049 -.177 -2.898 .004
  
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .142 .072 .125 1.975 .049
a  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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 Excluded Variables(f) 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Model   Beta In t Sig. 
Partial Cor-
relation Tolerance 
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .140(a) 2.387 .018 .148 .999
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .183(a) 3.144 .002 .194 1.000
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .220(a) 3.797 .000 .232 .990
Ave 10&30d: 
Promotion Sys .278(a) 4.906 .000 .295 1.000
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition .097(a) 1.628 .105 .102 .978
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .230(a) 3.974 .000 .242 .990
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.005(a) -.085 .932 -.005 .993
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .239(a) 4.153 .000 .253 .996
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments .086(a) 1.451 .148 .091 .995
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY .113(a) 1.922 .056 .120 .994
1 
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.196(a) 3.373 .001 .207 1.000
Ave 10&30a: 
Job .054(b) .893 .373 .056 .889
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .079(b) 1.266 .207 .080 .819
Ave 10&30c: 
Edu .152(b) 2.582 .010 .161 .907
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition -.069(b) -1.025 .306 -.064 .710
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .078(b) 1.012 .312 .064 .547
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.125(b) -2.059 .041 -.129 .858
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .153(b) 2.497 .013 .155 .841
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments .022(b) .380 .704 .024 .941
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY .025(b) .409 .683 .026 .887
2 
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.099(b) 1.601 .111 .100 .834
 172
 
3 Ave 10&30a: 
Job .023(c) .381 .704 .024 .851
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .030(c) .461 .645 .029 .732
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition -.110(c) -1.620 .107 -.102 .678
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .067(c) .880 .380 .055 .545
Ave 10&30g: 
Leadership 
Opp 
-.171(c) -2.783 .006 -.173 .811
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .115(c) 1.801 .073 .113 .762
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments -.010(c) -.175 .861 -.011 .897
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY -.039(c) -.613 .541 -.039 .759
  
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.059(c) .916 .360 .058 .767
4 Ave 10&30a: 
Job .113(d) 1.713 .088 .108 .703
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay .041(d) .626 .532 .040 .730
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition -.051(d) -.717 .474 -.045 .597
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .086(d) 1.141 .255 .072 .541
Ave 10&30h: 
Retirement .125(d) 1.975 .049 .124 .759
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments .070(d) 1.089 .277 .069 .740
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY .002(d) .031 .976 .002 .717
  
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.110(d) 1.690 .092 .106 .718
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5 Ave 10&30a: 
Job .108(e) 1.654 .099 .104 .702
Ave 10&30b: 
Pay -.004(e) -.053 .958 -.003 .643
Ave 10&30e: 
Recognition -.072(e) -1.000 .318 -.063 .586
Ave 10&30f: 
OPRs .090(e) 1.204 .230 .076 .540
Ave 10&30i: 
Deployments .071(e) 1.116 .266 .071 .740
Ave 10&30j: 
TDY .002(e) .032 .975 .002 .717
  
Ave 10&30k: 
Assignment 
Sys 
.098(e) 1.500 .135 .095 .710
a  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Min ADT Range 
b  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys 
c  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu 
d  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, 
Ave 10&30g: Leadership Opp 
e  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Min ADT Range, Ave 10&30d: Promotion Sys, Ave 10&30c: Edu, 
Ave 10&30g: Leadership Opp, Ave 10&30h: Retirement 
f  Dependent Variable: Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average 
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Appendix O Job Satisfaction Factors (Supplement) 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 19.2% 2.3% 2.1% 1.3% 3.4% 28.4% 
2 13.6% 3.3% 4.8% 4.4% 5.9% 32.0% 
3 6.7% 2.1% 1.9% 1.3% 3.6% 15.7% 
4 5.4% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 3.8% 13.8% 
18
a 
Jo
b:
 
M
ea
ni
ng
fu
ln
es
s 
to
 
U
ni
t 
5 Dissatisfied 3.4% 0.8% 1.9% 1.1% 2.9% 10.2% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 41.387 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 38.3% 66.2% 15.1% 50.6% 60.3% 
 Neutral 8.8% 15.2% 5.0% 16.7% 15.7% 
 Dissatisfied 10.7% 18.5% 9.8% 32.7% 23.9% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 22.4% 3.1% 3.6% 2.7% 4.0% 35.8% 
2 13.6% 2.5% 3.6% 3.3% 7.9% 30.8% 
3 4.6% 2.1% 1.3% 1.0% 1.7% 10.7% 
4 4.0% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 3.4% 12.1% 
18
b 
Jo
b:
 C
ha
lle
ng
e 
5 Dissatisfied 3.6% 0.8% 2.1% 1.3% 2.7% 10.5% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 41.235 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 41.6% 71.9% 17.8% 59.6% 66.7% 
 Neutral 6.7% 11.6% 2.7% 9.0% 10.7% 
 Dissatisfied 9.6% 16.6% 9.4% 31.4% 22.6% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 12.1% 2.3% 1.7% 1.1% 2.3% 19.5% 
2 16.3% 2.3% 2.9% 3.4% 4.4% 29.3% 
3 5.9% 1.5% 1.9% 0.8% 2.1% 12.3% 
4 8.8% 1.3% 2.5% 2.3% 6.1% 21.1% 
18
c 
Jo
b:
 U
se
 D
eg
re
e 
5 Dissatisfied 5.2% 2.1% 3.3% 2.5% 4.8% 17.8% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.021 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 33.0% 57.0% 11.3% 37.8% 48.9% 
 Neutral 7.5% 12.9% 2.9% 9.6% 12.3% 
 Dissatisfied 17.4% 30.1% 15.7% 52.6% 38.9% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 17.2% 2.7% 2.9% 0.8% 4.4% 28.0% 
2 15.7% 2.9% 2.7% 4.0% 5.9% 31.2% 
3 4.4% 1.3% 2.7% 1.3% 2.5% 12.3% 
4 7.3% 1.7% 2.3% 2.7% 4.6% 18.6% 
18
d 
Jo
b:
 F
ee
l V
al
ue
d 
5 Dissatisfied 3.6% 1.0% 1.7% 1.3% 2.3% 10.0% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 33.237 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.007  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 38.5% 66.6% 15.1% 50.6% 59.2% 
 Neutral 5.7% 9.9% 3.8% 12.8% 12.3% 
 Dissatisfied 13.6% 23.5% 10.9% 36.5% 28.5% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=522 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 13.6% 2.5% 2.1% 1.3% 3.1% 22.6% 
2 13.4% 2.3% 2.7% 2.7% 5.0% 26.1% 
3 13.0% 2.5% 3.1% 3.1% 4.6% 26.2% 
4 5.7% 1.7% 2.9% 1.5% 3.6% 15.5% 
18
e 
Jo
b:
 A
dd
'l 
D
ut
ie
s 
5 Dissatisfied 2.5% 0.6% 1.5% 1.5% 3.4% 9.6% 
 Total 48.3% 9.6% 12.3% 10.2% 19.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 30.713 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.015  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 31.8% 55.0% 12.1% 40.4% 48.7% 
 Neutral 15.5% 26.8% 7.7% 25.6% 26.2% 
 Dissatisfied 10.5% 18.2% 10.2% 34.0% 25.1% 
 N= 302 302 156 156 522 
 
Table 17 Cross tabulations of Q18 on aspects of job satisfaction vs. career intent. 
Red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 4% and up to and 
including 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 2% and 4% (inclusive), and white cells are less 
than 2%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N.  The summarized portion at the bottom lumps satisfaction 
of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains “Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, and categorizes by those leaning to an 
AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or leaning to leaving the AF (career intent of 4 or 5).   
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Figure 23 For those leaning to leave the AF (N=156), satisfaction as indicated in Q18. 
The lowest confidence interval in this figure is 98.5%, and corresponds to 18e Number of Additional Duties. 
0%
15%
30%
45%
60%
75%
18a Job: Meaningfulness to Unit
18b Job: Challenge
18c Job: Use Degree18d Job: Feel Valued
18e Job: Add'l Duties
Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied
 
Figure 24 For those leaning to a career in the AF (N=302), satisfaction as indicated in Q18. 
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Figure 25 Q18 job satisfaction factors:  dissatisfaction by rank (Major and below).95 
                                                 
95 N varies by sub-question for this plot. 
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% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager 
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 40.0% 34.3% 34.5% 66.7% 36.8% 
2 43.3% 29.2% 31.7% 12.8% 30.1% 
3 0.0% 11.4% 10.8% 7.7% 10.3% 
4 10.0% 10.6% 13.6% 7.7% 11.8% 18
b 
Jo
b:
 
C
ha
lle
ng
e 
5 Dissatisfied 6.7% 14.4% 9.4% 5.1% 11.0% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.578 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.009 
 Satisf. 66.9% Neutral 10.3% Dissatisf. 22.8% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager 
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 23.3% 16.9% 20.6% 43.6% 20.8% 
2 43.3% 27.5% 31.0% 23.1% 29.7% 
3 3.3% 14.8% 11.8% 5.1% 12.2% 
4 16.7% 20.8% 19.5% 12.8% 19.4% 18
c 
Jo
b:
 
U
se
 D
eg
re
e 
5 Dissatisfied 13.3% 19.9% 17.1% 15.4% 17.9% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 21.778 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.040 
 Satisf. 50.5% Neutral 12.2% Dissatisf. 37.3% 
 
% by AFSC AFSC Class  
 N=592 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A 
Program 
Manager 
Other Total 
1 Satisfied 36.7% 28.8% 25.4% 53.8% 29.2% 
2 26.7% 31.4% 33.4% 25.6% 31.8% 
3 16.7% 11.4% 12.2% 2.6% 11.5% 
4 16.7% 16.5% 20.2% 10.3% 17.9% 18
d 
Jo
b:
 
Fe
el
 V
al
ue
d 
5 Dissatisfied 3.3% 11.9% 8.7% 7.7% 9.6% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 30 236 287 39 592 
 Chi-Sq. = 19.852 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.070 
 Satisf. 61.0% Neutral 11.5% Dissatisf. 27.5% 
 
Table 18 Cross tabulations of AFSC vs. to Q18.96 
                                                 
96 No correlation exists for Q18a or Q18e, and so their cross tabulations are not presented here. 
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<5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=266 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 6.4% 3.0% 3.0% 1.1% 3.8% 17.3% 
2 6.8% 2.3% 3.8% 4.1% 8.6% 25.6% 
3 4.9% 3.0% 4.1% 4.9% 9.0% 25.9% 
4 1.9% 3.0% 3.8% 2.3% 7.1% 18.0% 18
e 
Jo
b:
 
A
dd
'l 
D
ut
ie
s 
5 Dissatisfied 1.5% 0.4% 1.9% 3.0% 6.4% 13.2% 
 Total 21.4% 11.7% 16.5% 15.4% 35.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 25.397 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.063  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 18.4% 55.7% 17.7% 35.1% 42.9% 
 Neutral 7.9% 23.9% 13.9% 27.6% 25.9% 
 Dissatisfied 6.8% 20.5% 18.8% 37.3% 31.2% 
 N= 88 88 134 134 266 
 
Table 19 Cross tabulation of Q18 on aspects of job satisfaction vs. career intent, <5yrs. 
Limited to respondents with less than 5 YOS.  Q18a, b, c, and d are not shown because they were not significant.  
Red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 11%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 7% and up to and 
including 11%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 3% and 7% (inclusive), and white cells are less 
than 3%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N.  The summarized portion at the bottom lumps satisfaction 
of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains “Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, and categorizes by those leaning to an 
AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or leaning to leaving the AF (career intent of 4 or 5).   
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≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 31.6% 2.7% 2.0% 0.8% 0.8% 37.9% 
2 19.9% 2.0% 2.7% 1.6% 2.7% 28.9% 
3 11.3% 2.3% 1.2% 0.4% 0.0% 15.2% 
4 8.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.0% 10.2% 18
a 
Jo
b:
 
M
ea
ni
ng
fu
l t
o 
U
ni
t 
5 Dissatisfied 5.1% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 0.4% 7.8% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 25.592 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.060  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 56.3% 67.3% 5.9% 68.2% 66.8% 
 Neutral 13.7% 16.4% 0.4% 4.5% 15.2% 
 Dissatisfied 13.7% 16.4% 2.3% 27.3% 18.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 37.9% 3.1% 3.1% 2.0% 0.8% 46.9% 
2 19.9% 2.0% 2.7% 1.6% 2.0% 28.1% 
3 7.4% 2.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.4% 10.9% 
4 5.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.5% 18
b 
Jo
b:
 
C
ha
lle
ng
e 
5 Dissatisfied 5.5% 0.0% 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 8.6% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 26.377 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.049  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 62.9% 75.2% 6.3% 72.7% 75.0% 
 Neutral 9.8% 11.7% 0.4% 4.5% 10.9% 
 Dissatisfied 10.9% 13.1% 2.0% 22.7% 14.1% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
 
(continued on next page) 
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≥5yrs  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=256 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Satisfied 28.9% 2.7% 2.0% 0.4% 1.2% 35.2% 
2 23.8% 1.2% 2.0% 1.6% 2.0% 30.5% 
3 7.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.4% 0.0% 11.3% 
4 11.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.2% 0.8% 15.2% 18
d 
Jo
b:
 
Fe
el
 V
al
ue
d 
5 Dissatisfied 4.7% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 7.8% 
 Total 76.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7% 3.9% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 24.532 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.079  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All 
 % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
 Satisfied 56.6% 67.8% 5.1% 59.1% 65.6% 
 Neutral 9.0% 10.7% 0.4% 4.5% 11.3% 
 Dissatisfied 18.0% 21.5% 3.1% 36.4% 23.0% 
 N= 214 214 22 22 256 
  
Table 20 Cross tabulations of Q18 on aspects of job satisfaction vs. career intent, ≥5yrs. 
Limited to respondents with 5 or more YOS.  Q18c and e are not shown because they were not significant.  Red 
(dark gray) cells are with percentages greater than 11%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 7% and up to and 
including 11%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for ranges between 3% and 7% (inclusive), and white cells are less 
than 3%.  Percentages are percent of the whole group N.  The summarized portion at the bottom lumps satisfaction 
of 1 and 2 as “Satisfied”, 3 remains “Neutral”, and 4 and 5 as “Dissatisfied”, and categorizes by those leaning to an 
AF career (career intent of 1 or 2) or leaning to leaving the AF (career intent of 4 or 5).   
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Appendix P The Assignment System (Supplement) 
For all cross tabulations presented in this appendix, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages 
greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells 
are for ranges between 1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of 
the whole group N. 
 N=277 Ave 10&30k: Assignment Sys  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 1.1% 2.2% 1.4% 5.8% 6.9% 17.3% 
2 0.7% 4.7% 4.0% 11.2% 8.7% 29.2% 
3 0.4% 5.4% 5.1% 5.4% 3.6% 19.9% 
4 3.6% 8.7% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 24.2% 
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5 1.4% 4.0% 1.4% 1.1% 1.4% 9.4% 
 Total 7.2% 24.9% 15.9% 27.4% 24.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 48.222 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 21 Cross tabulation of ranking of assignment system (Q31e) vs. 1030Ave(k) on assignment system. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
 N=277 20 Homestead Policy  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 8.7% 2.9% 2.2% 2.2% 1.4% 17.3% 
2 6.1% 7.2% 6.1% 6.1% 3.6% 29.2% 
3 4.7% 7.9% 2.9% 2.2% 2.2% 19.9% 
4 7.2% 5.1% 4.3% 4.7% 2.9% 24.2% 
As
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5 0.4% 2.9% 1.1% 2.5% 2.5% 9.4% 
 Total 27.1% 26.0% 16.6% 17.7% 12.6% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 33.868 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.006  
 
Table 22 Cross tabulation of ranking of assignment system (Q31e) vs. Q20 an AF homestead policy. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
 N=273 26b More Ops Experience  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 4.4% 3.7% 1.5% 4.4% 2.9% 16.8% 
2 7.7% 7.0% 5.1% 6.2% 2.9% 28.9% 
3 3.3% 6.6% 7.7% 1.5% 1.1% 20.1% 
4 4.8% 6.6% 5.1% 5.5% 2.6% 24.5% 
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5 1.5% 4.4% 1.1% 1.5% 1.1% 9.5% 
 Total 21.6% 28.2% 20.5% 19.0% 10.6% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 29.489 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.021  
 
Table 23 Cross tabulation of ranking of assignment system (Q31e) vs. Q26b more operational experience. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
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 N=277 Ave 10&30a: Job  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 3.6% 6.1% 3.2% 2.5% 1.8% 17.3% 
2 1.4% 6.1% 2.9% 11.9% 6.9% 29.2% 
3 2.2% 6.9% 2.9% 3.2% 4.7% 19.9% 
4 4.7% 6.5% 4.0% 4.7% 4.3% 24.2% 
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5 0.4% 2.9% 1.8% 2.9% 1.4% 9.4% 
 Total 12.3% 28.5% 14.8% 25.3% 19.1% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 32.614 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.008  
 
Table 24 Cross tabulation of ranking of assignment system (Q31e) vs. 1030Ave(a) on job satisfaction. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
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Figure 26 Homesteading Policy. 
Are you more likely to remain in the AF with such a policy?  N=58297  The 582 consist of 281 Lieutenants, 190 
Captains, 82 Majors, and 28 Lt Colonels. 
                                                 
97 There is no correlation with this response and the respondent’s career intent.  Note there are 10 Colonels that have 
been removed from this chart, since the policy asked if you would agree such that you would be more inclined to 
remain in the AF if such a policy existed, but limited you to the rank of Lt Col.   
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1 Agree
23%
2
29%
3 Neutral
23%
4
17%
5 Disagree
8%
 
Figure 27 Q26b More Ops Experience for all respondents; N=576. 
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Appendix Q Pay (Supplement) 
For all cross tabulations presented in this appendix, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages 
greater than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells 
are for ranges between 1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of 
the whole group N. 
  Ave 10&30b: Pay  
 N=592 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 Satisfied 10.0% 2.4% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 12.7% 
2 21.6% 18.6% 1.2% 0.2% 0.0% 41.6% 
3 4.1% 9.1% 4.2% 2.9% 0.2% 20.4% 
4 2.5% 5.9% 3.4% 5.7% 1.0% 18.6% 
21
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5 Dissatisfied 0.0% 1.9% 1.0% 1.9% 2.0% 6.8% 
 Total 38.2% 37.8% 10.1% 10.6% 3.2% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 330.382 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 25 Cross tabulation of satisfaction with pay from both Q21 and 1030Ave(b). 
For entire population.  Q21 asked if they agreed if they were paid well for their skills, seniority, and training.  
1030Ave(b) is satisfaction with pay.  This table confirms correlation of the two, as it should. 
 N=279 21 Skills Vs. Pay  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 0.4% 3.9% 4.7% 4.3% 3.2% 16.5% 
2 1.4% 4.7% 4.3% 6.1% 3.2% 19.7% 
3 2.2% 7.5% 6.8% 4.7% 1.8% 22.9% 
4 1.8% 9.7% 2.5% 4.7% 1.1% 19.7% P
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5 4.7% 8.6% 3.9% 3.2% 0.7% 21.1% 
 Total 10.4% 34.4% 22.2% 22.9% 10.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 37.644 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.002  
 
Table 26 Cross tabulation of ranking of pay (Q31a) vs. Q21. 
Q21 asked if they agreed if they were paid well for their skills, seniority, and training.  Q31 was only asked of those 
who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
 N=279 Ave 10&30b: Pay  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 2.9% 5.4% 1.8% 4.7% 1.8% 16.5% 
2 2.2% 6.8% 2.5% 5.7% 2.5% 19.7% 
3 4.7% 11.8% 3.6% 2.9% 0.0% 22.9% 
4 6.1% 9.0% 3.6% 0.7% 0.4% 19.7% P
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5 11.1% 8.2% 1.4% 0.4% 0.0% 21.1% 
 Total 26.9% 41.2% 12.9% 14.3% 4.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 73.251 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 27 Cross tabulation of ranking of pay (Q31a) vs. 1030Ave(b) on satisfaction with pay. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
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 N=142 14b Engineering Pay  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 12.7% 4.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 18.3% 
2 5.6% 9.9% 3.5% 1.4% 0.0% 20.4% 
3 4.9% 4.9% 7.7% 6.3% 1.4% 25.4% 
4 2.8% 7.0% 4.2% 3.5% 0.7% 18.3% P
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5 1.4% 5.6% 4.2% 3.5% 2.8% 17.6% 
 Total 27.5% 31.7% 20.4% 14.8% 5.6% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 48.200 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 28 Cross tabulation of ranking of pay (Q31a) vs. Q14b. 
Q14b asked desire for engineering specialty pay (asked only of 61’s and 62’s).  Q31 was only asked of those who 
are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
 N=140 16 More Pay for Tech Degree  
 RANK 1 Agree 2 3 4 5 Disagree Total 
1 9.3% 7.1% 1.4% 0.0% 0.7% 18.6% 
2 8.6% 10.0% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 20.7% 
3 2.9% 11.4% 5.7% 5.7% 0.0% 25.7% 
4 0.7% 7.9% 5.0% 2.9% 0.7% 17.1% P
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5 2.9% 5.0% 4.3% 2.9% 2.9% 17.9% 
 Total 24.3% 41.4% 18.6% 11.4% 4.3% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 46.122 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 29 Cross tabulation of ranking of pay (Q31a) vs. Q16. 
Q16 asked if those with advanced technical degrees should be paid more (asked only of 61’s and 62’s).  Q31 was 
only asked of those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
 N=279 Ave 10&30a: Job  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 2.5% 7.5% 2.9% 2.2% 1.4% 16.5% 
2 2.2% 5.4% 4.7% 4.3% 3.2% 19.7% 
3 2.9% 7.5% 2.9% 6.8% 2.9% 22.9% 
4 2.9% 4.7% 2.5% 3.9% 5.7% 19.7% P
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5 1.8% 3.6% 2.2% 7.5% 6.1% 21.1% 
 Total 12.2% 28.7% 15.1% 24.7% 19.4% 100.0%
 Chi-Sq. = 30.579 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.015  
 
Table 30 Cross tabulation of ranking of pay in Q31a vs. 1030Ave(a) on overall job satisfaction. 
For those with intent to separate (or undecided). 
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  Ave 10&30a: Job  
 N=592 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 Satisfied 5.1% 3.7% 0.5% 1.9% 1.5% 12.7% 
2 13.0% 12.0% 4.2% 7.1% 5.2% 41.6% 
3 2.5% 7.8% 3.0% 4.9% 2.2% 20.4% 
4 2.7% 5.4% 2.7% 4.2% 3.5% 18.6% 
21
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5 Dissatisfied 0.3% 1.7% 1.0% 1.7% 2.0% 6.8% 
 Total 23.6% 30.6% 11.5% 19.8% 14.5% 100.0%
 Chi-Sq. = 54.639 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 31 Cross tabulation of rating of adequate pay (Q21) vs. 1030Ave(a) on overall job satisfaction. 
For entire population. 
 
Agree
56%
Neutral
20%
Disagree
24%
 
Figure 28 Satisfaction with pay (Q21); N=522. 
Q21 on whether they agreed they were paid adequately for their work, skills, and experience. 
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Appendix R Bonuses (the CSRB, etc) (Supplement) 
This section goes into detail on the CSRB analysis, and repeats some of the text and tables 
from the main analysis section.   
Of the working data set of 592, 110 were filtered out for purposes of the CSRB analysis, 
leaving 482.  Of these 482, 119 qualified and accepted the CSRB, 203 did not qualify due to not 
having enough time on active duty, and only 20 were qualified for the CSRB but rejected it.98  Of 
these 20, 7 are no longer in the AF.  Of the 13 still on active duty, only 3 of them are leaning to-
wards a career in the AF (a 1 or 2, and consequently, these 3 are people that had nothing to lose 
and should have taken the CSRB), 1 is undecided (3), 3 possibly will separate (4), and 6 are defi-
nitely going to separate (5).  Due to only having 13 respondents that did not accept, it is impossi-
ble to draw any conclusions other than the obvious: most did not accept because they had already 
intended to separate, and extra pay was not an incentive enough to remain with the AF.   
Of the 119 that were qualified and accepted the CSRB, 1 is now separated.99  Of the remain-
ing 118, 64% were Captains and the rest were Majors.  Interestingly, two of the 42 Majors indi-
cated a career intent leaning towards separating, while all the remaining 40 were definitely mak-
ing a career in the AF.  Only about 61% of the Captains were sure they would remain in the AF, 
while the remainder was spread across the 5-point scale measuring career intent, though with this 
spread being more inclined towards making the AF a career.  What is interesting is that as a 
touted retention bonus, the CSRB likely had no retention impact on the Major class, considering 
all of them have more than 10+ years of active duty service and are more than half way to re-
tirement.100  Table 32 attempts to grade the effectiveness of the CSRB by comparing career in-
tent to the respondent’s own assessment on whether or not the CSRB made a difference in their 
career intent (Q23).  Q23 stated verbatim “Being offered the CSRB bonus increased how long I 
was planning to stay in the AF”.  This question was carefully worded to test if the CSRB ex-
tended the respondent’s stay in the military, versus posing the question in a way that might only 
give a 1 or 2 if the CSRB led the respondent to a career intention.  In other words, the question 
does not report whether the respondent was swayed to make the AF a career because of the 
CSRB.  This is important because it makes the analysis shown in Table 32  more valid for all re-
spondents, not just ones intending to make the AF a career.  It is only in the cross tabulation of 
Q23 with career intent then that we see the true affect of the CSRB for this group. 
Let us look at Table 32  to infer long-term effectiveness of the CSRB.  The table shows three 
highlighted areas.  I colored the orange (gray) area as it is because, on the right side, if they are 
intending to leave the AF (a 4 or a 5), then clearly the CSRB was not effective at swaying a ca-
reer decision, hence the higher right side of the orange (gray) section.  Additionally, if they re-
                                                 
98 The remaining 140 either did not know if they qualified, had too much active duty time, or did not qualify due to 
having the wrong AFSC.  See Appendix I for details about those that may have qualified but did not realize it.  
99 This was likely a special case or circumstance to be separated now, after only YOS = 7 years, reportedly now in 
the reserves.  More likely is this is a bad data point. 
100 The idea of a “point of no return” at 8-10 years is widely considered the last logical chance to voluntarily leave 
active military duty.  Otherwise, the huge benefits of the military retirement system become more and more a major 
factor in your career intent.  This can be graphically seen in Figure 5 where nearly all doubt on career intent is gone 
by YOS = 10. 
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ported neutral or no effect of the CSRB on their tenure in the military, then this area also became 
orange (gray) (a 3, 4, or 5 on Q23).  This orange (gray) area then is the area of respondents that 
the CSRB likely had no (at least long-term) effect on, and is a majority of those that accepted the 
CSRB (64%).  (In fact, if we only sum the columns for Q23 that were a 3, 4, or 5, then this 
group, 54%, likely had no effect, short or long-term, due to the CSRB.)  The blue (black) out-
lined area is then those that reported a 1 or 2 on Q23, suggesting the CSRB swayed them for at 
least the short-term to stay in the AF, and is nearly 46%.  However, only 11% of the 118 indicate 
a strong effect due to the CSRB and gave a strong indication of staying in the AF.  If we were to 
be a bit more generous and add those with 2 for Q23 and a 1 or 2 for career intent, we could say 
the CSRB was likely effective with about 31% of those that accepted it.   
Therefore, from a standpoint of long-term effect, the CSRB seems to have been widely un-
successful.  It is of course unclear if the intent of the CSRB was to fix a short-term problem.  
However, if this were the case, then it seems less likely that they would have offered it to Ma-
jors, or that the AF would have cancelled the CSRB after less than one year of being offered.  In 
fact, had the CSRB not been offered to Majors, it is possible that the excess funding could have 
been stretched for use for a second year.   
What is perhaps the most important thing to take away from looking at the CSRB is that the 
idea of fixing a retention problem by giving the target group a bonus opportunity does not really 
address the root cause(s) for the problem in the first place (and hence this thesis).   
I now turn an analysis of those 203 respondents who missed the brief window for the CSRB 
because they did not yet have enough time on active duty.  Of the 203, 1 is now separated, leav-
ing 202 for the analysis components involving career intent.  Of the 202, only 34 were Captains 
at the time of taking the survey, while the rest were still Lieutenants.   
 Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=118 1 Career in AF 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Strongly 
Agree 9.3% 1.7% 0.0% 3.4% 0.8% 15.3% 
2 14.4% 5.1% 5.9% 3.4% 1.7% 30.5% 
3 Neutral 9.3% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.2% 
4 26.3% 2.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 29.7% 
23
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5 Strongly 
Disagree 13.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 14.4% 
 Total 72.9% 10.2% 6.8% 7.6% 2.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 35.082 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.004  
       
63.6%  45.8%   11.0% 
no long-term effect with 
CSRB 
 
some effect of CSRB 
(long or short-term)  
definite long-term 
effect of CSRB 
 
Table 32 Cross tabulation of whether the CSRB had an effect (Q23) vs. career intent.  (Duplicate) 
Q23, which rates the respondent’s feelings of how much of an effect the CSRB had on how long they planned to 
stay in the AF versus their indicated career intent.  Duplicate of Table 3. 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=202 1 Career in AF 2 
3 
Neutral 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Strongly 
Agree 2.5% 1.0% 5.0% 3.0% 4.0% 15.3% 
2 4.5% 3.0% 5.0% 6.9% 5.9% 25.2% 
3 Neutral 9.4% 5.4% 3.5% 2.0% 7.9% 28.2% 
4 4.0% 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 11.9% 20.3% 
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5 Strongly 
Disagree 2.5% 0.5% 1.0% 3.0% 4.0% 10.9% 
 Total 22.8% 11.4% 15.8% 16.3% 33.7% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 39.125 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
 
43.1% possible effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
19.8% probable effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
 
9.9% definite effect of discontinuation of CSRB 
 
 
Table 33 Cross tabulation of effect of cancellation of the CSRB (Q24) vs. career intent.  (Duplicate) 
Q24, which rates the respondent’s feelings of how much of an effect the CSRB’s cancellation had on their AF career 
decision versus their indicated career intent.  Duplicate of Table 4. 
Table 33 shows a cross tabulation of career intent for the 202 versus whether cancellation of 
the CSRB had an effect (Q24).  Q24 stated verbatim “The CSRB Bonus has been discontinued 
indefinitely.  This has had a significant impact on my AF career decision”.  Those respondents 
with at least neutral (undecided) career intent, onwards towards leaning to separate from the AF 
(a career intent of 3, 4, or 5), and those respondents that indicated a 1, 2, or 3 on Q24, make up 
the orange (gray) section, and are the respondents which might possibly have been affected by 
the discontinuation of the CSRB.  The orange (gray) cells therefore are added such that the top 
nine squares give the value of 43% as shown in the table.  Likewise, the yellow (light gray) sec-
tion, which are the top four squares, represent those who are definitely leaning towards leaving 
the AF (a 4 or 5) and gave a 1 or 2 to Q24 as to their being at least somewhat affected by the dis-
continuation of the CSRB.  This yellow (light gray) section then adds the top four cells and 
shows that almost 20% of the respondents likely were significantly affected by the discontinua-
tion.  The top-right most two cells are red (dark gray) and indicate almost certain affect of the 
discontinuation, comprising nearly 10% of the 202 that missed the CSRB.   
The point of Table 33, in combination with the discussion above, is to highlight that the 
CSRB may have done more damage than good.  With only 11% definitely positively swayed to a 
long-term tenure with the AF due to the CSRB, 64% likely not at all swayed to stay in the AF for 
a career, the success of the CSRB is likely very limited.  This tied with the fact that the discon-
tinuation of the CSRB likely had a negative impact on at least 20% (the yellow (light gray) sec-
tion) and perhaps as high as 43% (the orange (gray) section) cast serious doubts on the CSRB as 
a useful mechanism for retention. 
Of course, even those 43% of the 202 respondents that said their career decision was signifi-
cantly affected by the discontinuation of the CSRB might not know what is really driving their 
feelings to leave the AF.  Figure 29 shows that of the 202 that missed the CSRB, their career in-
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tent profile mimics almost exactly the profile for the entire respondent pool that were of similar 
years of active service.  Even for the whole group up to just less than 7 years of service101, their 
profile, which includes 120 more respondents, is very similar to the profile of those that missed 
the CSRB.  This suggests that in reality, the effect might not be as big, but there clearly still is an 
effect.  It is hard to know the real effect because all of the lines in Figure 29 are still heavily 
weighted by the 202, and this is unavoidable.  Therefore, the scientific usefulness of this figure is 
limited, but it does raise the question on whether those that think the might have been affected by 
the discontinuation of the CSRB indeed really were, or did they just project other frustrations 
they would have otherwise had to the very tangible CSRB. 
0%
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10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1 Career in AF 2 3 Neutral 4 5 Leave AF
Too little time for CSRB; N=202 All w/ CYOS ≤ 5yrs; N=294 All w/ CYOS ≤ 6yrs; N=324
 
Figure 29 Comparison of the career intent profiles for different categories of respondents. 
                                                 
101 The fidelity of the survey on time on active duty is 1 year.  Therefore, those that said they were between 6-7 
years of active service would be included in the line that shows CYOS ≤ 6yrs.   
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Appendix S Availability of Civilian Jobs (Supplement) 
For all cross tabulations presented here, red (dark gray) cells are with percentages greater 
than 6%, orange (gray) is for ranges between 3.5% and 6%, light yellow (light gray) cells are for 
ranges between 1 and 3.5%, and white cells are less than 1%.  Percentages are percent of the 
whole group N. 
 N=275 Ave 10&30a: Job  
 RANK 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 1.8% 4.4% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 8.4% 
2 3.6% 6.2% 2.2% 2.5% 2.9% 17.5% 
3 3.3% 5.1% 2.9% 6.2% 5.1% 22.5% 
4 1.1% 5.1% 2.2% 6.9% 6.2% 21.5% 
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5 2.5% 8.7% 7.3% 7.3% 4.4% 30.2% 
 Total 12.4% 29.5% 15.6% 24.0% 18.5% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 33.995 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.005  
 
Table 34 Cross tabulation of ranking of the availability of civilian jobs (Q31d) vs. 1030Ave(a) job satisfaction. 
For those who are undecided or have intent to leave the AF. 
  Ave 10&30a: Job  
 N=569 1 Satisfied 2 3 4 5 Dissatisfied Total 
1 Better 9.7% 4.9% 1.6% 1.8% 1.1% 19.0% 
2 6.9% 9.8% 3.2% 4.6% 2.3% 26.7% 
3 Same 5.6% 9.1% 4.7% 5.6% 4.2% 29.3% 
4 1.2% 5.6% 1.4% 5.3% 3.9% 17.4% 19
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5 Worse 0.5% 1.4% 0.5% 1.9% 3.2% 7.6% 
 Total 23.9% 30.9% 11.4% 19.2% 14.6% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 111.276 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
 
Table 35 Cross tabulation of  Q19 vs. 1030Ave(a) on job satisfaction. 
Q19 asked how respondents compared their AF job to the civilian equivalent job 
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Appendix T Leadership Factors (Supplement) 
One other interesting observation of leadership is that there is a strong correlation (97.3% 
confidence) of command leadership to the respondent’s AFSC.  In particular, program mangers 
are more satisfied with their Command Leadership than any other group, with 33.0% indicating 
very satisfied, and less than 10% indicating a 4 or 5 for somewhat to very dissatisfied.  Slightly 
more engineers indicated dissatisfaction (a combined 16% for the 4 and 5 choices), and only 
24% indicated being very satisfied.  Scientists were the most apathetic, with 45% indicating a 3 
for neutral.  (See Table 36.)  This may suggest more technical officers may have career dissatis-
faction that they attribute to their command (likely AFMC or AFSPC), perhaps specifically on 
how the command is addressing either technical talent, or perhaps other factors (such as com-
mand support for technical considerations involved in their acquisitions program).   
 
% by Column AFSC Class   
N=585 61S Scientist 
62E 
Engineer 
63A Program 
Manager Other Total 
1 Satisfied 20.7% 24.1% 33.0% 33.3% 28.9% 
2 34.5% 29.3% 30.5% 25.6% 29.9% 
3 Neutral 44.8% 30.2% 26.7% 25.6% 28.9% 
4 0.0% 6.9% 6.3% 12.8% 6.7% 
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5 Dissatisfied 0.0% 9.5% 3.5% 2.6% 5.6% 
 Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 N= 29 232 285 39 585 
 Chi. Sq. = 23.101 d.f. = 12 Sig. = 0.027 
 
Table 36 Cross tabulation of satisfaction with command leadership vs. AFSC. 
Chi-Sq. = 29.346 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.022  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All Satisfaction with 
Command Leadership % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
Satisfied 40.1% 69.0% 13.6% 45.8% 60.5% 
Neutral 13.8% 23.7% 11.4% 38.6% 29.1% 
Dissatisfied 4.3% 7.3% 4.7% 15.7% 10.5% 
N= 300 300 153 153 516 
 
Table 37 Summary of career intent vs. satisfaction of command leadership102 
                                                 
102 Those with undecided career intent are not explicitly shown in the table, but are included in the “All” column.  
Also, note that the statistics given correspond to the 5-point raw data, while this table presentation summarizes that 
data and is not the original cross tabulation. 
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Chi-Sq. = 44.443 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.000  
Lean to AF Career Lean to Leave AF All Satisfaction with HQ 
Leadership % of 
Total 
% of 
Group 
% of 
Total 
% of 
Group Total 
Satisfied 41.3% 70.8% 13.7% 46.4% 60.5% 
Neutral 12.3% 21.1% 12.1% 41.1% 30.1% 
Dissatisfied 4.7% 8.1% 3.7% 12.6% 9.4% 
N= 298 298 151 151 511 
 
Table 38 Summary of career intent vs. satisfaction of AF HQ leadership103 
 
                                                 
103 See footnote for Table 37. 
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Appendix U Key Open-Ended Comments 
Q32, which was optional, was open to all respondents and was simply a forum for open-
ended comments on the survey.  There were 224 respondents that left some sort of comment, and 
this is of the entire population that took the survey (N = 762)—the comments have not been lim-
ited to the non-suspect data set used for analysis above (N = 592).   
Job satisfaction appeared in several forms in the comments, and most centered around being 
undervalued and underutilized.  As an example, one respondent was denied being able to pursue 
educational opportunities, yet in reality spent their days trying to find work to do:  “Today I tried 
to talk to my supervisor about getting (an advanced degree)…but they would not let me have 
time off to take class because I am too critical to the mission.  (That) afternoon I went out to get 
phonebooks and put together a table.”  Many suggested they had been fooled by joining the Air 
Force as a technical officer while not realizing what acquisitions work really was or how they 
would be utilized, reinforcing the survey’s findings that many did not understand acquisitions 
before joining.  Other related frustrations were that the Air Force treats all officers, regardless of 
skills and experience, as interchangeable.  Many comments expressed frustration with the lack of 
merit-based incentives:  “…whether I work 40 hrs a week or 60 hours a week, I will get pro-
moted the same and make the same pay.  I love the Air Force and I love my job, but there is no 
incentive to better myself personally.”  Finally, many frustrated with their AF jobs suggested the 
Air Force does not need officers to serve in acquisitions at all, and that these jobs can and should 
be outsourced to government civil servants.  These comments all serve to highlight that job satis-
faction is indeed a serious issue, even for many who have expressed intent to remain in the AF.    
The largest numbers of comments were on the assignment system.  Some highlighted the ri-
gidity of the system, and the apparent lack of support from the Air Force Personnel Center 
(AFPC).  Several referenced how the system failed by assigning them to jobs they were not edu-
cated to do (a chemical engineer being assigned to a mechanical engineering job, for example).  
Many other comments gave frustrations with being trapped in their AFSC’s, and that because 
they were a 61, 62, or 63, these career fields, because they are traditionally undermanned, pro-
hibited cross-flowing to other AFSC’s.  Others were frustrated with a lack of control in their life, 
in a career field that did not seem necessary to have such rigidity or demand to, say, relocate 
every three years.  The idea of homesteading, or remaining at one base for either a career or at 
least longer than 3-4 years, was also a common comment in which respondents expressed a de-
sire for such a policy for various reasons, but most often for family stability.  Family was another 
issue some expressed—they wanted the option to raise their newborn children for a time, the re-
turn to the AF a year or two later.  (The Air Force rarely lets anyone return once they have left.)  
This wide array of frustrations with the assignment system further exemplifies that the assign-
ment system is indeed a serious problem and needs to be addressed.  However, my survey did 
not fully address many of the nuances of the assignment system as expressed in these comments.   
There were several comments expressing frustration with the lack of leadership opportuni-
ties.  The Officer Performance Report evaluation system, its over-inflation and its subjectivity, 
were also key comments, as well as frustrations with the promotion system’s one opportunity for 
promotion and its dependence on OPR’s.  Several expressed frustrations with the lack of opera-
tional or deployment opportunities, or that when acquisitions officer do get deployments, they 
are meaningless staff jobs.  Such resentment only furthers feeling underutilized and undervalued. 
 197
Pay was only the source of one or two comments.  However, there were a several comments 
highlighting the military practice of pay discrimination: “Why do personnel with dependents get 
paid more than those without?  The limited pool of resources for benefits seems to be strongly 
biased towards those with dependents.”  Some also complained that while pay is not an issue, the 
fact that pilots get a “flight pay” bonus even despite airlines not hiring pilots, while the Air Force 
has cancelled the “engineering bonus” (CSRB), proves that the Air Force is biased towards pi-
lots.   
Some senior respondents recognized the problems with the Air Force and attributed their 
own satisfaction with lucky circumstances, while a few others touted the benefits of the Air 
Force.    
This remainder of this section will attempt to highlight key themes from the comments by 
noting a few key or indicative comments for the various issues raised.  The essence of the theme 
is highlighted in that sections of quotes’ header, and are presented without commentary.   
Feedback on the Survey 
“I am happy that someone finally has the courage and sense to do a study like this and get it into the 
hands of senior leadership…I have known many officers who would gladly risk their own lives, but I 
have never met an officer yet who would risk his own career.  Where are the Billy Mitchell's and the 
Jimmy Doolittle's in today's Air Force?  I have never seen one…” 
—Captain Ilyan Kei Lavanway of Los Angeles AFB 104 
“I think you are hitting the nails right on the heads.” 
Acquisitions Problems Need AF Leadership Recognition 
“Best of luck…my only hope is that sooner or later someone in the AF will notice.” 
“Great survey…I hope this leads to some positive changes!” 
“Thanks for studying this topic...hopefully you can make some recommendations that will help retain 
people like me who want to serve their country.” 
“What really irks me is that no one seems to care that we’re frustrated” 
Assignment System—The System Overall 
“The unwillingness of the Air Force to try and work with a person to help them get into a job they would 
like, or get an assignment they would like is horrible.  It is as if the Air Force could care less about you as 
an individual.  They take the phrase 'needs of the Air Force come first' and pervert it into some sort of 
edict against any kind of cooperation with people.  In reality, it is either the Air Force's way, or you have 
                                                 
104 Capt. Lavanway specifically requested if I use their comment that I credit them explicitly. 
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to get out, no negotiations.  As a result of this draconian approach to human resources, good people leave 
the Air Force and it suffers…” 
“The main reason I would want to separate from the Air Force is the lack of control over my life...where I 
live, what job I do, what deployments/TDY’s I go on, what medical procedures I have, etc.  I would rather 
have fewer benefits and make less money if it meant I had a job that I had more control and could be with 
my family more.” 
Assignment System—Job Mismatches 
“…the AF is more likely to have people making the AF a career if they would match people’s educational 
background with a career field that is related.  For example, I have a degree in Chemistry and I am a 
program manager (63) instead of a 61.” 
 “Engineers ought to be assigned based upon specialty…In my branch I was given a new 2Lt with a 
degree in Chemical Engr to replace a departing Lt who was a Mechanical Engr working mechanical engr 
issues on a particular program.” 
Assignment System—AFSC Cross-Flowing 
 “I think it shouldn’t be mandatory for us to remain in the career field if we are not happy with our 
jobs…I think that by making us be a 61-2 or 3 we feel we are stuck.” 
Assignment System—Number of Relocations (PCS’s) 
“I separated because 1) I didn't want to be forced to relocate every three years…” 
“Moving every person every three years does not efficiently use our force.  Some continuity would really 
help boost efficiency.” 
Assignment System—Homesteading 
“I would stay in the AF if I were allowed to remain at one base for the remainder of my career (even 
knowing that it would impact my promotions).  Family stability is very important to most AF members.” 
“…several bases provide the opportunity to do a lab, SPO, test, staff job at 3-4 years a piece and 
therefore, could still build depth and breadth at one location.” 
Family 
“I will separate so I can stay home and raise my kids when I have them.  The military would be wise to 
allow people to separate for a time for such reasons, and then make it easy for them to come back.” 
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Leadership 
“…We have people that were CGO’s 20 years ago trying to relate to a body of CGO’s w/ only 3-6 or so 
years.” 
Leadership Opportunities 
“My biggest concern about the S&E career field is the lack of true leadership opportunities…I am…very 
disappointed of the leadership opportunities that I have even at a relatively senior rank.”  
– A Lieutenant Colonel 
Officer Performance Reports 
“For those officers that do not really deserve a strong OPR still came back too our office stating that there 
were many 'fatal flaws' because the bullets were not strong enough.  To me a supervisor should not give 
someone more credit than what that particular officer performed at.  Too many times I seen OPR’s that 
painted a 'masterpiece' type of performance for an officer that was told immediately after a performance 
that they should have done a lot better.” 
“Everyone walks on water and does Herculean efforts to get the job done (all thanks to wordsmithing).” 
“There should be a black and white scoring of performance and obvious rankings of peers within each 
career field, that is, not across career fields (apples to oranges).  This way an officer knows from the very 
first OPR exactly where he/she stands in terms of performance and where they stand in relation to peers.  
Lower ratings make it clear that the officer needs to change or consider a new career.  Today the first 
clear signal the AF system gives you is when you are passed over for Major.  Too little, too late.” 
Promotion 
“…(regarding) the promotion system, the biggest problem(s) I have is that it's a 'one-shot-only' system.  If 
someone is unfortunate enough to have a bad job, bad boss or a supervisor who just doesn't understand 
the military promotion system (somewhat common in the highly civilianized Eng/Acq/R&D 
communities), one bad OPR or assignment can (and does) ruin a career.” 
“An acq officer doesn't have nearly the same opportunities, but will be judged by a promotion board and 
compared to those who did deploy!” 
“…the promotion system is not good for 62/63s, as we have disproportionately worse odds of making O-
6+ than pilot/ops officers.” 
“My biggest gripes for the air force is the OPR and Promotion system.” 
Pay Discrimination 
“Why do personnel with dependents get paid more than those without?  The limited pool of resources for 
benefits seems to be strongly biased towards those with dependents.” 
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“Disparity of benefits between service members with dependants and those without needs to end.  Off 
base housing allowances should be equalized for 'with' and 'without' dependant members.  This is a major 
quality of life issue for non-married members.”   
Poor Expectations or Understanding of Acquisitions (Being Fooled) 
“If I would have known that Engineer’s in the AF don’t get to do any real hands-on engineering, I would 
have never joined.” 
“Working in these career fields is unlike the operational Air Force.  People who are attracted to the Air 
Force that is portrayed in ROTC will feel severely disappointed in this very different career field.” 
S&E Officers Not Required in Air Force 
“The Air Force should consider eliminating the 61, 62 fields altogether since most work done by these 
fields is program management work anyway.  This would prevent scientists and engineers from being 
duped into thinking they're going to have a major role in designing the newest jet or bomb.” 
“…only allow O-5 and above in the career field.  This way the officer will have real world experience and 
know the value and importance of what they are doing.  Acquisitions is a bad AFSC to a new officer into.  
If the Air Force is unwilling to only allow O-5 and above as Acq Officers, then they need to make it an all 
civilian career field and let officers be real leaders.” 
“The military should not have acquisition focused/career officers.  There are perhaps 4-5 days in my 19 
year career when my military affiliation and uniform made a difference.  The other times a civilian could 
have done just as good a job.” 
“The AF may want to consider eliminating all military 62E's.  They have to answer the question: Why 
does the AF need military engineers when they are not performing duties that are inherently operational?” 
Job Satisfaction (Dissatisfaction) 
“…although my love of the Air Force and serving my country is making the decision difficult, the lack of 
job satisfaction in acquisitions is allowing me to make the decision to most likely separate before 
retirement.” 
“All the talk of the CSRB and everything is nice, but being able to do something rewarding definitely 
outweighs an extra $10 grand.” 
Being Valued 
“Too bad the AF paid all that money for my BS in Physics from MIT and never used it.” 
“Today I tried to talk to my supervisor about getting (an advanced degree)…but they would not let me 
have time off to take class because I am too critical to the mission.  (That) afternoon I went out to get 
phonebooks and put together a table.” 
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“…we are probably the most under-utilized for what we have to offer.” 
Officers Are Not Interchangeable—Flexibility Is Required 
“Not everyone is in it for the long-haul; many are testing the USAF to see if it’s right for them.  Everyone 
has different reasons for joining, so the higher-ups should quit assuming they can do what they like with 
us.” 
Merit-Based Incentives (Promotion, Pay, Etc) 
“I have seen a trend where the people who are more apt to take the initiative leave the service because 
there is nor real reward for demonstrating initiative.  This is not only leaving the service with not enough 
Captains, but its increasing the number of Captains that are not the best performers.” 
“…whether I work 40 hrs a week or 60 hours a week, I will get promoted the same and make the same 
pay.  I love the Air Force and I love my job, but there is no incentive to better myself personally.” 
“…my observations are the most talented officers are always the ones who leave first.” 
“…there are some who just don't 'get' their job and they should be moved to a new career field or escorted 
to the gate.  Others excel and deserve to promote into leadership-type positions more quickly than the 
current time-in-grade requirements.”  
Operational Opportunities 
“I know that not everyone is cut out for or can be assigned to an ops job out of school, but some type of 
operations exchange program that's short term could help alleviate this disconnect between the customer 
in the field and the acquisitions officer.” 
“I think it's a shame that new officer's are thrown into this career field without the opportunity of 
operational experience.  I see many young LT's that have absolutely no knowledge of the operational 
force and consequently very discouraged with their military experience.  The term 'remote' is typically 
used in reference to a duty location.  I think of 'remote' now as a characterization of the Acq career field.  
It's so far removed from the operational force that it feels like a 'remote' AFSC.” 
Deployments 
“One other problem I see with the 62E field is that we may only be deployed as (Executive Officers) or 
Protocol officers.  Many of the scientists and engineers are stuck in 63 positions, but have other skills that 
would prove useful in a deployed situation.” 
“It's a shame when there are plenty of young ACQ officers volunteering to deploy, only to be denied.” 
“IF a 61, 62, or 63 deploys they have to take a job in a support area such as command staff etc.” 
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It’s a Pilot’s Air Force 
“I don't think it's about $; it's about value/respect.  I don't need more money, but when pilots can't even 
get a job on the outside and they are still getting a bonus--all while HQ AF cancels the engineering bonus-
-it tells people that engineers are not as valuable as pilots.” 
“Industry is looking for engineers, not pilots right now, yet we have no incentive to stay.  And it's not 
primarily about the money, it's knowing were not as important and valued as the pilots.” 
Some Were Just Lucky and Acknowledge It 
“The Air Force structure is not what makes me enjoy my job—it’s the unique circumstances which I hope 
lead to future opportunities!” 
“I've been a 61, 62, and 63 and had a good breadth of experience (including an overseas tour).  Although 
that is an 'a-typical' career path - it was EXTREMELY satisfactory and got me promoted (I think) to Lt 
Col when many very capable friends retired as Major's following a 'typical' career path.” 
It Isn’t All Bad—The Benefits of Air Force 
“While it has its frustrations, my industry counterparts work 80-90 hours a week to my 50 or so.  We get 
so many holidays, family days, etc as well as 30 days (weekdays if you plan it right--6 weeks) of paid 
vacation.  No one else on the planet has a deal this sweet.” 
“Having left the Air Force, I have since learned how good it was compared to equivalent civilian jobs, but 
I still would have left for the same reasons.” 
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Appendix V  Comparison of the Understanding of Acquisitions 
Q17, asked only to non-61 and 62’s, asked how well the respondent understood what 
acquisitions was before joining the acquisitions career field.  Q17, shown by rank, is depicted in 
Figure 30.  While the fact that more Lieutenants did not understand might lend you to believe 
this may be a driver for them separating, Q17 was compared to career intent and there was no 
correlation.  The equivalent question, asked of 61’s and 62’s only, was, and specifically asked if 
the respondent understood how S&E’s were utilized in the AF.  Q14a versus rank is depicted in 
Figure 31 and shows a similar case for S&E’s. 
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Figure 30 Q17 depicting understanding of acquisitions before joining the field vs. rank. 
Q17 was only given to non-61’s and non-62’s.  N=327. 
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Figure 31 Q14a understanding of how S&E’s are utilized vs. rank. 
Q17 was only given to 61’s and 62’s.  N=265. 
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The one key difference with Q14a versus Q17 is that in the case of the S&E’s, Q14a does in 
fact correlate to their career intent, and is shown in Table 39.  However, it is unclear what the 
correlation depicted in the cross tabulation is.  Nevertheless, 61% of all S&E’s did not 
understand their career field before joining it (giving a 4 or 5 for Q14a).  At the very least this 
suggests the problem that the officer recruiting mechanisms aren’t either themselves informed of 
how S&E’s are utilized in the AF, or these mechanisms don’t have enough S&E’s or former 
S&E’s involved in recruiting new S&E officers.  For example, ROTC’s, particularly at 
technology schools, should always have at least one S&E on staff. 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=235 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Understood 2.6% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 3.8% 
2 9.8% 1.3% 1.7% 0.9% 6.0% 19.6% 
3 1.7% 2.6% 3.8% 3.4% 2.1% 13.6% 
4 14.5% 3.4% 4.7% 2.6% 9.4% 34.5% 
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5 Not Understood 13.2% 3.0% 3.4% 2.6% 6.4% 28.5% 
 Total 41.7% 10.2% 14.0% 9.8% 24.3% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 30.763 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.014  
 
Table 39 Cross tabulation of Q14a depicting understanding of how S&E’s are utilized vs. career intent.  
Q14a was only given to 61’s and 62’s. 
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Appendix W 61S and 62E Specific Results  
We now turn to further consideration of some specific questions asked only of 61’s and 62’s.  
The questions in this section were analyzed previously, but only of those respondents that had 
answered Q31, which meant they had neutral or intent to leave the AF.  This section now looks 
at the whole population.  However, the results herein do not suggest any new conclusions, but 
instead only reinforce previously stated observations, and hence this analysis has been relegated 
to an appendix. 
The idea for engineering specialty pay, Q14b, was mentioned in the analysis section under 
pay, where it was compared to how people ranked pay in Q31 if they had intent to leave the AF.  
Here we take the analysis one step further to compare Q14b to career intent.  Q14b, as a 
reminder, asks if the offering of engineering pay would make the respondent more likely to 
remain in the AF.  While it is significant, as can be seen in Table 40, what is interesting is that 
primarily only those that intend to stay in for a career in the AF suggest they strongly agree such 
pay would keep them in.  While this might have some sway for the fence sitters (career intent of 
3), only a small percentage with a career intent leaning towards leaving indicate they would be 
influenced by such a pay.  Note this specialty pay is like flight pay given to AF pilots, and is not 
like the CSRB, which was intended for retention purposes.  Rather, this is a continuous pay 
intended for anyone doing technical work for the AF.  Q16, which asked if those with advanced 
technical degrees were paid more, would the respondent be more likely to remain in the AF, 
gives almost identical results and is shown in Table 41.   
The use of one’s degree or technical skills, Q14c and Q14d, was considered in the analysis 
section on job satisfaction.  Here we take the analysis one step further to compare Q14c and 
Q14d to career intent.  As a reminder, both questions were asked in the negative form, Q14c 
stating verbatim “I am NOT satisfied with the opportunity to use my science/engineering 
degree(s)” and Q14d asking the same of technical skills.  There was close correlation to career 
intent for all respondents, and the cross tabulations for Q14c and Q14d are shown in Table 42 
and Table 43 respectively.  Both give nearly identical results, and support the conclusions given 
previously that there is a strong relationship between intent to leave and the lack of opportunity 
to use one’s degree or technical skills.  What the previous analysis did not show however, that 
this one does reveal, is there are quite a few people that intend to make the AF a career and yet 
are quite dissatisfied with the opportunity to use their degrees.  In other words, just because 
someone chooses to remain in the AF does not mean they are getting more opportunity to use 
their degree or skills.  It simply means they do not prioritize this element of job satisfaction as 
high as other factors that influence their career intent. 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=227 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Agree 19.8% 5.3% 7.0% 2.2% 4.0% 38.3% 
2 8.8% 3.1% 4.0% 4.4% 7.5% 27.8% 
3 6.6% 0.9% 2.2% 2.2% 5.7% 17.6% 
4 4.4% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 4.8% 11.9% 1
4b
 
E
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
P
ay
 
5 Disagree 0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 2.2% 4.4% 
 Total 40.5% 10.6% 14.5% 10.1% 24.2% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 27.645 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.035  
 
Table 40 Cross tabulation of Q14b engineering pay vs. career intent.  
Q14b asked agreement on whether engineering pay would make the respondent more likely to remain in the AF, and 
was only given to 61’s and 62’s. 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=227 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Agree 16.7% 4.0% 5.3% 1.3% 3.5% 30.8% 
2 12.3% 3.5% 6.2% 4.8% 9.7% 36.6% 
3 7.5% 1.8% 3.1% 1.8% 4.0% 18.1% 
4 2.6% 0.4% 0.0% 1.3% 4.4% 8.8% 
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5 Disagree 2.2% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 2.6% 5.7% 
 Total 41.4% 10.1% 14.5% 9.7% 24.2% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 28.283 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.029  
 
Table 41 Cross tabulation of Q16 pay for technical degrees vs. career intent. 
Q16 asked agreement on whether extra pay for advanced technical degrees would make the respondent more likely 
to remain in the AF, and was only given to 61’s and 62’s. 
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  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=234 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Agree 3.8% 2.6% 3.8% 4.3% 6.0% 20.5% 
2 10.3% 2.6% 5.1% 2.1% 11.1% 31.2% 
3 12.4% 1.7% 1.3% 2.1% 2.6% 20.1% 
4 12.4% 2.1% 2.6% 0.9% 3.8% 21.8% 14
c 
I'm
 
N
O
T 
sa
tis
fie
d 
w
/ 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 
to
 u
se
 
de
gr
ee
 
5 Disagree 2.6% 1.3% 1.3% 0.4% 0.9% 6.4% 
 Total 41.5% 10.3% 14.1% 9.8% 24.4% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 37.588 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.002  
 
Table 42 Cross tabulation of Q14c use of degree vs. career intent. 
Q14c asked if the respondent was NOT satisfied with the opportunity to use their degree, and was only given to 61’s 
and 62’s. 
  Career Intent Normalized to True 5pt Average  
 N=233 1 Career in AF 2 3 4 
5 Leave 
AF Total 
1 Agree 4.3% 1.7% 4.3% 5.2% 4.7% 20.2% 
2 10.7% 3.0% 5.2% 0.9% 11.6% 31.3% 
3 11.2% 2.1% 0.9% 2.1% 3.0% 19.3% 
4 12.4% 2.6% 3.0% 1.3% 3.4% 22.7% 14
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5 Disagree 3.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.4% 1.3% 6.4% 
 Total 41.6% 10.3% 14.2% 9.9% 24.0% 100.0% 
 Chi-Sq. = 41.040 d.f. = 16 Sig. = 0.001  
 
Table 43 Cross tabulation of Q14d use of technical skills vs. career intent. 
Q14d asked if the respondent was NOT satisfied with the opportunity to use their technical skills, and was only 
given to 61’s and 62’s. 
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Appendix X Miscellaneous 
This appendix seeks to include interesting supplemental observations that are not key to the main 
discussion of the thesis. 
 
401K-Like Retirement System 
Q27 asked all respondents if they supported a 401K-like retirement system.  Such a system 
would allow personnel to transfer their accrued benefits in the military retirement system to a 
civilian 401K plan.  The advantage of the system as it currently stands is that, when one can re-
tire after 20years, people are incentivized to remain in the AF and then retire earlier than most 
civilians.  The disadvantage of the system is that it also incentivizes people to leave early if they 
have any doubt on whether they would like to remain with the AF.  If someone would like to re-
main in the AF for just 10-12 years, then start a different career path, they would, under the cur-
rent system, have no retirement benefits saved up, unlike civilian counterparts who may be in-
volved in a 401K program with their employee.105  Thus, the system encourages people to get out 
early.  There is no value in staying to 15 years under such a system.  Q27 then asked respondents 
if they would be more likely to remain in the AF if the retirement system were transferable.   
The responses, by rank, are shown in Figure 32.  The spread varies, but the reasons are clear.  
For example, ignoring the Colonels, who are all retirement-eligible anyhow, Lt Colonels show a 
slightly stronger percentage on the disagree side because they are either retirement eligible as 
well, or very nearly so, and mostly they all intend to stay in the AF.  Therefore, they likely 
mostly disagree that such a retirement system will keep them in longer because they are going to 
stay in for 20 years regardless.  However, this can also mean that they disagree because if such 
an option were available today, they would leave immediately, taking advantage of the new re-
tirement option to transfer to a civilian employee.  This explanation is also true of the Majors.  
Captains are mostly neutral, though more over on the agree side, while Lieutenants are much 
more strongly on the agree side.  The real point of this is that the question unfortunately gives 
ambiguous results since it is not clear what their intent is if they disagree with such a policy. 
There are two final points on this retirement system proposal.  First, just over 46% of all re-
spondents (N=573) gave a 1 or 2 for their agreement in Q27 that such a policy would keep them 
in the AF longer.  This is of course because Lieutenants heavily weight the total population char-
acteristics.  (Figure 32 shows percentages by rank, thus normalizing the data.)  However, 46% of 
a population this large is very significant and so such a policy should be further considered.  The 
second point is that 74% of all respondents (N = 578) gave a 1 or 2 for their agreement that such 
a retirement policy should exist in Q28, while another 16% were neither for or against such a 
policy.   
                                                 
105 Additionally, the military retirement system (which may never yield any value depending on one’s career intent) 
is considered a pension plan.  This negates certain tax advantages afforded by the IRS, such as tax deductions on 
contributions to a Traditional IRA.   
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Figure 32 Q27 on a 401K-like retirement plan. 
Q27 asked whether the respondent would be more likely to remain in the AF if their retirement plan was transfer-
able.  N=573. 
Education Issues 
It was originally planned to do an analysis of education issues and career intent.  For exam-
ple, those that may have advanced degrees may expect more pay, or may feel differently about 
their job satisfaction.  Part of the reason for the need for such an analysis is that educational op-
portunities, particularly for advanced degrees that are difficult to accomplish part-time (technical 
advanced degrees for example), are limited.  Additionally, the AF does not recognize advanced 
degrees for job assignments, for consideration of a new AFSC (unless actively pursued by the 
officer, and then perhaps not even), for pay, and for some promotion review boards.  For part-
time advanced degrees, the AF offers what they refer to as “100% tuition assistance” in exchange 
for an Active Duty Service Commitment (ADSC).  However, this tuition assistance exists as a 
frustration to many since it really is not 100%, but 100% up to a cap106, which is often only suf-
ficient to cover the fees at smaller schools.   
While there is a need for further analysis of these issues, as well as the problems with the 
programs currently available to give educational opportunities, I have chosen to exclude it from 
this thesis.  The primary reason to exclude it was that educational opportunities did not appear to 
be a major source of dissatisfaction.107  Additionally, while this subject is interesting and should 
be studied, it is not part of any of my hypotheses.  Finally, the pertinent cross tabulations that are 
significant appear only to have minor patterns, and are likely only indicative of rank.108  
                                                 
106 According to http://www.military.com/Resources/ResourcesContent/0,13964,30843--1,00.html this cap is $250 
per semester hour or $166 per credit hour, up to $4500 per fiscal year. 
107 See for example Figure 21. 
108 Those who are more likely to remain in the AF are higher ranking and are more likely to have an advanced de-
gree, etc.  Conversely, those that separate (mostly Lieutenants) do not tend to have an advanced degree.  This does 
not indicate anything education related, but is just hiding the basic demographics. 
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Appendix Y Promotions and the OPR Evaluation System109 
The problems with the promotion system, and the closely related issues of recognition and 
performance evaluation (which ultimately feed into the promotion system), are all centered on 
two basic principles:  fairness and recognition of merit.  For junior officers at a crossroads on a 
career decision, these issues appear to be minor.  However, for many mid-level or senior (non-
junior) officers, they were quite important.  Yet, while these become sources of frustration with 
higher ranks, it is these higher ranks that are also closer to retirement, and so are unlikely to 
leave the Air Force regardless of their dissatisfaction.  It is then either a twist of fate or a well-
designed plan that the problems with the promotion system do not become apparent until an offi-
cer is at about CYOS = 10 years—a point where they are already half way to retirement, and 
thereby reluctant to leave the Air Force.  Since it is then true that this does not drive people to 
leave the Air Force, likely because the issues are apparent once it is too late economically to do 
so, I have relegated this discussion to this appendix. 
The evaluation system, embodied in form of a document known as the Officer Performance 
Report, is a curious thing.  As the primary tool for evaluation, it is assumed this is the means of 
providing feedback to an officer.  However, with over-exaggeration mandatory on all OPR’s (the 
first supervisor not to over-exaggerate will ruin their subordinate’s career), the evaluation system 
is broken.  The concern for most is that one supervisor, who is either a poor boss or simply a 
poor poet (and it is poetry that is required), can derail an entire career with one “bad” OPR.  Un-
fortunately, the first time an officer might realize that one of their past OPR’s is not quite up to 
par, it may be after a long commitment of 10 years to the Air Force, when they are now being 
considered for Major.  The feedback the OPR is meant to provide may not come until years later.   
It is for this reason that there is a lack of trust in the evaluation system, and therefore, the 
promotion system.110  Some open-ended comments stated they feel it is risky to remain in the Air 
Force under the current system.  The real problem is not trying to convince the Air Force that the 
OPR system is over-inflated and does not work right—this is widely accepted.  The problem is 
either finding a better solution, or having the courage to change the system. 
The promotion system, while it may consider OPR’s for higher ranking promotions, is 
largely time-based.  Second Lieutenants are promoted to First Lieutenant after 2 year, and then 
after another 2 years to Captain.  It is often said that you must try not to be promoted for these 
first ranks, for otherwise they are assured.  Once an officer becomes eligible for the Major pro-
motion, at about CYOS = 9 to 10 years, performance becomes a slight factor.  OPR’s are used in 
the Major promotion board, but gleaning the real performance out of a document known to be 
over-exaggerated is lucky at best.  In the end, the OPR, and therefore the Major’s performance, 
has only a small influence.  For Majors on schedule to be promoted (“In the Primary Zone”), the 
promotion rate was 92%111 in a recent review board.  No opportunity exists that would allow one 
                                                 
109 Source for all promotion rate data:  http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/offprom/default.htm and direct from AFPC 
110 According to Lin (Lin 54), many perceive it difficult to be promoted to Colonel or above because these ranks are 
filled mostly by pilots and other officers with operations experience. 
111 The in the primary zone promotion rate to Major from the 1 Nov 03 promotion board was about 92% for non-
rated mission support officers (which includes 61, 62, 63’s).  
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to be promoted to Major sooner than this zone and just one chance exists (“Above the Primary 
Zone”) to be promoted after, in case not selected previously when “In the Zone”.   
Accelerated promotions are not available until the rank of Lt Colonel (CYOS ≈ 15 years), 
where a “Below the Primary Zone” (“Below the Zone” for short) promotion is available, propel-
ling over-achievers as much as two years ahead of their contemporaries.  Even so, this acceler-
ated promotion is unlikely.112  In just a year or two, those mediocre candidates are still likely113 
to catch up, thereby erasing the short-term performance advantage.   
                                                 
112 The below the primary zone promotion rate to Lt Colonel from the 1 Mar 04 promotion board was about 3.2% for 
non-rated mission support officers (which includes 61, 62, 63’s). 
113 The in the primary zone promotion rate to Lt Colonel from the 1 Mar 04 promotion board was about 79% for 
non-rated mission support officers (which includes 61, 62, 63’s). 
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